Mercurial > ecos-v3_0-branch
changeset 1382:56b339272cd4
* include/net/if_gif.h include/net/if_sec.h include/net/zlib.h
include/netinet/ip_ecn.h include/netinet6/ah.h
include/netinet6/esp.h include/netinet6/esp_rijndael.h
include/netinet6/esp_twofish.h include/netinet6/in6_gif.h
include/netinet6/ipcomp.h include/netkey/key.h
include/netkey/key_debug.h include/netkey/keysock.h src/sys/netkey
src/sys/netinet/ip_ecn.c src/sys/netinet6/ah_core.c
src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c src/sys/netinet6/ah_output.c
src/sys/netinet6/esp_core.c src/sys/netinet6/esp_input.c
src/sys/netinet6/esp_output.c src/sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c
src/sys/netinet6/esp_twofish.c src/sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c
src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c
src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_output.c src/sys/netinet6/ipsec.c:
Added back the original KAME FreeBSD IPSEC files.
* cdl/freebsd_net.cdl: CDl to control the compilation of IPSEC
* include/sys/malloc.h: New memory type needed by IPSEC
* include/sys/param.h: Name munging for IPSEC symbols
* src/ecos/support.c: read_random_unlimited() should return the
number of random bytes in the buffer.
* src/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c: Added missing copyright header.
* src/sys/netinet/ip_output.c: Removed user() checks in IPSEC code.
* src/sys/netinet6/ip6_output.c: Compiler warning fixes.
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/ChangeLog +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,28 @@ +2003-11-22 Andrew Lunn <andrew.lunn@ascom.ch> + + * include/net/if_gif.h include/net/if_sec.h include/net/zlib.h + include/netinet/ip_ecn.h include/netinet6/ah.h + include/netinet6/esp.h include/netinet6/esp_rijndael.h + include/netinet6/esp_twofish.h include/netinet6/in6_gif.h + include/netinet6/ipcomp.h include/netkey/key.h + include/netkey/key_debug.h include/netkey/keysock.h src/sys/netkey + src/sys/netinet/ip_ecn.c src/sys/netinet6/ah_core.c + src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c src/sys/netinet6/ah_output.c + src/sys/netinet6/esp_core.c src/sys/netinet6/esp_input.c + src/sys/netinet6/esp_output.c src/sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c + src/sys/netinet6/esp_twofish.c src/sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c + src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c + src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_output.c src/sys/netinet6/ipsec.c: + Added back the original KAME FreeBSD IPSEC files. + * cdl/freebsd_net.cdl: CDl to control the compilation of IPSEC + * include/sys/malloc.h: New memory type needed by IPSEC + * include/sys/param.h: Name munging for IPSEC symbols + * src/ecos/support.c: read_random_unlimited() should return the + number of random bytes in the buffer. + * src/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c: Added missing copyright header. + * src/sys/netinet/ip_output.c: Removed user() checks in IPSEC code. + * src/sys/netinet6/ip6_output.c: Compiler warning fixes. + 2003-11-08 Andrew Lunn <andrew.lunn@ascom.ch> * src/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c (sysctl): Update the oldlen value at
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/cdl/freebsd_net.cdl +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/cdl/freebsd_net.cdl @@ -42,9 +42,18 @@ cdl_package CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_STACK { requires CYGPKG_IO_FILEIO description "Basic networking support, including TCP/IP." + cdl_interface CYGINT_NET_IPSEC_BSD_CRYPTO { + display "Implementation of BSD CRYPTO functions" + description " + In order to avoid potential export problems of crypto + functions, they are distributed in a separate package which + must implement this interface" + } + implements CYGPKG_NET_STACK implements CYGPKG_NET_STACK_INET implements CYGPKG_NET_STACK_INET6 + # Note: separating the stack implementation from the common support leads # to some rather incestious config file relationships. define_proc { @@ -152,6 +161,50 @@ cdl_package CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_STACK { ## sys/netinet6/ip6_fw.c \ ## } + cdl_option CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_IPSEC { + display "IPSEC support" + requires CYGPKG_COMPRESS_ZLIB + implements CYGPKG_NET_STACK_IPSEC + + flavor bool + default_value CYGPKG_NET_IPSEC_BSD_CRYPTO + + description " + This option enables support for IPSEC." + # These files were derived from FreeBSD/KAME and carry their copyright + compile \ + sys/netkey/key.c \ + sys/netkey/key_debug.c \ + sys/netkey/keydb.c\ + sys/netkey/keysock.c \ + sys/netinet6/ipsec.c \ + sys/netinet6/ah_core.c \ + sys/netinet6/ah_input.c \ + sys/netinet6/ah_output.c \ + sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c \ + sys/netinet6/esp_core.c \ + sys/netinet6/esp_output.c \ + sys/netinet6/esp_input.c \ + sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c \ + sys/netinet6/esp_twofish.c \ + sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c \ + sys/netinet6/ipcomp_output.c \ + sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c \ + sys/netinet/ip_ecn.c + } + cdl_option CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_IPSEC6 { + display "IPSEC support for IPv6" + active_if CYGPKG_NET_INET6 + active_if CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_IPSEC + + flavor bool + default_value 1 + description " + This option enables support for IPSEC with IPv6" + compile \ + sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c + + } cdl_option CYGPKG_NET_FREEBSD_SYSCTL { display "sysctl support" flavor bool
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/net/if_gif.h @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/net/ip_gif.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: if_gif.h,v 1.28 2001/10/23 12:41:29 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * if_gif.h + */ + +#ifndef _NET_IF_GIF_H_ +#define _NET_IF_GIF_H_ + +#include <netinet/in.h> +/* xxx sigh, why route have struct route instead of pointer? */ + +struct encaptab; + +struct gif_softc { + struct ifnet gif_if; /* common area - must be at the top */ + struct sockaddr *gif_psrc; /* Physical src addr */ + struct sockaddr *gif_pdst; /* Physical dst addr */ + union { + struct route gifscr_ro; /* xxx */ +#ifdef INET6 +#if defined(NEW_STRUCT_ROUTE) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) + struct route gifscr_ro6; /* xxx */ +#else + struct route_in6 gifscr_ro6; /* xxx */ +#endif +#endif + } gifsc_gifscr; + const struct encaptab *encap_cookie4; + const struct encaptab *encap_cookie6; +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4 + struct resource *r_unit; /* resource allocated for this unit */ +#endif + LIST_ENTRY(gif_softc) gif_list; /* all gif's are linked */ + + time_t rtcache_expire; /* expiration time of the cached route */ +}; + +#define gif_ro gifsc_gifscr.gifscr_ro +#ifdef INET6 +#define gif_ro6 gifsc_gifscr.gifscr_ro6 +#endif + +#define GIF_MTU (1280) /* Default MTU */ +#define GIF_MTU_MIN (1280) /* Minimum MTU */ +#define GIF_MTU_MAX (8192) /* Maximum MTU */ + +extern int ngif; +extern struct gif_softc *gif_softc; + +/* Prototypes */ +void gifattach0 __P((struct gif_softc *)); +#ifndef __OpenBSD__ +void gif_input __P((struct mbuf *, int, struct ifnet *)); +#endif +int gif_output __P((struct ifnet *, struct mbuf *, + struct sockaddr *, struct rtentry *)); +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ < 3 +int gif_ioctl __P((struct ifnet *, int, caddr_t)); +#else +int gif_ioctl __P((struct ifnet *, u_long, caddr_t)); +#endif +int gif_set_tunnel __P((struct ifnet *, struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *)); +void gif_delete_tunnel __P((struct ifnet *)); +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ +void gif_start __P((struct ifnet *)); +#endif +int gif_encapcheck __P((const struct mbuf *, int, int, void *)); + +#endif /* _NET_IF_GIF_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/net/if_sec.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/net/if_sec.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: if_sec.h,v 1.3 2001/07/27 09:54:51 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2001 WIDE Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _NET_IF_SEC_H_ +#define _NET_IF_SEC_H_ + +#include <net/if_gif.h> + +struct sec_softc { + struct gif_softc sc_gif; + int sc_refcnt; /* references other than ifchain */ +}; + +/* Prototypes */ +struct ifnet *sec_establish __P((struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *)); +int sec_demolish __P((struct ifnet *)); +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ < 3 +int sec_ioctl __P((struct ifnet *, int, caddr_t)); +#else +int sec_ioctl __P((struct ifnet *, u_long, caddr_t)); +#endif + +#endif /* _NET_IF_SEC_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/net/zlib.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +#ifndef CYGONCE_NET_BSD_TCPIP_NET_ZLIB_H +#define CYGONCE_NET_BSD_TCPIP_NET_ZLIB_H + +//========================================================================== +// +// include/net/zlib.h +// +// zlib compression +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD or other sources, +// and are covered by the appropriate copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== +//#####DESCRIPTIONBEGIN#### +// +// Author(s): Andrew Lunn +// Contributors: Andrew Lunn +// Date: 2003-11-08 +// Purpose: +// Description: +// +// +//####DESCRIPTIONEND#### +// +//========================================================================== + +#include <cyg/compress/zlib.h> + +#endif //CYGONCE_NET_BSD_TCPIP_NET_ZLIB_H + + + +
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet/ip_ecn.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet/ip_ecn.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ip_ecn.h,v 1.7 2001/12/06 02:18:47 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +/* + * ECN consideration on tunnel ingress/egress operation. + * http://www.aciri.org/floyd/papers/draft-ipsec-ecn-00.txt + */ + +#ifndef _NETINET_IP_ECN_H_ +#define _NETINET_IP_ECN_H_ + +#define ECN_ALLOWED 1 /* ECN allowed */ +#define ECN_FORBIDDEN 0 /* ECN forbidden */ +#define ECN_NOCARE (-1) /* no consideration to ECN */ + +#if defined(KERNEL) || defined(_KERNEL) +extern void ip_ecn_ingress __P((int, u_int8_t *, const u_int8_t *)); +extern void ip_ecn_egress __P((int, const u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +#ifdef INET6 +extern void ip6_ecn_ingress __P((int, u_int32_t *, const u_int32_t *)); +extern void ip6_ecn_egress __P((int, const u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *)); +#endif +#endif +#endif
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/ah.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/ah.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### + +/* $KAME: ah.h,v 1.16 2001/09/04 08:43:19 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. + */ + +#ifndef _NETINET6_AH_H_ +#define _NETINET6_AH_H_ + +struct ah { + u_int8_t ah_nxt; /* Next Header */ + u_int8_t ah_len; /* Length of data, in 32bit */ + u_int16_t ah_reserve; /* Reserved for future use */ + u_int32_t ah_spi; /* Security parameter index */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound*/ /* Authentication data */ +}; + +struct newah { + u_int8_t ah_nxt; /* Next Header */ + u_int8_t ah_len; /* Length of data + 1, in 32bit */ + u_int16_t ah_reserve; /* Reserved for future use */ + u_int32_t ah_spi; /* Security parameter index */ + u_int32_t ah_seq; /* Sequence number field */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound*/ /* Authentication data */ +}; + +#ifdef _KERNEL +struct secasvar; + +struct ah_algorithm_state { + struct secasvar *sav; + void* foo; /* per algorithm data - maybe */ +}; + +struct ah_algorithm { + int (*sumsiz) __P((struct secasvar *)); + int (*mature) __P((struct secasvar *)); + int keymin; /* in bits */ + int keymax; /* in bits */ + const char *name; + int (*init) __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, struct secasvar *)); + void (*update) __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, size_t)); + void (*result) __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +}; + +#define AH_MAXSUMSIZE 16 + +extern const struct ah_algorithm *ah_algorithm_lookup __P((int)); + +/* cksum routines */ +extern int ah_hdrlen __P((struct secasvar *)); + +extern size_t ah_hdrsiz __P((struct ipsecrequest *)); +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +extern void ah4_input __P((struct mbuf *, int)); +#else +extern void ah4_input __P((struct mbuf *, ...)); +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +extern int ah4_output __P((struct mbuf *, struct ipsecrequest *)); +extern int ah4_calccksum __P((struct mbuf *, caddr_t, size_t, + const struct ah_algorithm *, struct secasvar *)); + +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +extern void *ah4_ctlinput __P((int, struct sockaddr *, void *)); +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +extern int ah6_input __P((struct mbuf **, int *, int)); +extern int ah6_output __P((struct mbuf *, u_char *, struct mbuf *, + struct ipsecrequest *)); +extern int ah6_calccksum __P((struct mbuf *, caddr_t, size_t, + const struct ah_algorithm *, struct secasvar *)); + +extern void ah6_ctlinput __P((int, struct sockaddr *, void *)); +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#endif /* _KERNEL */ + +#endif /* _NETINET6_AH_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/esp.h @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/esp.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp.h,v 1.19 2001/09/04 08:43:19 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1827/2406 Encapsulated Security Payload. + */ + +#ifndef _NETINET6_ESP_H_ +#define _NETINET6_ESP_H_ + +struct esp { + u_int32_t esp_spi; /* ESP */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound */ /* Initialization Vector */ + /* variable size */ /* Payload data */ + /* variable size */ /* padding */ + /* 8bit */ /* pad size */ + /* 8bit */ /* next header */ + /* 8bit */ /* next header */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound */ /* Authentication data (new IPsec) */ +}; + +struct newesp { + u_int32_t esp_spi; /* ESP */ + u_int32_t esp_seq; /* Sequence number */ + /* variable size */ /* (IV and) Payload data */ + /* variable size */ /* padding */ + /* 8bit */ /* pad size */ + /* 8bit */ /* next header */ + /* 8bit */ /* next header */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound *//* Authentication data */ +}; + +struct esptail { + u_int8_t esp_padlen; /* pad length */ + u_int8_t esp_nxt; /* Next header */ + /* variable size, 32bit bound *//* Authentication data (new IPsec)*/ +}; + +#ifdef _KERNEL +struct secasvar; + +struct esp_algorithm { + size_t padbound; /* pad boundary, in byte */ + int ivlenval; /* iv length, in byte */ + int (*mature) __P((struct secasvar *)); + int keymin; /* in bits */ + int keymax; /* in bits */ + int (*schedlen) __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); + const char *name; + int (*ivlen) __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, struct secasvar *)); + int (*decrypt) __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); + int (*encrypt) __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); + /* not supposed to be called directly */ + int (*schedule) __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, struct secasvar *)); + int (*blockdecrypt) __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); + int (*blockencrypt) __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +}; + +extern const struct esp_algorithm *esp_algorithm_lookup __P((int)); +extern int esp_max_ivlen __P((void)); + +/* crypt routines */ +extern int esp4_output __P((struct mbuf *, struct ipsecrequest *)); +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +extern void esp4_input __P((struct mbuf *, int)); +#else +extern void esp4_input __P((struct mbuf *, ...)); +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +extern size_t esp_hdrsiz __P((struct ipsecrequest *)); + +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +extern void *esp4_ctlinput __P((int, struct sockaddr *, void *)); +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +extern int esp6_output __P((struct mbuf *, u_char *, struct mbuf *, + struct ipsecrequest *)); +extern int esp6_input __P((struct mbuf **, int *, int)); + +extern void esp6_ctlinput __P((int, struct sockaddr *, void *)); +#endif /* INET6 */ + +extern int esp_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, struct secasvar *)); +extern int esp_auth __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, size_t, + struct secasvar *, u_char *)); +#endif /* _KERNEL */ + +#endif /* _NETINET6_ESP_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/esp_rijndael.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/esp_rijndael.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_rijndael.h,v 1.1 2000/09/20 18:15:22 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. +s */ + +int esp_rijndael_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +int esp_rijndael_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +int esp_rijndael_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +int esp_rijndael_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *));
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/esp_twofish.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/esp_twofish.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_twofish.h,v 1.1 2000/09/20 18:15:23 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +int esp_twofish_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +int esp_twofish_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +int esp_twofish_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +int esp_twofish_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *));
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/in6_gif.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/in6_gif.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: in6_gif.h,v 1.10 2001/12/21 03:32:34 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _NETINET6_IN6_GIF_H_ +#define _NETINET6_IN6_GIF_H_ + +#define GIF_HLIM 30 +extern int ip6_gif_hlim; /* Hop limit for gif encap packet */ + +struct gif_softc; +struct sockaddr; +int in6_gif_input __P((struct mbuf **, int *, int)); +int in6_gif_output __P((struct ifnet *, int, struct mbuf *)); +int gif_encapcheck6 __P((const struct mbuf *, int, int, void *)); +int in6_gif_attach __P((struct gif_softc *)); +int in6_gif_detach __P((struct gif_softc *)); +void in6_gif_ctlinput __P((int, struct sockaddr *, void *)); + +#endif /* _NETINET6_IN6_GIF_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/ipcomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netinet6/ipcomp.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### + +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ipcomp.h,v 1.11 2001/09/04 08:43:19 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC2393 IP payload compression protocol (IPComp). + */ + +#ifndef _NETINET6_IPCOMP_H_ +#define _NETINET6_IPCOMP_H_ + +struct ipcomp { + u_int8_t comp_nxt; /* Next Header */ + u_int8_t comp_flags; /* reserved, must be zero */ + u_int16_t comp_cpi; /* Compression parameter index */ +}; + +/* well-known algorithm number (in CPI), from RFC2409 */ +#define IPCOMP_OUI 1 /* vendor specific */ +#define IPCOMP_DEFLATE 2 /* RFC2394 */ +#define IPCOMP_LZS 3 /* RFC2395 */ +#define IPCOMP_MAX 4 + +#define IPCOMP_CPI_NEGOTIATE_MIN 256 + +#if defined(KERNEL) || defined(_KERNEL) +struct ipcomp_algorithm { + int (*compress) __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, size_t *)); + int (*decompress) __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, size_t *)); + size_t minplen; /* minimum required length for compression */ +}; + +struct ipsecrequest; +extern const struct ipcomp_algorithm *ipcomp_algorithm_lookup __P((int)); +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +extern void ipcomp4_input __P((struct mbuf *, int)); +#else +extern void ipcomp4_input __P((struct mbuf *, ...)); +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +extern int ipcomp4_output __P((struct mbuf *, struct ipsecrequest *)); +#ifdef INET6 +extern int ipcomp6_input __P((struct mbuf **, int *, int)); +extern int ipcomp6_output __P((struct mbuf *, u_char *, struct mbuf *, + struct ipsecrequest *)); +#endif +#endif /* KERNEL */ + +#endif /* _NETINET6_IPCOMP_H_ */
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/ipsec.h +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netinet6/ipsec.h @@ -57,18 +57,6 @@ #ifndef _NETINET6_IPSEC_H_ #define _NETINET6_IPSEC_H_ -#if defined(_KERNEL) && !defined(_LKM) && !defined(KLD_MODULE) -#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 -#include "opt_inet.h" -#include "opt_inet6.h" -#include "opt_ipsec.h" -#endif -#if defined(__NetBSD__) -#include "opt_inet.h" -#include "opt_ipsec.h" -#endif -#endif - #include <net/pfkeyv2.h> #include <netkey/keydb.h>
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netkey/key.h @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netkey/key.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: key.h,v 1.21 2001/07/27 03:51:30 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _NETKEY_KEY_H_ +#define _NETKEY_KEY_H_ + +#ifdef _KERNEL + +extern struct key_cb key_cb; + +struct secpolicy; +struct secpolicyindex; +struct ipsecrequest; +struct secasvar; +struct sockaddr; +struct socket; +struct sadb_msg; +struct sadb_x_policy; + +extern struct secpolicy *key_allocsp __P((struct secpolicyindex *, u_int)); +extern struct secpolicy *key_gettunnel __P((struct sockaddr *, + struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *)); +extern int key_checkrequest + __P((struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasindex *)); +extern struct secasvar *key_allocsa __P((u_int, caddr_t, caddr_t, + u_int, u_int32_t)); +extern void key_freesp __P((struct secpolicy *)); +extern void key_freeso __P((struct socket *)); +extern void key_freesav __P((struct secasvar *)); +extern struct secpolicy *key_newsp __P((void)); +extern struct secpolicy *key_msg2sp __P((struct sadb_x_policy *, + size_t, int *)); +extern struct mbuf *key_sp2msg __P((struct secpolicy *)); +extern int key_ismyaddr __P((struct sockaddr *)); +extern int key_cmpspidx_exactly + __P((struct secpolicyindex *, struct secpolicyindex *)); +extern int key_cmpspidx_withmask + __P((struct secpolicyindex *, struct secpolicyindex *)); +extern int key_spdacquire __P((struct secpolicy *)); +extern void key_timehandler __P((void)); +extern u_long key_random __P((void)); +extern void key_randomfill __P((void *, size_t)); +extern void key_freereg __P((struct socket *)); +extern int key_parse __P((struct mbuf *, struct socket *)); +extern void key_init __P((void)); +extern int key_checktunnelsanity __P((struct secasvar *, u_int, + caddr_t, caddr_t)); +extern void key_sa_recordxfer __P((struct secasvar *, struct mbuf *)); +extern void key_sa_routechange __P((struct sockaddr *)); +extern void key_sa_stir_iv __P((struct secasvar *)); + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#ifdef MALLOC_DECLARE +MALLOC_DECLARE(M_SECA); +#endif /* MALLOC_DECLARE */ +#endif + +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(__NetBSD__) +extern int key_sysctl __P((int *, u_int, void *, size_t *, void *, size_t)); +#endif + +#endif /* defined(_KERNEL) */ +#endif /* _NETKEY_KEY_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netkey/key_debug.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netkey/key_debug.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: key_debug.h,v 1.10 2001/08/05 08:37:52 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _NETKEY_KEY_DEBUG_H_ +#define _NETKEY_KEY_DEBUG_H_ + +#ifdef _KERNEL +/* debug flags */ +#define KEYDEBUG_STAMP 0x00000001 /* path */ +#define KEYDEBUG_DATA 0x00000002 /* data */ +#define KEYDEBUG_DUMP 0x00000004 /* dump */ + +#define KEYDEBUG_KEY 0x00000010 /* key processing */ +#define KEYDEBUG_ALG 0x00000020 /* ciph & auth algorithm */ +#define KEYDEBUG_IPSEC 0x00000040 /* ipsec processing */ + +#define KEYDEBUG_KEY_STAMP (KEYDEBUG_KEY | KEYDEBUG_STAMP) +#define KEYDEBUG_KEY_DATA (KEYDEBUG_KEY | KEYDEBUG_DATA) +#define KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP (KEYDEBUG_KEY | KEYDEBUG_DUMP) +#define KEYDEBUG_ALG_STAMP (KEYDEBUG_ALG | KEYDEBUG_STAMP) +#define KEYDEBUG_ALG_DATA (KEYDEBUG_ALG | KEYDEBUG_DATA) +#define KEYDEBUG_ALG_DUMP (KEYDEBUG_ALG | KEYDEBUG_DUMP) +#define KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP (KEYDEBUG_IPSEC | KEYDEBUG_STAMP) +#define KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA (KEYDEBUG_IPSEC | KEYDEBUG_DATA) +#define KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP (KEYDEBUG_IPSEC | KEYDEBUG_DUMP) + +#define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg) \ + do { if ((key_debug_level & (lev)) == (lev)) { arg; } } while (0) + +extern u_int32_t key_debug_level; +#endif /*_KERNEL*/ + +struct sadb_msg; +struct sadb_ext; +extern void kdebug_sadb __P((struct sadb_msg *)); +extern void kdebug_sadb_x_policy __P((struct sadb_ext *)); + +#ifdef _KERNEL +struct secpolicy; +struct secpolicyindex; +struct secasindex; +struct secasvar; +struct secreplay; +struct mbuf; +extern void kdebug_secpolicy __P((struct secpolicy *)); +extern void kdebug_secpolicyindex __P((struct secpolicyindex *)); +extern void kdebug_secasindex __P((struct secasindex *)); +extern void kdebug_secasv __P((struct secasvar *)); +extern void kdebug_mbufhdr __P((struct mbuf *)); +extern void kdebug_mbuf __P((struct mbuf *)); +#endif /*_KERNEL*/ + +struct sockaddr; +extern void kdebug_sockaddr __P((struct sockaddr *)); + +extern void ipsec_hexdump __P((caddr_t, int)); +extern void ipsec_bindump __P((caddr_t, int)); + +#endif /* _NETKEY_KEY_DEBUG_H_ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/netkey/keysock.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// include/netkey/keysock.h +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: keysock.h,v 1.8 2000/03/27 05:11:06 sumikawa Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _NETKEY_KEYSOCK_H_ +#define _NETKEY_KEYSOCK_H_ + +/* statistics for pfkey socket */ +struct pfkeystat { + /* kernel -> userland */ + u_quad_t out_total; /* # of total calls */ + u_quad_t out_bytes; /* total bytecount */ + u_quad_t out_msgtype[256]; /* message type histogram */ + u_quad_t out_invlen; /* invalid length field */ + u_quad_t out_invver; /* invalid version field */ + u_quad_t out_invmsgtype; /* invalid message type field */ + u_quad_t out_tooshort; /* msg too short */ + u_quad_t out_nomem; /* memory allocation failure */ + u_quad_t out_dupext; /* duplicate extension */ + u_quad_t out_invexttype; /* invalid extension type */ + u_quad_t out_invsatype; /* invalid sa type */ + u_quad_t out_invaddr; /* invalid address extension */ + /* userland -> kernel */ + u_quad_t in_total; /* # of total calls */ + u_quad_t in_bytes; /* total bytecount */ + u_quad_t in_msgtype[256]; /* message type histogram */ + u_quad_t in_msgtarget[3]; /* one/all/registered */ + u_quad_t in_nomem; /* memory allocation failure */ + /* others */ + u_quad_t sockerr; /* # of socket related errors */ +}; + +#define KEY_SENDUP_ONE 0 +#define KEY_SENDUP_ALL 1 +#define KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED 2 + +#ifdef _KERNEL +struct keycb { + struct rawcb kp_raw; /* rawcb */ + int kp_promisc; /* promiscuous mode */ + int kp_registered; /* registered socket */ +}; + +extern struct pfkeystat pfkeystat; + +extern int key_output __P((struct mbuf *, ...)); +#ifndef __NetBSD__ +extern int key_usrreq __P((struct socket *, + int, struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *)); +#else +extern int key_usrreq __P((struct socket *, + int, struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, struct proc *)); +#endif + +extern int key_sendup __P((struct socket *, struct sadb_msg *, u_int, int)); +extern int key_sendup_mbuf __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, int)); +#endif /* _KERNEL */ + +#endif /*_NETKEY_KEYSOCK_H_*/
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/sys/malloc.h +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/sys/malloc.h @@ -62,5 +62,6 @@ externC void cyg_net_free(caddr_t addr, #define M_FTABLE 88 #define M_SYSCTLOID 100 #define M_SYSCTL 101 +#define M_SECA 102 #endif // _SYS_MALLOC_H_
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/sys/param.h +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/include/sys/param.h @@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ // polution to a minimum // TEXT symbols -#define MD5Final cyg_MD5Final -#define MD5Init cyg_MD5Init -#define MD5Pad cyg_MD5Pad -#define MD5Transform cyg_MD5Transform -#define MD5Update cyg_MD5Update #define _ip_mcast_src cyg__ip_mcast_src #define _ip_mforward cyg__ip_mforward #define _ip_mrouter_done cyg__ip_mrouter_done @@ -704,6 +699,65 @@ #define udpstat cyg_udpstat #endif +// Symbols from the BSD_CRYPTO package + +// TEXT symbols + +#define SHA256_Data cyg_SHA256_Data +#define SHA256_End cyg_SHA256_End +#define SHA256_Final cyg_SHA256_Final +#define SHA256_Init cyg_SHA256_Init +#define SHA256_Transform cyg_SHA256_Transform +#define SHA256_Update cyg_SHA256_Update +#define SHA384_Data cyg_SHA384_Data +#define SHA384_End cyg_SHA384_End +#define SHA384_Final cyg_SHA384_Final +#define SHA384_Init cyg_SHA384_Init +#define SHA384_Update cyg_SHA384_Update +#define SHA512_Data cyg_SHA512_Data +#define SHA512_End cyg_SHA512_End +#define SHA512_Final cyg_SHA512_Final +#define SHA512_Init cyg_SHA512_Init +#define SHA512_Last cyg_SHA512_Last +#define SHA512_Transform cyg_SHA512_Transform +#define SHA512_Update cyg_SHA512_Update +#define md5_init cyg_md5_init +#define md5_loop cyg_md5_loop +#define md5_pad cyg_md5_pad +#define md5_result cyg_md5_result +#define sha1_init cyg_sha1_init +#define sha1_loop cyg_sha1_loop +#define sha1_pad cyg_sha1_pad +#define sha1_result cyg_sha1_result +#define cast128_decrypt_round12 cyg_cast128_decrypt_round12 +#define cast128_decrypt_round16 cyg_cast128_decrypt_round16 +#define cast128_encrypt_round12 cyg_cast128_encrypt_round12 +#define cast128_encrypt_round16 cyg_cast128_encrypt_round16 +#define set_cast128_subkey cyg_set_cast128_subkey +#define twofish_TableOp cyg_twofish_TableOp +#define twofish_blockDecrypt cyg_twofish_blockDecrypt +#define twofish_blockEncrypt cyg_twofish_blockEncrypt +#define twofish_cipherInit cyg_twofish_cipherInit +#define twofish_makeKey cyg_twofish_makeKey +#define twofish_reKey cyg_twofish_reKey +#define rijndaelDecrypt cyg_rijndaelDecrypt +#define rijndaelEncrypt cyg_rijndaelEncrypt +#define rijndaelKeyEncToDec cyg_rijndaelKeyEncToDec +#define rijndaelKeySched cyg_rijndaelKeySched +#define rijndael_blockDecrypt cyg_rijndael_blockDecrypt +#define rijndael_blockEncrypt cyg_rijndael_blockEncrypt +#define rijndael_cipherInit cyg_rijndael_cipherInit +#define rijndael_makeKey cyg_rijndael_makeKey +#define rijndael_padDecrypt cyg_rijndael_padDecrypt +#define rijndael_padEncrypt cyg_rijndael_padEncrypt + +// Data symbols + +#define numRounds cyg_numRounds + +// BSS symbols + + #include <pkgconf/net.h> #include <cyg/infra/cyg_type.h> // Standard eCos types @@ -878,7 +932,7 @@ extern void get_mono_time(void); extern int arc4random(void); extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); extern void read_random(void *buf, size_t len); -extern void read_random_unlimited(void *buf, size_t len); +extern int read_random_unlimited(void *buf, size_t len); extern void *hashinit(int elements, void *type, u_long *hashmask); // Initialization support - cross between RedBoot & FreeBSD
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/ecos/support.c +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/ecos/support.c @@ -556,10 +556,11 @@ get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) } } -void +int read_random_unlimited(void *buf, size_t len) { get_random_bytes(buf, len); + return len; } void read_random(void *buf, size_t len)
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/kern/kern_sysctl.c @@ -1,3 +1,24 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/kern/kerm_sysctl.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + /*- * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet/ip_ecn.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet/ip_ecn.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ip_ecn.c,v 1.11 2001/05/03 16:09:29 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +/* + * ECN consideration on tunnel ingress/egress operation. + * http://www.aciri.org/floyd/papers/draft-ipsec-ecn-00.txt + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> + +/* + * modify outer ECN (TOS) field on ingress operation (tunnel encapsulation). + */ +void +ip_ecn_ingress(mode, outer, inner) + int mode; + u_int8_t *outer; + const u_int8_t *inner; +{ + if (!outer || !inner) + panic("NULL pointer passed to ip_ecn_ingress"); + + *outer = *inner; + switch (mode) { + case ECN_ALLOWED: /* ECN allowed */ + *outer &= ~IPTOS_CE; + break; + case ECN_FORBIDDEN: /* ECN forbidden */ + *outer &= ~(IPTOS_ECT | IPTOS_CE); + break; + case ECN_NOCARE: /* no consideration to ECN */ + break; + } +} + +/* + * modify inner ECN (TOS) field on egress operation (tunnel decapsulation). + */ +void +ip_ecn_egress(mode, outer, inner) + int mode; + const u_int8_t *outer; + u_int8_t *inner; +{ + if (!outer || !inner) + panic("NULL pointer passed to ip_ecn_egress"); + + switch (mode) { + case ECN_ALLOWED: + if (*outer & IPTOS_CE) + *inner |= IPTOS_CE; + break; + case ECN_FORBIDDEN: /* ECN forbidden */ + case ECN_NOCARE: /* no consideration to ECN */ + break; + } +} + +#ifdef INET6 +void +ip6_ecn_ingress(mode, outer, inner) + int mode; + u_int32_t *outer; + const u_int32_t *inner; +{ + u_int8_t outer8, inner8; + + if (!outer || !inner) + panic("NULL pointer passed to ip6_ecn_ingress"); + + inner8 = (ntohl(*inner) >> 20) & 0xff; + ip_ecn_ingress(mode, &outer8, &inner8); + *outer &= ~htonl(0xff << 20); + *outer |= htonl((u_int32_t)outer8 << 20); +} + +void +ip6_ecn_egress(mode, outer, inner) + int mode; + const u_int32_t *outer; + u_int32_t *inner; +{ + u_int8_t outer8, inner8; + + if (!outer || !inner) + panic("NULL pointer passed to ip6_ecn_egress"); + + outer8 = (ntohl(*outer) >> 20) & 0xff; + ip_ecn_egress(mode, &outer8, &inner8); + *inner &= ~htonl(0xff << 20); + *inner |= htonl((u_int32_t)inner8 << 20); +} +#endif
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet/ip_output.c +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet/ip_output.c @@ -1249,8 +1249,7 @@ ip_ctloutput(so, sopt) break; if ((error = soopt_mcopyin(sopt, m)) != 0) /* XXX */ break; - priv = (sopt->sopt_p != NULL && - suser(sopt->sopt_p) != 0) ? 0 : 1; + priv = 1; req = mtod(m, caddr_t); len = m->m_len; optname = sopt->sopt_name; @@ -1350,6 +1349,17 @@ ip_ctloutput(so, sopt) struct mbuf *m = NULL; caddr_t req = NULL; size_t len = 0; + size_t ovalsize = sopt->sopt_valsize; + caddr_t oval = (caddr_t)sopt->sopt_val; + + error = soopt_getm(sopt, &m); /* XXX */ + if (error != 0) + break; + error = soopt_mcopyin(sopt, m); /* XXX */ + if (error != 0) + break; + sopt->sopt_valsize = ovalsize; + sopt->sopt_val = oval; if (m != 0) { req = mtod(m, caddr_t);
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ah_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,1666 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ah_core.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ah_core.c,v 1.47 2001/10/29 04:43:08 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. + */ + +/* TODO: have shared routines for hmac-* algorithms */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +#include <sys/kernel.h> +#endif + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#endif +#include <net/pfkeyv2.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#ifdef HAVE_MD5 +#include <sys/md5.h> +#else +#include <crypto/md5.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHA1 +#include <sys/sha1.h> +#define SHA1_RESULTLEN 20 +#else +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#endif +#include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h> + +#define HMACSIZE 16 + +static int ah_sumsiz_1216 __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_sumsiz_zero __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_none_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_none_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_none_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, size_t)); +static void ah_none_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_keyed_md5_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_keyed_md5_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_keyed_md5_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_keyed_md5_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_keyed_sha1_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_keyed_sha1_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_keyed_sha1_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_keyed_sha1_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_hmac_md5_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_hmac_md5_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_hmac_md5_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_hmac_md5_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_hmac_sha1_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_hmac_sha1_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_hmac_sha1_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_hmac_sha1_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_256_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_256_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_256_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_384_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_384_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_384_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int ah_hmac_sha2_512_init __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, + struct secasvar *)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_512_loop __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t, + size_t)); +static void ah_hmac_sha2_512_result __P((struct ah_algorithm_state *, caddr_t)); + +static void ah_update_mbuf __P((struct mbuf *, int, int, + const struct ah_algorithm *, struct ah_algorithm_state *)); + +const struct ah_algorithm * +ah_algorithm_lookup(idx) + int idx; +{ + /* checksum algorithms */ + static struct ah_algorithm ah_algorithms[] = { + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_hmac_md5_mature, 128, 128, "hmac-md5", + ah_hmac_md5_init, ah_hmac_md5_loop, + ah_hmac_md5_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_hmac_sha1_mature, 160, 160, "hmac-sha1", + ah_hmac_sha1_init, ah_hmac_sha1_loop, + ah_hmac_sha1_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_keyed_md5_mature, 128, 128, "keyed-md5", + ah_keyed_md5_init, ah_keyed_md5_loop, + ah_keyed_md5_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_keyed_sha1_mature, 160, 160, "keyed-sha1", + ah_keyed_sha1_init, ah_keyed_sha1_loop, + ah_keyed_sha1_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_zero, ah_none_mature, 0, 2048, "none", + ah_none_init, ah_none_loop, ah_none_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature, 256, 256, + "hmac-sha2-256", + ah_hmac_sha2_256_init, ah_hmac_sha2_256_loop, + ah_hmac_sha2_256_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature, 384, 384, + "hmac-sha2-384", + ah_hmac_sha2_384_init, ah_hmac_sha2_384_loop, + ah_hmac_sha2_384_result, }, + { ah_sumsiz_1216, ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature, 512, 512, + "hmac-sha2-512", + ah_hmac_sha2_512_init, ah_hmac_sha2_512_loop, + ah_hmac_sha2_512_result, }, + }; + + switch (idx) { + case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: + return &ah_algorithms[0]; + case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: + return &ah_algorithms[1]; + case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: + return &ah_algorithms[2]; + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: + return &ah_algorithms[3]; + case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: + return &ah_algorithms[4]; + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: + return &ah_algorithms[5]; + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: + return &ah_algorithms[6]; + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: + return &ah_algorithms[7]; + default: + return NULL; + } +} + + +static int +ah_sumsiz_1216(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + if (!sav) + return -1; + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) + return 16; + else + return 12; +} + +static int +ah_sumsiz_zero(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + if (!sav) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_none_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + if (sav->sah->saidx.proto == IPPROTO_AH) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_none_mature: protocol and algorithm mismatch.\n")); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_none_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + state->foo = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_none_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ +} + +static void +ah_none_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ +} + +static int +ah_keyed_md5_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + /* anything is okay */ + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_keyed_md5_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + size_t padlen; + size_t keybitlen; + u_int8_t buf[32]; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_keyed_md5_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(sizeof(MD5_CTX), M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (state->foo == NULL) + return ENOBUFS; + + MD5Init((MD5_CTX *)state->foo); + if (state->sav) { + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, + (u_int8_t *)_KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + (u_int)_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + + /* + * Pad after the key. + * We cannot simply use md5_pad() since the function + * won't update the total length. + */ + if (_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth) < 56) + padlen = 64 - 8 - _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + else + padlen = 64 + 64 - 8 - _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + keybitlen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + keybitlen *= 8; + + buf[0] = 0x80; + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, &buf[0], 1); + padlen--; + + bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + while (sizeof(buf) < padlen) { + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, &buf[0], sizeof(buf)); + padlen -= sizeof(buf); + } + if (padlen) { + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, &buf[0], padlen); + } + + buf[0] = (keybitlen >> 0) & 0xff; + buf[1] = (keybitlen >> 8) & 0xff; + buf[2] = (keybitlen >> 16) & 0xff; + buf[3] = (keybitlen >> 24) & 0xff; + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, buf, 8); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_keyed_md5_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + if (!state) + panic("ah_keyed_md5_loop: what?"); + + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, addr, len); +} + +static void +ah_keyed_md5_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[16]; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_keyed_md5_result: what?"); + + if (state->sav) { + MD5Update((MD5_CTX *)state->foo, + (u_int8_t *)_KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + (u_int)_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + } + MD5Final(&digest[0], (MD5_CTX *)state->foo); + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, sizeof(digest)); +} + +static int +ah_keyed_sha1_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_keyed_sha1_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_keyed_sha1_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin + || algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_keyed_sha1_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_keyed_sha1_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + size_t padlen; + size_t keybitlen; + u_int8_t buf[32]; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_keyed_sha1_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(sizeof(SHA1_CTX), M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)state->foo; + SHA1Init(ctxt); + + if (state->sav) { + SHA1Update(ctxt, (u_int8_t *)_KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + (u_int)_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + + /* + * Pad after the key. + */ + if (_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth) < 56) + padlen = 64 - 8 - _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + else + padlen = 64 + 64 - 8 - _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + keybitlen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + keybitlen *= 8; + + buf[0] = 0x80; + SHA1Update(ctxt, &buf[0], 1); + padlen--; + + bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + while (sizeof(buf) < padlen) { + SHA1Update(ctxt, &buf[0], sizeof(buf)); + padlen -= sizeof(buf); + } + if (padlen) { + SHA1Update(ctxt, &buf[0], padlen); + } + + buf[0] = (keybitlen >> 0) & 0xff; + buf[1] = (keybitlen >> 8) & 0xff; + buf[2] = (keybitlen >> 16) & 0xff; + buf[3] = (keybitlen >> 24) & 0xff; + SHA1Update(ctxt, buf, 8); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_keyed_sha1_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_keyed_sha1_loop: what?"); + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)state->foo; + + SHA1Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)addr, (size_t)len); +} + +static void +ah_keyed_sha1_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[SHA1_RESULTLEN]; /* SHA-1 generates 160 bits */ + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_keyed_sha1_result: what?"); + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)state->foo; + + if (state->sav) { + SHA1Update(ctxt, (u_int8_t *)_KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + (u_int)_KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + } + SHA1Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +ah_hmac_md5_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_hmac_md5_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_hmac_md5_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin + || algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_md5_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_hmac_md5_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + u_char tk[16]; + u_char *key; + size_t keylen; + size_t i; + MD5_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_hmac_md5_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(64 + 64 + sizeof(MD5_CTX), M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (MD5_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + /* compress the key if necessery */ + if (64 < _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)) { + MD5Init(ctxt); + MD5Update(ctxt, _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + MD5Final(&tk[0], ctxt); + key = &tk[0]; + keylen = 16; + } else { + key = _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth); + keylen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + } + + bzero(ipad, 64); + bzero(opad, 64); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + MD5Init(ctxt); + MD5Update(ctxt, ipad, 64); + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_hmac_md5_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + MD5_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_md5_loop: what?"); + ctxt = (MD5_CTX *)(((caddr_t)state->foo) + 128); + MD5Update(ctxt, addr, len); +} + +static void +ah_hmac_md5_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[16]; + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + MD5_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_md5_result: what?"); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (MD5_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + MD5Final(&digest[0], ctxt); + + MD5Init(ctxt); + MD5Update(ctxt, opad, 64); + MD5Update(ctxt, &digest[0], sizeof(digest)); + MD5Final(&digest[0], ctxt); + + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha1_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_hmac_sha1_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah_hmac_sha1_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin + || algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha1_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha1_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + u_char tk[SHA1_RESULTLEN]; /* SHA-1 generates 160 bits */ + u_char *key; + size_t keylen; + size_t i; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_hmac_sha1_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA1_CTX), + M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + /* compress the key if necessery */ + if (64 < _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)) { + SHA1Init(ctxt); + SHA1Update(ctxt, _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + SHA1Final(&tk[0], ctxt); + key = &tk[0]; + keylen = SHA1_RESULTLEN; + } else { + key = _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth); + keylen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + } + + bzero(ipad, 64); + bzero(opad, 64); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + SHA1Init(ctxt); + SHA1Update(ctxt, ipad, 64); + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha1_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha1_loop: what?"); + + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)(((u_char *)state->foo) + 128); + SHA1Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)addr, (size_t)len); +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha1_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[SHA1_RESULTLEN]; /* SHA-1 generates 160 bits */ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA1_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha1_result: what?"); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA1_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + SHA1Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + SHA1Init(ctxt); + SHA1Update(ctxt, opad, 64); + SHA1Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)&digest[0], sizeof(digest)); + SHA1Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin || + algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_256_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_256_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA256_CTX *ctxt; + u_char tk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *key; + size_t keylen; + size_t i; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_256_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA256_CTX), + M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA256_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + /* compress the key if necessery */ + if (64 < _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)) { + bzero(tk, sizeof(tk)); + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA256_Init(ctxt); + SHA256_Update(ctxt, _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + SHA256_Final(&tk[0], ctxt); + key = &tk[0]; + keylen = sizeof(tk) < 64 ? sizeof(tk) : 64; + } else { + key = _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth); + keylen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + } + + bzero(ipad, 64); + bzero(opad, 64); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA256_Init(ctxt); + SHA256_Update(ctxt, ipad, 64); + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_256_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + SHA256_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_256_loop: what?"); + + ctxt = (SHA256_CTX *)(((u_char *)state->foo) + 128); + SHA256_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)addr, (size_t)len); +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_256_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA256_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_256_result: what?"); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA256_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + SHA256_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA256_Init(ctxt); + SHA256_Update(ctxt, opad, 64); + SHA256_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)&digest[0], sizeof(digest)); + SHA256_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin || + algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_384_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_384_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA384_CTX *ctxt; + u_char tk[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *key; + size_t keylen; + size_t i; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_384_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA384_CTX), + M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + bzero(state->foo, 64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA384_CTX)); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA384_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + /* compress the key if necessery */ + if (64 < _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)) { + bzero(tk, sizeof(tk)); + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA384_Init(ctxt); + SHA384_Update(ctxt, _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + SHA384_Final(&tk[0], ctxt); + key = &tk[0]; + keylen = sizeof(tk) < 64 ? sizeof(tk) : 64; + } else { + key = _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth); + keylen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + } + + bzero(ipad, 64); + bzero(opad, 64); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA384_Init(ctxt); + SHA384_Update(ctxt, ipad, 64); + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_384_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + SHA384_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_384_loop: what?"); + + ctxt = (SHA384_CTX *)(((u_char *)state->foo) + 128); + SHA384_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)addr, (size_t)len); +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_384_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA384_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_384_result: what?"); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA384_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + SHA384_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA384_Init(ctxt); + SHA384_Update(ctxt, opad, 64); + SHA384_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)&digest[0], sizeof(digest)); + SHA384_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + + if (!sav->key_auth) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits < algo->keymin || + algo->keymax < sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah_hmac_sha2_512_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ah_hmac_sha2_512_init(state, sav) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA512_CTX *ctxt; + u_char tk[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *key; + size_t keylen; + size_t i; + + if (!state) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_512_init: what?"); + + state->sav = sav; + state->foo = (void *)malloc(64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA512_CTX), + M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!state->foo) + return ENOBUFS; + bzero(state->foo, 64 + 64 + sizeof(SHA512_CTX)); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA512_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + /* compress the key if necessery */ + if (64 < _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)) { + bzero(tk, sizeof(tk)); + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA512_Init(ctxt); + SHA512_Update(ctxt, _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth), + _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth)); + SHA512_Final(&tk[0], ctxt); + key = &tk[0]; + keylen = sizeof(tk) < 64 ? sizeof(tk) : 64; + } else { + key = _KEYBUF(state->sav->key_auth); + keylen = _KEYLEN(state->sav->key_auth); + } + + bzero(ipad, 64); + bzero(opad, 64); + bcopy(key, ipad, keylen); + bcopy(key, opad, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + opad[i] ^= 0x5c; + } + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA512_Init(ctxt); + SHA512_Update(ctxt, ipad, 64); + + return 0; +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_512_loop(state, addr, len) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; + size_t len; +{ + SHA512_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_512_loop: what?"); + + ctxt = (SHA512_CTX *)(((u_char *)state->foo) + 128); + SHA512_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)addr, (size_t)len); +} + +static void +ah_hmac_sha2_512_result(state, addr) + struct ah_algorithm_state *state; + caddr_t addr; +{ + u_char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char *ipad; + u_char *opad; + SHA512_CTX *ctxt; + + if (!state || !state->foo) + panic("ah_hmac_sha2_512_result: what?"); + + ipad = (u_char *)state->foo; + opad = (u_char *)(ipad + 64); + ctxt = (SHA512_CTX *)(opad + 64); + + SHA512_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bzero(ctxt, sizeof(*ctxt)); + SHA512_Init(ctxt); + SHA512_Update(ctxt, opad, 64); + SHA512_Update(ctxt, (caddr_t)&digest[0], sizeof(digest)); + SHA512_Final((caddr_t)&digest[0], ctxt); + + bcopy(&digest[0], (void *)addr, HMACSIZE); + + free(state->foo, M_TEMP); +} + +/*------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/* + * go generate the checksum. + */ +static void +ah_update_mbuf(m, off, len, algo, algos) + struct mbuf *m; + int off; + int len; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + struct ah_algorithm_state *algos; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + int tlen; + + /* easy case first */ + if (off + len <= m->m_len) { + (algo->update)(algos, mtod(m, caddr_t) + off, len); + return; + } + + for (n = m; n; n = n->m_next) { + if (off < n->m_len) + break; + + off -= n->m_len; + } + + if (!n) + panic("ah_update_mbuf: wrong offset specified"); + + for (/* nothing */; n && len > 0; n = n->m_next) { + if (n->m_len == 0) + continue; + if (n->m_len - off < len) + tlen = n->m_len - off; + else + tlen = len; + + (algo->update)(algos, mtod(n, caddr_t) + off, tlen); + + len -= tlen; + off = 0; + } +} + +#ifdef INET +/* + * Go generate the checksum. This function won't modify the mbuf chain + * except AH itself. + * + * NOTE: the function does not free mbuf on failure. + * Don't use m_copy(), it will try to share cluster mbuf by using refcnt. + */ +int +ah4_calccksum(m, ahdat, len, algo, sav) + struct mbuf *m; + caddr_t ahdat; + size_t len; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int off; + int hdrtype; + size_t advancewidth; + struct ah_algorithm_state algos; + u_char sumbuf[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + int error = 0; + int ahseen; + struct mbuf *n = NULL; + + if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) + return EINVAL; + + ahseen = 0; + hdrtype = -1; /* dummy, it is called IPPROTO_IP */ + + off = 0; + + error = (algo->init)(&algos, sav); + if (error) + return error; + + advancewidth = 0; /* safety */ + +again: + /* gory. */ + switch (hdrtype) { + case -1: /* first one only */ + { + /* + * copy ip hdr, modify to fit the AH checksum rule, + * then take a checksum. + */ + struct ip iphdr; + size_t hlen; + + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(iphdr), (caddr_t)&iphdr); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(iphdr.ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = iphdr.ip_hl << 2; +#endif + iphdr.ip_ttl = 0; + iphdr.ip_sum = htons(0); + if (ip4_ah_cleartos) + iphdr.ip_tos = 0; + iphdr.ip_off = htons(ntohs(iphdr.ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); + (algo->update)(&algos, (caddr_t)&iphdr, sizeof(struct ip)); + + if (hlen != sizeof(struct ip)) { + u_char *p; + int i, l, skip; + + if (hlen > MCLBYTES) { + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && hlen > MLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (n == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_copydata(m, off, hlen, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + + /* + * IP options processing. + * See RFC2402 appendix A. + */ + p = mtod(n, u_char *); + i = sizeof(struct ip); + while (i < hlen) { + if (i + IPOPT_OPTVAL >= hlen) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah4_calccksum: " + "invalid IP option\n")); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + if (p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL] == IPOPT_EOL || + p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL] == IPOPT_NOP || + i + IPOPT_OLEN < hlen) + ; + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah4_calccksum: invalid IP option " + "(type=%02x)\n", + p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL])); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + skip = 1; + switch (p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL]) { + case IPOPT_EOL: + case IPOPT_NOP: + l = 1; + skip = 0; + break; + case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ + case 0x85: /* Extended security */ + case 0x86: /* Commercial security */ + case 0x94: /* Router alert */ + case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ + l = p[i + IPOPT_OLEN]; + if (l < 2) + goto invalopt; + skip = 0; + break; + default: + l = p[i + IPOPT_OLEN]; + if (l < 2) + goto invalopt; + skip = 1; + break; + } + if (l < 1 || hlen - i < l) { + invalopt: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ah4_calccksum: invalid IP option " + "(type=%02x len=%02x)\n", + p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL], + p[i + IPOPT_OLEN])); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + if (skip) + bzero(p + i, l); + if (p[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL] == IPOPT_EOL) + break; + i += l; + } + p = mtod(n, u_char *) + sizeof(struct ip); + (algo->update)(&algos, p, hlen - sizeof(struct ip)); + + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + + hdrtype = (iphdr.ip_p) & 0xff; + advancewidth = hlen; + break; + } + + case IPPROTO_AH: + { + struct ah ah; + int siz; + int hdrsiz; + int totlen; + + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah); + hdrsiz = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) + ? sizeof(struct ah) + : sizeof(struct newah); + siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); + totlen = (ah.ah_len + 2) << 2; + + /* + * special treatment is necessary for the first one, not others + */ + if (!ahseen) { + if (totlen > m->m_pkthdr.len - off || + totlen > MCLBYTES) { + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && totlen > MLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (n == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_copydata(m, off, totlen, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + n->m_len = totlen; + bzero(mtod(n, caddr_t) + hdrsiz, siz); + (algo->update)(&algos, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len); + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } else + ah_update_mbuf(m, off, totlen, algo, &algos); + ahseen++; + + hdrtype = ah.ah_nxt; + advancewidth = totlen; + break; + } + + default: + ah_update_mbuf(m, off, m->m_pkthdr.len - off, algo, &algos); + advancewidth = m->m_pkthdr.len - off; + break; + } + + off += advancewidth; + if (off < m->m_pkthdr.len) + goto again; + + if (len < (*algo->sumsiz)(sav)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + (algo->result)(&algos, &sumbuf[0]); + bcopy(&sumbuf[0], ahdat, (*algo->sumsiz)(sav)); + + if (n) + m_free(n); + return error; + +fail: + if (n) + m_free(n); + return error; +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * Go generate the checksum. This function won't modify the mbuf chain + * except AH itself. + * + * NOTE: the function does not free mbuf on failure. + * Don't use m_copy(), it will try to share cluster mbuf by using refcnt. + */ +int +ah6_calccksum(m, ahdat, len, algo, sav) + struct mbuf *m; + caddr_t ahdat; + size_t len; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int newoff, off; + int proto, nxt; + struct mbuf *n = NULL; + int error; + int ahseen; + struct ah_algorithm_state algos; + u_char sumbuf[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + + if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) + return EINVAL; + + error = (algo->init)(&algos, sav); + if (error) + return error; + + off = 0; + proto = IPPROTO_IPV6; + nxt = -1; + ahseen = 0; + + again: + newoff = ip6_nexthdr(m, off, proto, &nxt); + if (newoff < 0) + newoff = m->m_pkthdr.len; + else if (newoff <= off) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_IPV6: + /* + * special treatment is necessary for the first one, not others + */ + if (off == 0) { + struct ip6_hdr ip6copy; + + if (newoff - off != sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + m_copydata(m, off, newoff - off, (caddr_t)&ip6copy); + /* RFC2402 */ + ip6copy.ip6_flow = 0; + ip6copy.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; + ip6copy.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; + ip6copy.ip6_hlim = 0; + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&ip6copy.ip6_src)) + ip6copy.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0x0000; + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&ip6copy.ip6_dst)) + ip6copy.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0x0000; + (algo->update)(&algos, (caddr_t)&ip6copy, + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + } else { + newoff = m->m_pkthdr.len; + ah_update_mbuf(m, off, m->m_pkthdr.len - off, algo, + &algos); + } + break; + + case IPPROTO_AH: + { + int siz; + int hdrsiz; + + hdrsiz = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) + ? sizeof(struct ah) + : sizeof(struct newah); + siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); + + /* + * special treatment is necessary for the first one, not others + */ + if (!ahseen) { + if (newoff - off > MCLBYTES) { + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && newoff - off > MLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (n == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_copydata(m, off, newoff - off, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + n->m_len = newoff - off; + bzero(mtod(n, caddr_t) + hdrsiz, siz); + (algo->update)(&algos, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len); + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } else + ah_update_mbuf(m, off, newoff - off, algo, &algos); + ahseen++; + break; + } + + case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: + case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: + { + struct ip6_ext *ip6e; + int hdrlen, optlen; + u_int8_t *p, *optend, *optp; + + if (newoff - off > MCLBYTES) { + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && newoff - off > MLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (n == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_copydata(m, off, newoff - off, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + n->m_len = newoff - off; + + ip6e = mtod(n, struct ip6_ext *); + hdrlen = (ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3; + if (newoff - off < hdrlen) { + error = EINVAL; + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + goto fail; + } + p = mtod(n, u_int8_t *); + optend = p + hdrlen; + + /* + * ICV calculation for the options header including all + * options. This part is a little tricky since there are + * two type of options; mutable and immutable. We try to + * null-out mutable ones here. + */ + optp = p + 2; + while (optp < optend) { + if (optp[0] == IP6OPT_PAD1) + optlen = 1; + else { + if (optp + 2 > optend) { + error = EINVAL; + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + goto fail; + } + optlen = optp[1] + 2; + } + + if (optp + optlen > optend) { + error = EINVAL; + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + goto fail; + } + + if (optp[0] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) + bzero(optp + 2, optlen - 2); + + optp += optlen; + } + + (algo->update)(&algos, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len); + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + break; + } + + case IPPROTO_ROUTING: + /* + * For an input packet, we can just calculate `as is'. + * For an output packet, we assume ip6_output have already + * made packet how it will be received at the final + * destination. + */ + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + ah_update_mbuf(m, off, newoff - off, algo, &algos); + break; + } + + if (newoff < m->m_pkthdr.len) { + proto = nxt; + off = newoff; + goto again; + } + + if (len < (*algo->sumsiz)(sav)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + (algo->result)(&algos, &sumbuf[0]); + bcopy(&sumbuf[0], ahdat, (*algo->sumsiz)(sav)); + + /* just in case */ + if (n) + m_free(n); + return 0; +fail: + /* just in case */ + if (n) + m_free(n); + return error; +} +#endif
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c @@ -0,0 +1,1145 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.66 2001/12/07 07:07:08 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/netisr.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet/ip6.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> +#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +#define IPLEN_FLIPPED + +#ifdef INET +extern struct protosw inetsw[]; +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(__NetBSD__) +extern u_char ip_protox[]; +#endif + +void +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +ah4_input(m, off) + struct mbuf *m; + int off; +#else +#if __STDC__ +ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, ...) +#else +ah4_input(m, va_alist) + struct mbuf *m; + va_dcl +#endif +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +{ + struct ip *ip; + struct ah *ah; + u_int32_t spi; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + size_t siz; + size_t siz1; + u_char *cksum; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + u_int16_t nxt; + size_t hlen; + int s; +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + int off, proto; + va_list ap; +#endif /* !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ + size_t stripsiz = 0; + +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + va_start(ap, m); + off = va_arg(ap, int); + proto = va_arg(ap, int); + va_end(ap); +#endif + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) { + m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah)); + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;" + "dropping the packet for simplicity\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + } + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); +#else + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah)); + if (ah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;" + "dropping the packet for simplicity\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } +#endif + nxt = ah->ah_nxt; +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + + /* find the sassoc. */ + spi = ah->ah_spi; + + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, + (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst, + IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_nosa++; + goto fail; + } + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_badspi++; + goto fail; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " + "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_badspi++; + goto fail; + } + + siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); + siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + + /* + * sanity checks for header, 1. + */ + { + int sizoff; + + sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; + + /* + * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way + * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation + * to 96 bits. + * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of + * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1, + * 32 bits of padding is attached. + * + * There are two downsides to this specification. + * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling. + * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH, + * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue + * intermediate nodes. + * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes + * no real issue, however, it is wacky. + * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never + * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just + * work. + * + * We may need some clarification in the spec. + */ + if (siz1 < siz) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input " + "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", + (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz, + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input " + "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", + (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1, + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) { + m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off); + } +#else + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); + if (ah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } +#endif + } + + /* + * check for sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) + ; /* okey */ + else { + ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++; + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* + * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the + * cryptographic checksum. + */ + cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!cksum) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: " + "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian. + * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid. + */ +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_AND_STRIP_IP_LEN + ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen); +#elif defined(WITH_CONVERT_IP_LEN) + ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len); +#endif +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_IP_ID + ip->ip_id = htons(ip->ip_id); +#endif +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_IP_OFF + ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off); +#endif + if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; + /* + * flip them back. + */ +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_AND_STRIP_IP_LEN + ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen; +#elif defined(WITH_CONVERT_IP_LEN) + ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len); +#endif +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_IP_ID + ip->ip_id = ntohs(ip->ip_id); +#endif +#ifdef WITH_CONVERT_IP_OFF + ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off); +#endif + + { + caddr_t sumpos = NULL; + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); + } + + if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++; + goto fail; + } + } + + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; + +#if 0 + /* + * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. + * XXX should elaborate. + */ + if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { + struct ip *nip; + size_t sizoff; + + sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; + + if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) { + m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + + sizoff + siz1 + hlen); + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + } + + nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); + if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr + || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) { + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; + } + } +#ifdef INET6 + else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; + } +#endif /* INET6 */ +#endif /* 0 */ + + if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR + && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { +#if 0 + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); +#endif + ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++; + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * update sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { + ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; + } + if (!ipsec_tunnel_device && + ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) { + /* + * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. + * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload + * + * XXX more sanity checks + * XXX relationship with gif? + */ + u_int8_t tos; + + tos = ip->ip_tos; + m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); + if (!m) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos); + if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET, + (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " + "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + +#if 1 + /* + * Should the inner packet be considered authentic? + * My current answer is: NO. + * + * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2 + * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the + * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered + * between host1 and gw1. + * + * host1 -- gw1 === host2 + * This case falls into the same scenario as above. + * + * host1 === host2 + * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave + * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set. + * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows + * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and + * dst=host2, you are in risk. + */ + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; +#endif + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || + ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + + s = splimp(); + if (IF_QFULL(&ipintrq)) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + splx(s); + goto fail; + } + IF_ENQUEUE(&ipintrq, m); + m = NULL; + schednetisr(NETISR_IP); /* can be skipped but to make sure */ + splx(s); + nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; + } else { + /* + * strip off AH. + */ + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + /* + * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that + * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf. + */ + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; +#else + /* + * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that + * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly. + */ + if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) { + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; + } else { + /* + * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on + * cluster + */ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT); + if (n == NULL) { + /* m is retained by m_split */ + goto fail; + } + m_adj(n, stripsiz); + m_cat(m, n); + /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */ + m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len; + } +#endif + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); + if (m == NULL) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz; +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz); +#endif + ip->ip_p = nxt; + /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */ + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + + if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) { + if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 && + ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) { + ipsecstat.in_polvio++; + goto fail; + } +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4 + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off); +#else + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt); +#endif + } else + m_freem(m); + m = NULL; + } + + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + ipsecstat.in_success++; + return; + +fail: + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return; +} + +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +/* assumes that ip header and ah header are contiguous on mbuf */ +void * +ah4_ctlinput(cmd, sa, v) + int cmd; + struct sockaddr *sa; + void *v; +{ + struct ip *ip = v; + struct ah *ah; + struct icmp *icp; + struct secasvar *sav; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET || + sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return NULL; + if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) + return NULL; + if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE && ip_mtudisc && ip && ip->ip_v == 4) { + /* + * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to + * the address in the ICMP message payload. + */ + ah = (struct ah *)((caddr_t)ip + (ip->ip_hl << 2)); + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, + (caddr_t) &ip->ip_src, + (caddr_t) &ip->ip_dst, + IPPROTO_AH, ah->ah_spi)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE && + sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + key_freesav(sav); + return NULL; + } + + /* XXX Further validation? */ + + key_freesav(sav); + + /* + * Now that we've validated that we are actually communicating + * with the host indicated in the ICMP message, locate the + * ICMP header, recalculate the new MTU, and create the + * corresponding routing entry. + */ + icp = (struct icmp *)((caddr_t)ip - + offsetof(struct icmp, icmp_ip)); + icmp_mtudisc(icp, ip->ip_dst); + + return NULL; + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* NetBSD 1.5H or later */ +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +int +ah6_input(mp, offp, proto) + struct mbuf **mp; + int *offp, proto; +{ + struct mbuf *m = *mp; + int off = *offp; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct ah *ah; + u_int32_t spi; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + size_t siz; + size_t siz1; + u_char *cksum; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + u_int16_t nxt; + int s; + size_t stripsiz = 0; + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE); + ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); +#else + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah)); + if (ah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } +#endif + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + nxt = ah->ah_nxt; + + /* find the sassoc. */ + spi = ah->ah_spi; + + if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: " + "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst, + IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_nosa++; + goto fail; + } + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; + goto fail; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " + "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; + goto fail; + } + + siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav); + siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + + /* + * sanity checks for header, 1. + */ + { + int sizoff; + + sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; + + /* + * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete + * description. + */ + if (siz1 < siz) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input " + "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n", + (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz, + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input " + "(%d should be %lu): %s\n", + (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1, + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE); +#else + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1); + if (ah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + m = NULL; + goto fail; + } +#endif + } + + /* + * check for sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) + ; /* okey */ + else { + ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++; + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* + * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the + * cryptographic checksum. + */ + cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + if (!cksum) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: " + "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) { + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; + + { + caddr_t sumpos = NULL; + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1); + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1); + } + + if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++; + goto fail; + } + } + + free(cksum, M_TEMP); + + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; + +#if 0 + /* + * looks okey, but we need more sanity check. + * XXX should elaborate. + */ + if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) { + struct ip6_hdr *nip6; + size_t sizoff; + + sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4; + + IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE); + + nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1); + if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src) + || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) { + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; + } + } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) { + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; + } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) { + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; + } +#endif + + if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR + && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) { +#if 0 + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n")); +#endif + ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++; + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * update sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) { + ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1; + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1; + } + if (!ipsec_tunnel_device && + ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) { + /* + * strip off all the headers that precedes AH. + * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload + * + * XXX more sanity checks + * XXX relationship with gif? + */ + u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */ + + flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow; + m_adj(m, off + stripsiz); + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { + /* + * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing + * but there's no other way! + */ + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); + if (!m) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow); + if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " + "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + +#if 1 + /* + * should the inner packet be considered authentic? + * see comment in ah4_input(). + */ + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR; + m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM; +#endif + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 || + ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + + s = splimp(); + if (IF_QFULL(&ip6intrq)) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + splx(s); + goto fail; + } + IF_ENQUEUE(&ip6intrq, m); + m = NULL; + schednetisr(NETISR_IPV6); /* can be skipped but to make sure */ + splx(s); + nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; + } else { + /* + * strip off AH. + */ + char *prvnxtp; + + /* + * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the + * next header field of the previous header. + * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below. + */ + prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */ + *prvnxtp = nxt; + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + /* + * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that + * the packet is placed in a single mbuf. + */ + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; +#else + /* + * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that + * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly. + */ + if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) { + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; + } else { + /* + * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on + * cluster + */ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT); + if (n == NULL) { + /* m is retained by m_split */ + goto fail; + } + m_adj(n, stripsiz); + m_cat(m, n); + /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */ + m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len; + } +#endif + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + /* XXX jumbogram */ + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz); + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + } + + *offp = off; + *mp = m; + + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + ipsec6stat.in_success++; + return nxt; + +fail: + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return IPPROTO_DONE; +} + +void +ah6_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d) + int cmd; + struct sockaddr *sa; + void *d; +{ + const struct newah *ahp; + struct newah ah; + struct secasvar *sav; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct mbuf *m; + struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL; + int off=0; + struct sockaddr_in6 sa6_src, sa6_dst; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 || + sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return; + if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) + return; + + /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */ + if (d != NULL) { + ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d; + m = ip6cp->ip6c_m; + ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6; + off = ip6cp->ip6c_off; + } else { + m = NULL; + ip6 = NULL; + } + + if (ip6) { + /* + * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL, + * M and OFF are valid. + */ + + /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah)) + return; + + if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) { + /* + * this should be rare case, + * so we compromise on this copy... + */ + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah); + ahp = &ah; + } else + ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); + + if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) { + int valid = 0; + + /* + * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to + * the address in the ICMP message payload. + */ + sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&sa6_src.sin6_addr, + (caddr_t)&sa6_dst.sin6_addr, + IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi); + if (sav) { + if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE || + sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING) + valid++; + key_freesav(sav); + } + + /* XXX Further validation? */ + + /* + * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table + * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will: + * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the + * corresponding routing entry, or + * - ignore the MTU change notification. + */ + icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid); + } + + /* we normally notify single pcb here */ + } else { + /* we normally notify any pcb here */ + } +} +#endif /* INET6 */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ah_output.c @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ah_output.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ah_output.c,v 1.31 2001/07/26 06:53:15 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1826/2402 authentication header. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> + +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> + +#ifdef INET +static struct in_addr *ah4_finaldst __P((struct mbuf *)); +#endif + +/* + * compute AH header size. + * transport mode only. for tunnel mode, we should implement + * virtual interface, and control MTU/MSS by the interface MTU. + */ +size_t +ah_hdrsiz(isr) + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + size_t hdrsiz; + + /* sanity check */ + if (isr == NULL) + panic("ah_hdrsiz: NULL was passed.\n"); + + if (isr->saidx.proto != IPPROTO_AH) + panic("unsupported mode passed to ah_hdrsiz"); + + if (isr->sav == NULL) + goto estimate; + if (isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) + goto estimate; + + /* we need transport mode AH. */ + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(isr->sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) + goto estimate; + + /* + * XXX + * right now we don't calcurate the padding size. simply + * treat the padding size as constant, for simplicity. + * + * XXX variable size padding support + */ + hdrsiz = (((*algo->sumsiz)(isr->sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + if (isr->sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) + hdrsiz += sizeof(struct ah); + else + hdrsiz += sizeof(struct newah); + + return hdrsiz; + + estimate: + /* ASSUMING: + * sizeof(struct newah) > sizeof(struct ah). + * 16 = (16 + 3) & ~(4 - 1). + */ + return sizeof(struct newah) + 16; +} + +#ifdef INET +/* + * Modify the packet so that it includes the authentication data. + * The mbuf passed must start with IPv4 header. + * + * assumes that the first mbuf contains IPv4 header + option only. + * the function does not modify m. + */ +int +ah4_output(m, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + struct secasvar *sav = isr->sav; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + u_int32_t spi; + u_char *ahdrpos; + u_char *ahsumpos = NULL; + size_t hlen = 0; /* IP header+option in bytes */ + size_t plen = 0; /* AH payload size in bytes */ + size_t ahlen = 0; /* plen + sizeof(ah) */ + struct ip *ip; + struct in_addr dst; + struct in_addr *finaldst; + int error; + + /* sanity checks */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && !sav->replay) { + struct ip *ip; + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ah4_output: internal error: " + "sav->replay is null: %x->%x, SPI=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(ip->ip_src.s_addr), + (u_int32_t)ntohl(ip->ip_dst.s_addr), + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah4_output: unsupported algorithm: " + "SPI=%u\n", (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + spi = sav->spi; + + /* + * determine the size to grow. + */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + plen = ((*algo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1); /* XXX pad to 8byte? */ + ahlen = plen + sizeof(struct ah); + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + plen = ((*algo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1); /* XXX pad to 8byte? */ + ahlen = plen + sizeof(struct newah); + } + + /* + * grow the mbuf to accomodate AH. + */ + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + + if (m->m_len != hlen) + panic("ah4_output: assumption failed (first mbuf length)"); + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(m->m_next) < ahlen) { + struct mbuf *n; + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ENOBUFS in ah4_output %d\n", + __LINE__)); + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + n->m_len = ahlen; + n->m_next = m->m_next; + m->m_next = n; + m->m_pkthdr.len += ahlen; + ahdrpos = mtod(n, u_char *); + } else { + m->m_next->m_len += ahlen; + m->m_next->m_data -= ahlen; + m->m_pkthdr.len += ahlen; + ahdrpos = mtod(m->m_next, u_char *); + } + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); /* just to be sure */ + + /* + * initialize AH. + */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + struct ah *ahdr; + + ahdr = (struct ah *)ahdrpos; + ahsumpos = (u_char *)(ahdr + 1); + ahdr->ah_len = plen >> 2; + ahdr->ah_nxt = ip->ip_p; + ahdr->ah_reserve = htons(0); + ahdr->ah_spi = spi; + bzero(ahdr + 1, plen); + } else { + struct newah *ahdr; + + ahdr = (struct newah *)ahdrpos; + ahsumpos = (u_char *)(ahdr + 1); + ahdr->ah_len = (plen >> 2) + 1; /* plus one for seq# */ + ahdr->ah_nxt = ip->ip_p; + ahdr->ah_reserve = htons(0); + ahdr->ah_spi = spi; + if (sav->replay->count == ~0) { + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { + /* XXX Is it noisy ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay counter overflowed. %s\n", + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + } + sav->replay->count++; + /* + * XXX sequence number must not be cycled, if the SA is + * installed by IKE daemon. + */ + ahdr->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); + bzero(ahdr + 1, plen); + } + + /* + * modify IPv4 header. + */ + ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_AH; + if (ahlen < (IP_MAXPACKET - ntohs(ip->ip_len))) + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) + ahlen); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv4 AH output: size exceeds limit\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EMSGSIZE; + } + + /* + * If there is source routing option, update destination field in + * the IPv4 header to the final destination. + * Note that we do not need to update source routing option itself + * (as done in IPv4 AH processing -- see ip6_output()), since + * source routing option is not part of the ICV computation. + */ + finaldst = ah4_finaldst(m); + if (finaldst) { + dst.s_addr = ip->ip_dst.s_addr; + ip->ip_dst.s_addr = finaldst->s_addr; + } + + /* + * calcurate the checksum, based on security association + * and the algorithm specified. + */ + error = ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)ahsumpos, plen, algo, sav); + if (error) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "error after ah4_calccksum, called from ah4_output")); + m_freem(m); + m = NULL; + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + return error; + } + + if (finaldst) { + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); /* just to make sure */ + ip->ip_dst.s_addr = dst.s_addr; + } + ipsecstat.out_success++; + ipsecstat.out_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* Calculate AH length */ +int +ah_hdrlen(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + int plen, ahlen; + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) + return 0; + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1826 */ + plen = ((*algo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1); /* XXX pad to 8byte? */ + ahlen = plen + sizeof(struct ah); + } else { + /* RFC 2402 */ + plen = ((*algo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1); /* XXX pad to 8byte? */ + ahlen = plen + sizeof(struct newah); + } + + return(ahlen); +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * Fill in the Authentication Header and calculate checksum. + */ +int +ah6_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *md; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + struct mbuf *mprev; + struct mbuf *mah; + struct secasvar *sav = isr->sav; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + u_int32_t spi; + u_char *ahsumpos = NULL; + size_t plen; /* AH payload size in bytes */ + int error = 0; + int ahlen; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ah6_output: first mbuf too short\n")); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + ahlen = ah_hdrlen(sav); + if (ahlen == 0) + return 0; + + for (mprev = m; mprev && mprev->m_next != md; mprev = mprev->m_next) + ; + if (!mprev || mprev->m_next != md) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ah6_output: md is not in chain\n")); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + MGET(mah, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!mah) { + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + if (ahlen > MLEN) { + MCLGET(mah, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((mah->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(mah); + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + } + mah->m_len = ahlen; + mah->m_next = md; + mprev->m_next = mah; + m->m_pkthdr.len += ahlen; + + /* fix plen */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > IPV6_MAXPACKET) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ip6_output: AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported\n")); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && !sav->replay) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ah6_output: internal error: " + "sav->replay is null: SPI=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ah6_output: unsupported algorithm: " + "SPI=%u\n", (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + spi = sav->spi; + + /* + * initialize AH. + */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + struct ah *ahdr = mtod(mah, struct ah *); + + plen = mah->m_len - sizeof(struct ah); + ahsumpos = (u_char *)(ahdr + 1); + ahdr->ah_nxt = *nexthdrp; + *nexthdrp = IPPROTO_AH; + ahdr->ah_len = plen >> 2; + ahdr->ah_reserve = htons(0); + ahdr->ah_spi = spi; + bzero(ahdr + 1, plen); + } else { + struct newah *ahdr = mtod(mah, struct newah *); + + plen = mah->m_len - sizeof(struct newah); + ahsumpos = (u_char *)(ahdr + 1); + ahdr->ah_nxt = *nexthdrp; + *nexthdrp = IPPROTO_AH; + ahdr->ah_len = (plen >> 2) + 1; /* plus one for seq# */ + ahdr->ah_reserve = htons(0); + ahdr->ah_spi = spi; + if (sav->replay->count == ~0) { + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { + /* XXX Is it noisy ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay counter overflowed. %s\n", + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + } + sav->replay->count++; + /* + * XXX sequence number must not be cycled, if the SA is + * installed by IKE daemon. + */ + ahdr->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); + bzero(ahdr + 1, plen); + } + + /* + * calcurate the checksum, based on security association + * and the algorithm specified. + */ + error = ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)ahsumpos, plen, algo, sav); + if (error) { + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + } else { + ipsec6stat.out_success++; + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + } + ipsec6stat.out_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++; + + return(error); +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET +/* + * Find the final destination if there is loose/strict source routing option. + * Returns NULL if there's no source routing options. + * Returns NULL on errors too. + * Note that this function will return a pointer INTO the given parameter, + * struct mbuf *m. + * The mbuf must be pulled up toward, at least, ip option part. + */ +static struct in_addr * +ah4_finaldst(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct ip *ip; + int optlen; + u_char *q; + int i; + int hlen; + + if (!m) + panic("ah4_finaldst: m == NULL"); + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + hlen = (ip->ip_hl << 2); + + if (m->m_len < hlen) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "ah4_finaldst: parameter mbuf wrong (not pulled up)\n")); + return NULL; + } + + if (hlen == sizeof(struct ip)) + return NULL; + + optlen = hlen - sizeof(struct ip); + if (optlen < 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ah4_finaldst: wrong optlen %d\n", + optlen)); + return NULL; + } + + q = (u_char *)(ip + 1); + i = 0; + while (i < optlen) { + if (i + IPOPT_OPTVAL >= optlen) + return NULL; + if (q[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL] == IPOPT_EOL || + q[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL] == IPOPT_NOP || + i + IPOPT_OLEN < optlen) + ; + else + return NULL; + + switch (q[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL]) { + case IPOPT_EOL: + i = optlen; /* bye */ + break; + case IPOPT_NOP: + i++; + break; + case IPOPT_LSRR: + case IPOPT_SSRR: + if (q[i + IPOPT_OLEN] < 2 + sizeof(struct in_addr) || + optlen - i < q[i + IPOPT_OLEN]) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ip_finaldst: invalid IP option " + "(code=%02x len=%02x)\n", + q[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL], q[i + IPOPT_OLEN])); + return NULL; + } + i += q[i + IPOPT_OLEN] - sizeof(struct in_addr); + return (struct in_addr *)(q + i); + default: + if (q[i + IPOPT_OLEN] < 2 || + optlen - i < q[i + IPOPT_OLEN]) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ip_finaldst: invalid IP option " + "(code=%02x len=%02x)\n", + q[i + IPOPT_OPTVAL], q[i + IPOPT_OLEN])); + return NULL; + } + i += q[i + IPOPT_OLEN]; + break; + } + } + return NULL; +} +#endif
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/esp_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,1149 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/esp_core.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_core.c,v 1.54 2001/12/07 07:07:08 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#include <netinet6/esp_twofish.h> +#include <netinet6/esp_rijndael.h> +#include <net/pfkeyv2.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <crypto/des/des.h> +#include <crypto/blowfish/blowfish.h> +#include <crypto/cast128/cast128.h> + +static int esp_null_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_null_decrypt __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); +static int esp_null_encrypt __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); +static int esp_descbc_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_descbc_ivlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_des_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_des_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +static int esp_des_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_des_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_cbc_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_blowfish_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_blowfish_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +static int esp_blowfish_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_blowfish_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_cast128_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_cast128_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +static int esp_cast128_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_cast128_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_3des_schedule __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_3des_schedlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *)); +static int esp_3des_blockdecrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_3des_blockencrypt __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *)); +static int esp_common_ivlen __P((const struct esp_algorithm *, + struct secasvar *)); +static int esp_cbc_decrypt __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); +static int esp_cbc_encrypt __P((struct mbuf *, size_t, size_t, + struct secasvar *, const struct esp_algorithm *, int)); + +#define MAXIVLEN 16 + +static const struct esp_algorithm esp_algorithms[] = { + { 8, -1, esp_descbc_mature, 64, 64, esp_des_schedlen, + "des-cbc", + esp_descbc_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_des_schedule, + esp_des_blockdecrypt, esp_des_blockencrypt, }, + { 8, 8, esp_cbc_mature, 192, 192, esp_3des_schedlen, + "3des-cbc", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_3des_schedule, + esp_3des_blockdecrypt, esp_3des_blockencrypt, }, + { 1, 0, esp_null_mature, 0, 2048, 0, "null", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_null_decrypt, + esp_null_encrypt, NULL, }, + { 8, 8, esp_cbc_mature, 40, 448, esp_blowfish_schedlen, "blowfish-cbc", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_blowfish_schedule, + esp_blowfish_blockdecrypt, esp_blowfish_blockencrypt, }, + { 8, 8, esp_cbc_mature, 40, 128, esp_cast128_schedlen, + "cast128-cbc", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_cast128_schedule, + esp_cast128_blockdecrypt, esp_cast128_blockencrypt, }, + { 16, 16, esp_cbc_mature, 128, 256, esp_rijndael_schedlen, + "rijndael-cbc", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_rijndael_schedule, + esp_rijndael_blockdecrypt, esp_rijndael_blockencrypt }, + { 16, 16, esp_cbc_mature, 128, 256, esp_twofish_schedlen, + "twofish-cbc", + esp_common_ivlen, esp_cbc_decrypt, + esp_cbc_encrypt, esp_twofish_schedule, + esp_twofish_blockdecrypt, esp_twofish_blockencrypt }, +}; + +const struct esp_algorithm * +esp_algorithm_lookup(idx) + int idx; +{ + + switch (idx) { + case SADB_EALG_DESCBC: + return &esp_algorithms[0]; + case SADB_EALG_3DESCBC: + return &esp_algorithms[1]; + case SADB_EALG_NULL: + return &esp_algorithms[2]; + case SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC: + return &esp_algorithms[3]; + case SADB_X_EALG_CAST128CBC: + return &esp_algorithms[4]; + case SADB_X_EALG_RIJNDAELCBC: + return &esp_algorithms[5]; + case SADB_X_EALG_TWOFISHCBC: + return &esp_algorithms[6]; + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +int +esp_max_ivlen() +{ + int idx; + int ivlen; + + ivlen = 0; + for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(esp_algorithms)/sizeof(esp_algorithms[0]); + idx++) { + if (esp_algorithms[idx].ivlenval > ivlen) + ivlen = esp_algorithms[idx].ivlenval; + } + + return ivlen; +} + +int +esp_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int error; + + /* check for key length */ + if (_KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) < algo->keymin || + _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) > algo->keymax) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_schedule %s: unsupported key length %d: " + "needs %d to %d bits\n", algo->name, _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc), + algo->keymin, algo->keymax)); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* already allocated */ + if (sav->sched && sav->schedlen != 0) + return 0; + /* no schedule necessary */ + if (!algo->schedule || !algo->schedlen) + return 0; + + sav->schedlen = (*algo->schedlen)(algo); + if (sav->schedlen < 0) + return EINVAL; + sav->sched = malloc(sav->schedlen, M_SECA, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!sav->sched) { + sav->schedlen = 0; + return ENOBUFS; + } + + error = (*algo->schedule)(algo, sav); + if (error) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_schedule %s: error %d\n", + algo->name, error)); + free(sav->sched, M_SECA); + sav->sched = NULL; + sav->schedlen = 0; + } + return error; +} + +static int +esp_null_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + /* anything is okay */ + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_null_decrypt(m, off, sav, algo, ivlen) + struct mbuf *m; + size_t off; /* offset to ESP header */ + struct secasvar *sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; +{ + + return 0; /* do nothing */ +} + +static int +esp_null_encrypt(m, off, plen, sav, algo, ivlen) + struct mbuf *m; + size_t off; /* offset to ESP header */ + size_t plen; /* payload length (to be encrypted) */ + struct secasvar *sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; +{ + + return 0; /* do nothing */ +} + +static int +esp_descbc_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + + if (!(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) && (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: " + "algorithm incompatible with 4 octets IV length\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (!sav->key_enc) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_descbc_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_descbc_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (_KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) < algo->keymin || + _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) > algo->keymax) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_descbc_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", + _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc))); + return 1; + } + + /* weak key check */ + if (des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc))) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_descbc_mature: weak key was passed.\n")); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_descbc_ivlen(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + if (!sav) + return 8; + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) && (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) + return 4; + if (!(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) && (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV)) + return 4; + return 8; +} + +static int +esp_des_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(des_key_schedule); +} + +static int +esp_des_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + if (des_key_sched((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), + *(des_key_schedule *)sav->sched)) + return EINVAL; + else + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_des_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + + /* assumption: d has a good alignment */ + bcopy(s, d, sizeof(DES_LONG) * 2); + des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)d, (des_cblock *)d, + *(des_key_schedule *)sav->sched, DES_DECRYPT); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_des_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + + /* assumption: d has a good alignment */ + bcopy(s, d, sizeof(DES_LONG) * 2); + des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)d, (des_cblock *)d, + *(des_key_schedule *)sav->sched, DES_ENCRYPT); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_cbc_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int keylen; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature: algorithm incompatible with esp-old\n")); + return 1; + } + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature: algorithm incompatible with derived\n")); + return 1; + } + + if (!sav->key_enc) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: no key is given.\n")); + return 1; + } + + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature %s: unsupported algorithm.\n", algo->name)); + return 1; + } + + keylen = sav->key_enc->sadb_key_bits; + if (keylen < algo->keymin || algo->keymax < keylen) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature %s: invalid key length %d.\n", + algo->name, sav->key_enc->sadb_key_bits)); + return 1; + } + switch (sav->alg_enc) { + case SADB_EALG_3DESCBC: + /* weak key check */ + if (des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) || + des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc) + 8)) || + des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc) + 16))) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature %s: weak key was passed.\n", + algo->name)); + return 1; + } + break; + case SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC: + case SADB_X_EALG_CAST128CBC: + case SADB_X_EALG_TWOFISHCBC: + break; + case SADB_X_EALG_RIJNDAELCBC: + /* allows specific key sizes only */ + if (!(keylen == 128 || keylen == 192 || keylen == 256)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_cbc_mature %s: invalid key length %d.\n", + algo->name, keylen)); + return 1; + } + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_blowfish_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(BF_KEY); +} + +static int +esp_blowfish_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + BF_set_key((BF_KEY *)sav->sched, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), + _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_blowfish_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + /* HOLY COW! BF_encrypt() takes values in host byteorder */ + BF_LONG t[2]; + + bcopy(s, t, sizeof(t)); + t[0] = ntohl(t[0]); + t[1] = ntohl(t[1]); + BF_encrypt(t, (BF_KEY *)sav->sched, BF_DECRYPT); + t[0] = htonl(t[0]); + t[1] = htonl(t[1]); + bcopy(t, d, sizeof(t)); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_blowfish_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + /* HOLY COW! BF_encrypt() takes values in host byteorder */ + BF_LONG t[2]; + + bcopy(s, t, sizeof(t)); + t[0] = ntohl(t[0]); + t[1] = ntohl(t[1]); + BF_encrypt(t, (BF_KEY *)sav->sched, BF_ENCRYPT); + t[0] = htonl(t[0]); + t[1] = htonl(t[1]); + bcopy(t, d, sizeof(t)); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_cast128_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(u_int32_t) * 32; +} + +static int +esp_cast128_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + set_cast128_subkey((u_int32_t *)sav->sched, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), + _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_cast128_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + + if (_KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) <= 80 / 8) + cast128_decrypt_round12(d, s, (u_int32_t *)sav->sched); + else + cast128_decrypt_round16(d, s, (u_int32_t *)sav->sched); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_cast128_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + + if (_KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) <= 80 / 8) + cast128_encrypt_round12(d, s, (u_int32_t *)sav->sched); + else + cast128_encrypt_round16(d, s, (u_int32_t *)sav->sched); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_3des_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(des_key_schedule) * 3; +} + +static int +esp_3des_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int error; + des_key_schedule *p; + int i; + char *k; + + p = (des_key_schedule *)sav->sched; + k = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + error = des_key_sched((des_cblock *)(k + 8 * i), p[i]); + if (error) + return EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_3des_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + des_key_schedule *p; + + /* assumption: d has a good alignment */ + p = (des_key_schedule *)sav->sched; + bcopy(s, d, sizeof(DES_LONG) * 2); + des_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *)d, (des_cblock *)d, + p[0], p[1], p[2], DES_DECRYPT); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_3des_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + des_key_schedule *p; + + /* assumption: d has a good alignment */ + p = (des_key_schedule *)sav->sched; + bcopy(s, d, sizeof(DES_LONG) * 2); + des_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *)d, (des_cblock *)d, + p[0], p[1], p[2], DES_ENCRYPT); + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_common_ivlen(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + if (!algo) + panic("esp_common_ivlen: unknown algorithm"); + return algo->ivlenval; +} + +static int +esp_cbc_decrypt(m, off, sav, algo, ivlen) + struct mbuf *m; + size_t off; + struct secasvar *sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; +{ + struct mbuf *s; + struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp; + int soff, doff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */ + int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */ + size_t ivoff, bodyoff; + u_int8_t iv[MAXIVLEN], *ivp; + u_int8_t sbuf[MAXIVLEN], *sp; + u_int8_t *p, *q; + struct mbuf *scut; + int scutoff; + int i; + int blocklen; + int derived; + + if (ivlen != sav->ivlen || ivlen > sizeof(iv)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: " + "unsupported ivlen %d\n", algo->name, ivlen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* assumes blocklen == padbound */ + blocklen = algo->padbound; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (blocklen > sizeof(iv)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: " + "unsupported blocklen %d\n", algo->name, blocklen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#endif + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen; + derived = 0; + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) { + /* + * draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des-derived-00.txt + * uses sequence number field as IV field. + */ + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + sizeof(u_int32_t); + ivlen = sizeof(u_int32_t); + derived = 1; + } else { + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen; + derived = 0; + } + } + + /* grab iv */ + m_copydata(m, ivoff, ivlen, iv); + + /* extend iv */ + if (ivlen == blocklen) + ; + else if (ivlen == 4 && blocklen == 8) { + bcopy(&iv[0], &iv[4], 4); + iv[4] ^= 0xff; + iv[5] ^= 0xff; + iv[6] ^= 0xff; + iv[7] ^= 0xff; + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: " + "unsupported ivlen/blocklen: %d %d\n", + algo->name, ivlen, blocklen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: bad len %d/%lu\n", + algo->name, m->m_pkthdr.len, (unsigned long)bodyoff)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + if ((m->m_pkthdr.len - bodyoff) % blocklen) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_decrypt %s: " + "payload length must be multiple of %d\n", + algo->name, blocklen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + s = m; + d = d0 = dp = NULL; + soff = doff = sn = dn = 0; + ivp = sp = NULL; + + /* skip bodyoff */ + while (soff < bodyoff) { + if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) { + sn = bodyoff - soff; + break; + } + + soff += s->m_len; + s = s->m_next; + } + scut = s; + scutoff = sn; + + /* skip over empty mbuf */ + while (s && s->m_len == 0) + s = s->m_next; + + while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) { + /* source */ + if (sn + blocklen <= s->m_len) { + /* body is continuous */ + sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn; + } else { + /* body is non-continuous */ + m_copydata(s, sn, blocklen, sbuf); + sp = sbuf; + } + + /* destination */ + if (!d || dn + blocklen > d->m_len) { + if (d) + dp = d; + MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn); + if (d && i > MLEN) { + MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(d); + d = NULL; + } + } + if (!d) { + m_freem(m); + if (d0) + m_freem(d0); + return ENOBUFS; + } + if (!d0) + d0 = d; + if (dp) + dp->m_next = d; + d->m_len = 0; + d->m_len = (M_TRAILINGSPACE(d) / blocklen) * blocklen; + if (d->m_len > i) + d->m_len = i; + dn = 0; + } + + /* decrypt */ + (*algo->blockdecrypt)(algo, sav, sp, mtod(d, u_int8_t *) + dn); + + /* xor */ + p = ivp ? ivp : iv; + q = mtod(d, u_int8_t *) + dn; + for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) + q[i] ^= p[i]; + + /* next iv */ + if (sp == sbuf) { + bcopy(sbuf, iv, blocklen); + ivp = NULL; + } else + ivp = sp; + + sn += blocklen; + dn += blocklen; + + /* find the next source block */ + while (s && sn >= s->m_len) { + sn -= s->m_len; + soff += s->m_len; + s = s->m_next; + } + + /* skip over empty mbuf */ + while (s && s->m_len == 0) + s = s->m_next; + } + + m_freem(scut->m_next); + scut->m_len = scutoff; + scut->m_next = d0; + + /* just in case */ + bzero(iv, sizeof(iv)); + bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); + + return 0; +} + +static int +esp_cbc_encrypt(m, off, plen, sav, algo, ivlen) + struct mbuf *m; + size_t off; + size_t plen; + struct secasvar *sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; +{ + struct mbuf *s; + struct mbuf *d, *d0, *dp; + int soff, doff; /* offset from the head of chain, to head of this mbuf */ + int sn, dn; /* offset from the head of the mbuf, to meat */ + size_t ivoff, bodyoff; + u_int8_t iv[MAXIVLEN], *ivp; + u_int8_t sbuf[MAXIVLEN], *sp; + u_int8_t *p, *q; + struct mbuf *scut; + int scutoff; + int i; + int blocklen; + int derived; + + if (ivlen != sav->ivlen || ivlen > sizeof(iv)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: " + "unsupported ivlen %d\n", algo->name, ivlen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* assumes blocklen == padbound */ + blocklen = algo->padbound; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (blocklen > sizeof(iv)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: " + "unsupported blocklen %d\n", algo->name, blocklen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#endif + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen; + derived = 0; + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) { + /* + * draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des-derived-00.txt + * uses sequence number field as IV field. + */ + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct esp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct esp) + sizeof(u_int32_t); + ivlen = sizeof(u_int32_t); + derived = 1; + } else { + ivoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp); + bodyoff = off + sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen; + derived = 0; + } + } + + /* put iv into the packet. if we are in derived mode, use seqno. */ + if (derived) + m_copydata(m, ivoff, ivlen, iv); + else { + bcopy(sav->iv, iv, ivlen); + /* maybe it is better to overwrite dest, not source */ + m_copyback(m, ivoff, ivlen, iv); + } + + /* extend iv */ + if (ivlen == blocklen) + ; + else if (ivlen == 4 && blocklen == 8) { + bcopy(&iv[0], &iv[4], 4); + iv[4] ^= 0xff; + iv[5] ^= 0xff; + iv[6] ^= 0xff; + iv[7] ^= 0xff; + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: " + "unsupported ivlen/blocklen: %d %d\n", + algo->name, ivlen, blocklen)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < bodyoff) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: bad len %d/%lu\n", + algo->name, m->m_pkthdr.len, (unsigned long)bodyoff)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + if ((m->m_pkthdr.len - bodyoff) % blocklen) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_encrypt %s: " + "payload length must be multiple of %lu\n", + algo->name, (unsigned long)algo->padbound)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + s = m; + d = d0 = dp = NULL; + soff = doff = sn = dn = 0; + ivp = sp = NULL; + + /* skip bodyoff */ + while (soff < bodyoff) { + if (soff + s->m_len > bodyoff) { + sn = bodyoff - soff; + break; + } + + soff += s->m_len; + s = s->m_next; + } + scut = s; + scutoff = sn; + + /* skip over empty mbuf */ + while (s && s->m_len == 0) + s = s->m_next; + + while (soff < m->m_pkthdr.len) { + /* source */ + if (sn + blocklen <= s->m_len) { + /* body is continuous */ + sp = mtod(s, u_int8_t *) + sn; + } else { + /* body is non-continuous */ + m_copydata(s, sn, blocklen, sbuf); + sp = sbuf; + } + + /* destination */ + if (!d || dn + blocklen > d->m_len) { + if (d) + dp = d; + MGET(d, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + i = m->m_pkthdr.len - (soff + sn); + if (d && i > MLEN) { + MCLGET(d, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((d->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(d); + d = NULL; + } + } + if (!d) { + m_freem(m); + if (d0) + m_freem(d0); + return ENOBUFS; + } + if (!d0) + d0 = d; + if (dp) + dp->m_next = d; + d->m_len = 0; + d->m_len = (M_TRAILINGSPACE(d) / blocklen) * blocklen; + if (d->m_len > i) + d->m_len = i; + dn = 0; + } + + /* xor */ + p = ivp ? ivp : iv; + q = sp; + for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) + q[i] ^= p[i]; + + /* encrypt */ + (*algo->blockencrypt)(algo, sav, sp, mtod(d, u_int8_t *) + dn); + + /* next iv */ + ivp = mtod(d, u_int8_t *) + dn; + + sn += blocklen; + dn += blocklen; + + /* find the next source block */ + while (s && sn >= s->m_len) { + sn -= s->m_len; + soff += s->m_len; + s = s->m_next; + } + + /* skip over empty mbuf */ + while (s && s->m_len == 0) + s = s->m_next; + } + + m_freem(scut->m_next); + scut->m_len = scutoff; + scut->m_next = d0; + + /* just in case */ + bzero(iv, sizeof(iv)); + bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); + + key_sa_stir_iv(sav); + + return 0; +} + +/*------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/* does not free m0 on error */ +int +esp_auth(m0, skip, length, sav, sum) + struct mbuf *m0; + size_t skip; /* offset to ESP header */ + size_t length; /* payload length */ + struct secasvar *sav; + u_char *sum; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + size_t off; + struct ah_algorithm_state s; + u_char sumbuf[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + size_t siz; + int error; + + /* sanity checks */ + if (m0->m_pkthdr.len < skip) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp_auth: mbuf length < skip\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + if (m0->m_pkthdr.len < skip + length) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "esp_auth: mbuf length < skip + length\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + /* + * length of esp part (excluding authentication data) must be 4n, + * since nexthdr must be at offset 4n+3. + */ + if (length % 4) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_auth: length is not multiple of 4\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + if (!sav) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp_auth: NULL SA passed\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "esp_auth: bad ESP auth algorithm passed: %d\n", + sav->alg_auth)); + return EINVAL; + } + + m = m0; + off = 0; + + siz = (((*algo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + if (sizeof(sumbuf) < siz) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "esp_auth: AH_MAXSUMSIZE is too small: siz=%lu\n", + (u_long)siz)); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* skip the header */ + while (skip) { + if (!m) + panic("mbuf chain?"); + if (m->m_len <= skip) { + skip -= m->m_len; + m = m->m_next; + off = 0; + } else { + off = skip; + skip = 0; + } + } + + error = (*algo->init)(&s, sav); + if (error) + return error; + + while (0 < length) { + if (!m) + panic("mbuf chain?"); + + if (m->m_len - off < length) { + (*algo->update)(&s, mtod(m, u_char *) + off, + m->m_len - off); + length -= m->m_len - off; + m = m->m_next; + off = 0; + } else { + (*algo->update)(&s, mtod(m, u_char *) + off, length); + break; + } + } + (*algo->result)(&s, sumbuf); + bcopy(sumbuf, sum, siz); /* XXX */ + + return 0; +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/esp_input.c @@ -0,0 +1,1071 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/esp_input.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_input.c,v 1.61 2001/10/19 05:20:55 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1827/2406 Encapsulated Security Payload. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#endif +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/netisr.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h> +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> +#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +#define IPLEN_FLIPPED + +#define ESPMAXLEN \ + (sizeof(struct esp) < sizeof(struct newesp) \ + ? sizeof(struct newesp) : sizeof(struct esp)) + +#ifdef INET +extern struct protosw inetsw[]; +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(__NetBSD__) +extern u_char ip_protox[]; +#endif + +void +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +esp4_input(m, off) + struct mbuf *m; + int off; +#else +#if __STDC__ +esp4_input(struct mbuf *m, ...) +#else +esp4_input(m, va_alist) + struct mbuf *m; + va_dcl +#endif +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +{ + struct ip *ip; + struct esp *esp; + struct esptail esptail; + u_int32_t spi; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + size_t taillen; + u_int16_t nxt; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; + size_t hlen; + size_t esplen; + int s; +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + va_list ap; + int off, proto; +#endif /* !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ + +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + va_start(ap, m); + off = va_arg(ap, int); + proto = va_arg(ap, int); + va_end(ap); +#endif /* !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ + + /* sanity check for alignment. */ + if (off % 4 != 0 || m->m_pkthdr.len % 4 != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv4 ESP input: packet alignment problem " + "(off=%d, pktlen=%d)\n", off, m->m_pkthdr.len)); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + if (m->m_len < off + ESPMAXLEN) { + m = m_pullup(m, off + ESPMAXLEN); + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 ESP input: can't pullup in esp4_input\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + } + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + esp = (struct esp *)(((u_int8_t *)ip) + off); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + + /* find the sassoc. */ + spi = esp->esp_spi; + + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, + (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst, + IPPROTO_ESP, spi)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv4 ESP input: no key association found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_nosa++; + goto bad; + } + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 ESP input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_badspi++; + goto bad; + } + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 ESP input: " + "unsupported encryption algorithm for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsecstat.in_badspi++; + goto bad; + } + + /* check if we have proper ivlen information */ + ivlen = sav->ivlen; + if (ivlen < 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "inproper ivlen in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + if (!((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay + && (sav->alg_auth && sav->key_auth))) + goto noreplaycheck; + + if (sav->alg_auth == SADB_X_AALG_NULL || + sav->alg_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) + goto noreplaycheck; + + /* + * check for sequence number. + */ + if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newesp *)esp)->esp_seq), sav)) + ; /* okey */ + else { + ipsecstat.in_espreplay++; + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay packet in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + goto bad; + } + + /* check ICV */ + { + u_char sum0[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + u_char sum[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + const struct ah_algorithm *sumalgo; + size_t siz; + + sumalgo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!sumalgo) + goto noreplaycheck; + siz = (((*sumalgo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + if (AH_MAXSUMSIZE < siz) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "internal error: AH_MAXSUMSIZE must be larger than %lu\n", + (u_long)siz)); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - siz, siz, &sum0[0]); + + if (esp_auth(m, off, m->m_pkthdr.len - off - siz, sav, sum)) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "auth fail in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_espauthfail++; + goto bad; + } + + if (bcmp(sum0, sum, siz) != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "auth fail in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_espauthfail++; + goto bad; + } + + /* strip off the authentication data */ + m_adj(m, -siz); + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - siz; +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - siz); +#endif + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; + ipsecstat.in_espauthsucc++; + } + + /* + * update sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newesp *)esp)->esp_seq), sav)) { + ipsecstat.in_espreplay++; + goto bad; + } + } + +noreplaycheck: + + /* process main esp header. */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + else + esplen = sizeof(struct newesp); + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + esplen + ivlen + sizeof(esptail)) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv4 ESP input: packet too short\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + if (m->m_len < off + esplen + ivlen) { + m = m_pullup(m, off + esplen + ivlen); + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv4 ESP input: can't pullup in esp4_input\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + } + + /* + * pre-compute and cache intermediate key + */ + if (esp_schedule(algo, sav) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + /* + * decrypt the packet. + */ + if (!algo->decrypt) + panic("internal error: no decrypt function"); + if ((*algo->decrypt)(m, off, sav, algo, ivlen)) { + /* m is already freed */ + m = NULL; + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "decrypt fail in IPv4 ESP input: %s\n", + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + ipsecstat.in_esphist[sav->alg_enc]++; + + m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED; + + /* + * find the trailer of the ESP. + */ + m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(esptail), sizeof(esptail), + (caddr_t)&esptail); + nxt = esptail.esp_nxt; + taillen = esptail.esp_padlen + sizeof(esptail); + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < taillen + || m->m_pkthdr.len - taillen < hlen) { /* ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "bad pad length in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + /* strip off the trailing pad area. */ + m_adj(m, -taillen); + +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - taillen; +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - taillen); +#endif + + /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ + if (!ipsec_tunnel_device && + ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + esplen + ivlen, nxt, sav)) { + /* + * strip off all the headers that precedes ESP header. + * IP4 xx ESP IP4' payload -> IP4' payload + * + * XXX more sanity checks + * XXX relationship with gif? + */ + u_int8_t tos; + + tos = ip->ip_tos; + m_adj(m, off + esplen + ivlen); + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); + if (!m) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos); + if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET, + (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " + "in IPv4 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_ESP, spi) != 0 || + ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + goto bad; + } + + s = splimp(); + if (IF_QFULL(&ipintrq)) { + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + splx(s); + goto bad; + } + IF_ENQUEUE(&ipintrq, m); + m = NULL; + schednetisr(NETISR_IP); /* can be skipped but to make sure */ + splx(s); + nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; + } else { + /* + * strip off ESP header and IV. + * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off ESP so that + * we can always compute checksum for AH correctly. + */ + size_t stripsiz; + + stripsiz = esplen + ivlen; + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz; +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz); +#endif + ip->ip_p = nxt; + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_ESP, spi) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + goto bad; + } + + if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) { + if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 && + ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) { + ipsecstat.in_polvio++; + goto bad; + } +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4 + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off); +#else + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt); +#endif + } else + m_freem(m); + m = NULL; + } + + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + ipsecstat.in_success++; + return; + +bad: + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return; +} + +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105080000 /* 1.5H */ +/* assumes that ip header and esp header are contiguous on mbuf */ +void * +esp4_ctlinput(cmd, sa, v) + int cmd; + struct sockaddr *sa; + void *v; +{ + struct ip *ip = v; + struct esp *esp; + struct icmp *icp; + struct secasvar *sav; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET || + sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return NULL; + if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) + return NULL; + if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE && ip_mtudisc && ip && ip->ip_v == 4) { + /* + * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to + * the address in the ICMP message payload. + */ + esp = (struct esp *)((caddr_t)ip + (ip->ip_hl << 2)); + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, + (caddr_t) &ip->ip_src, + (caddr_t) &ip->ip_dst, + IPPROTO_ESP, esp->esp_spi)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE && + sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + key_freesav(sav); + return NULL; + } + + /* XXX Further validation? */ + + key_freesav(sav); + + /* + * Now that we've validated that we are actually communicating + * with the host indicated in the ICMP message, locate the + * ICMP header, recalculate the new MTU, and create the + * corresponding routing entry. + */ + icp = (struct icmp *)((caddr_t)ip - + offsetof(struct icmp, icmp_ip)); + icmp_mtudisc(icp, ip->ip_dst); + + return NULL; + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* NetBSD 1.5H or later */ +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +int +esp6_input(mp, offp, proto) + struct mbuf **mp; + int *offp, proto; +{ + struct mbuf *m = *mp; + int off = *offp; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct esp *esp; + struct esptail esptail; + u_int32_t spi; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + size_t taillen; + u_int16_t nxt; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int ivlen; + size_t esplen; + int s; + + /* sanity check for alignment. */ + if (off % 4 != 0 || m->m_pkthdr.len % 4 != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 ESP input: packet alignment problem " + "(off=%d, pktlen=%d)\n", off, m->m_pkthdr.len)); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, ESPMAXLEN, IPPROTO_DONE); + esp = (struct esp *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); +#else + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct esp *, m, off, ESPMAXLEN); + if (esp == NULL) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } +#endif + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + + if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 ESP input: " + "ESP with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + /* find the sassoc. */ + spi = esp->esp_spi; + + if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst, + IPPROTO_ESP, spi)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv6 ESP input: no key association found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_nosa++; + goto bad; + } + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav)); + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "IPv6 ESP input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; + goto bad; + } + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 ESP input: " + "unsupported encryption algorithm for spi %u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi))); + ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; + goto bad; + } + + /* check if we have proper ivlen information */ + ivlen = sav->ivlen; + if (ivlen < 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "inproper ivlen in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_badspi++; + goto bad; + } + + if (!((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay + && (sav->alg_auth && sav->key_auth))) + goto noreplaycheck; + + if (sav->alg_auth == SADB_X_AALG_NULL || + sav->alg_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) + goto noreplaycheck; + + /* + * check for sequence number. + */ + if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newesp *)esp)->esp_seq), sav)) + ; /* okey */ + else { + ipsec6stat.in_espreplay++; + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay packet in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + goto bad; + } + + /* check ICV */ + { + u_char sum0[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + u_char sum[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + const struct ah_algorithm *sumalgo; + size_t siz; + + sumalgo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!sumalgo) + goto noreplaycheck; + siz = (((*sumalgo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1)); + if (AH_MAXSUMSIZE < siz) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "internal error: AH_MAXSUMSIZE must be larger than %lu\n", + (u_long)siz)); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - siz, siz, &sum0[0]); + + if (esp_auth(m, off, m->m_pkthdr.len - off - siz, sav, sum)) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "auth fail in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_espauthfail++; + goto bad; + } + + if (bcmp(sum0, sum, siz) != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "auth fail in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_espauthfail++; + goto bad; + } + + /* strip off the authentication data */ + m_adj(m, -siz); + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - siz); + + m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM; + ipsec6stat.in_espauthsucc++; + } + + /* + * update sequence number. + */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) { + if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newesp *)esp)->esp_seq), sav)) { + ipsec6stat.in_espreplay++; + goto bad; + } + } + +noreplaycheck: + + /* process main esp header. */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + else + esplen = sizeof(struct newesp); + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + esplen + ivlen + sizeof(esptail)) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "IPv6 ESP input: packet too short\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, esplen + ivlen, IPPROTO_DONE); /* XXX */ +#else + IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct esp *, m, off, esplen + ivlen); + if (esp == NULL) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + m = NULL; + goto bad; + } +#endif + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); /* set it again just in case */ + + /* + * pre-compute and cache intermediate key + */ + if (esp_schedule(algo, sav) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + /* + * decrypt the packet. + */ + if (!algo->decrypt) + panic("internal error: no decrypt function"); + if ((*algo->decrypt)(m, off, sav, algo, ivlen)) { + /* m is already freed */ + m = NULL; + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "decrypt fail in IPv6 ESP input: %s\n", + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + ipsec6stat.in_esphist[sav->alg_enc]++; + + m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED; + + /* + * find the trailer of the ESP. + */ + m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(esptail), sizeof(esptail), + (caddr_t)&esptail); + nxt = esptail.esp_nxt; + taillen = esptail.esp_padlen + sizeof(esptail); + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < taillen + || m->m_pkthdr.len - taillen < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { /* ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "bad pad length in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + /* strip off the trailing pad area. */ + m_adj(m, -taillen); + + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - taillen); + + /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */ + if (!ipsec_tunnel_device && + ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + esplen + ivlen, nxt, sav)) { + /* + * strip off all the headers that precedes ESP header. + * IP6 xx ESP IP6' payload -> IP6' payload + * + * XXX more sanity checks + * XXX relationship with gif? + */ + u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */ + flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow; + m_adj(m, off + esplen + ivlen); + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + /* + * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing + * but there's no other way! + */ +#else + /* okay to pullup in m_pulldown style */ +#endif + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); + if (!m) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow); + if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch " + "in IPv6 ESP input: %s %s\n", + ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto bad; + } + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_ESP, spi) != 0 || + ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + goto bad; + } + + s = splimp(); + if (IF_QFULL(&ip6intrq)) { + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + splx(s); + goto bad; + } + IF_ENQUEUE(&ip6intrq, m); + m = NULL; + schednetisr(NETISR_IPV6); /* can be skipped but to make sure */ + splx(s); + nxt = IPPROTO_DONE; + } else { + /* + * strip off ESP header and IV. + * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off ESP so that + * we can always compute checksum for AH correctly. + */ + size_t stripsiz; + char *prvnxtp; + + /* + * Set the next header field of the previous header correctly. + */ + prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */ + *prvnxtp = nxt; + + stripsiz = esplen + ivlen; + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) { + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off); + m->m_data += stripsiz; + m->m_len -= stripsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz; + } else { + /* + * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on + * cluster + */ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT); + if (n == NULL) { + /* m is retained by m_split */ + goto bad; + } + m_adj(n, stripsiz); + m_cat(m, n); + /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */ + m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len; + } + +#ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST + /* + * KAME requires that the packet to be contiguous on the + * mbuf. We need to make that sure. + * this kind of code should be avoided. + * XXX other conditions to avoid running this part? + */ + if (m->m_len != m->m_pkthdr.len) { + struct mbuf *n = NULL; + int maxlen; + + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER); + maxlen = MHLEN; + if (n) + M_COPY_PKTHDR(n, m); + if (n && m->m_pkthdr.len > maxlen) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + maxlen = MCLBYTES; + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (!n) { + printf("esp6_input: mbuf allocation failed\n"); + goto bad; + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len <= maxlen) { + m_copydata(m, 0, m->m_pkthdr.len, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + n->m_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; + n->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_pkthdr.len; + n->m_next = NULL; + m_freem(m); + } else { + m_copydata(m, 0, maxlen, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + m_adj(m, maxlen); + n->m_len = maxlen; + n->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_pkthdr.len; + n->m_next = m; + m->m_flags &= ~M_PKTHDR; + } + m = n; + } +#endif + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz); + + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_ESP, spi) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + goto bad; + } + } + + *offp = off; + *mp = m; + + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + ipsec6stat.in_success++; + return nxt; + +bad: + if (sav) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP esp6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav)); + key_freesav(sav); + } + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return IPPROTO_DONE; +} + +void +esp6_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d) + int cmd; + struct sockaddr *sa; + void *d; +{ + const struct newesp *espp; + struct newesp esp; + struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL, ip6cp1; + struct secasvar *sav; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct mbuf *m; + int off=0; + struct sockaddr_in6 sa6_src, sa6_dst; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 || + sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return; + if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) + return; + + /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */ + if (d != NULL) { + ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d; + m = ip6cp->ip6c_m; + ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6; + off = ip6cp->ip6c_off; + } else { + m = NULL; + ip6 = NULL; + } + + if (ip6) { + /* + * Notify the error to all possible sockets via pfctlinput2. + * Since the upper layer information (such as protocol type, + * source and destination ports) is embedded in the encrypted + * data and might have been cut, we can't directly call + * an upper layer ctlinput function. However, the pcbnotify + * function will consider source and destination addresses + * as well as the flow info value, and may be able to find + * some PCB that should be notified. + * Although pfctlinput2 will call esp6_ctlinput(), there is + * no possibility of an infinite loop of function calls, + * because we don't pass the inner IPv6 header. + */ + bzero(&ip6cp1, sizeof(ip6cp1)); + ip6cp1.ip6c_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src; + pfctlinput2(cmd, sa, (void *)&ip6cp1); + + /* + * Then go to special cases that need ESP header information. + * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL, + * M and OFF are valid. + */ + + /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(esp)) + return; + + if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(esp)) { + /* + * this should be rare case, + * so we compromise on this copy... + */ + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(esp), (caddr_t)&esp); + espp = &esp; + } else + espp = (struct newesp*)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off); + + if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) { + int valid = 0; + + /* + * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to + * the address in the ICMP message payload. + */ + sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, + (caddr_t)&sa6_src.sin6_addr, + (caddr_t)&sa6_dst, IPPROTO_ESP, + espp->esp_spi); + if (sav) { + if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE || + sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING) + valid++; + key_freesav(sav); + } + + /* XXX Further validation? */ + + /* + * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table + * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will: + * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the + * corresponding routing entry, or + * - ignore the MTU change notification. + */ + icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid); + } + } else { + /* we normally notify any pcb here */ + } +} +#endif /* INET6 */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/esp_output.c @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/esp_output.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_output.c,v 1.44 2001/07/26 06:53:15 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC1827/2406 Encapsulated Security Payload. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#endif +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> + +static int esp_output __P((struct mbuf *, u_char *, struct mbuf *, + struct ipsecrequest *, int)); + +/* + * compute ESP header size. + */ +size_t +esp_hdrsiz(isr) + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + struct secasvar *sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + const struct ah_algorithm *aalgo; + size_t ivlen; + size_t authlen; + size_t hdrsiz; + + /* sanity check */ + if (isr == NULL) + panic("esp_hdrsiz: NULL was passed.\n"); + + sav = isr->sav; + + if (isr->saidx.proto != IPPROTO_ESP) + panic("unsupported mode passed to esp_hdrsiz"); + + if (sav == NULL) + goto estimate; + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) + goto estimate; + + /* we need transport mode ESP. */ + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) + goto estimate; + ivlen = sav->ivlen; + if (ivlen < 0) + goto estimate; + + /* + * XXX + * right now we don't calcurate the padding size. simply + * treat the padding size as constant, for simplicity. + * + * XXX variable size padding support + */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + hdrsiz = sizeof(struct esp) + ivlen + 9; + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + aalgo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (aalgo && sav->replay && sav->key_auth) + authlen = (aalgo->sumsiz)(sav); + else + authlen = 0; + hdrsiz = sizeof(struct newesp) + ivlen + 9 + authlen; + } + + return hdrsiz; + + estimate: + /* + * ASSUMING: + * sizeof(struct newesp) > sizeof(struct esp). + * esp_max_ivlen() = max ivlen for CBC mode + * 9 = (maximum padding length without random padding length) + * + (Pad Length field) + (Next Header field). + * 16 = maximum ICV we support. + */ + return sizeof(struct newesp) + esp_max_ivlen() + 9 + 16; +} + +/* + * Modify the packet so that the payload is encrypted. + * The mbuf (m) must start with IPv4 or IPv6 header. + * On failure, free the given mbuf and return NULL. + * + * on invocation: + * m nexthdrp md + * v v v + * IP ......... payload + * during the encryption: + * m nexthdrp mprev md + * v v v v + * IP ............... esp iv payload pad padlen nxthdr + * <--><-><------><---------------> + * esplen plen extendsiz + * ivlen + * <-----> esphlen + * <-> hlen + * <-----------------> espoff + */ +static int +esp_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr, af) + struct mbuf *m; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *md; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + int af; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct mbuf *mprev; + struct esp *esp; + struct esptail *esptail; + struct secasvar *sav = isr->sav; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + u_int32_t spi; + u_int8_t nxt = 0; + size_t plen; /* payload length to be encrypted */ + size_t espoff; + int ivlen; + int afnumber; + size_t extendsiz; + int error = 0; + struct ipsecstat *stat; + + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + afnumber = 4; + stat = &ipsecstat; + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + afnumber = 6; + stat = &ipsec6stat; + break; +#endif + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_output: unsupported af %d\n", af)); + return 0; /* no change at all */ + } + + /* some sanity check */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && !sav->replay) { + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + { + struct ip *ip; + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp4_output: internal error: " + "sav->replay is null: %x->%x, SPI=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(ip->ip_src.s_addr), + (u_int32_t)ntohl(ip->ip_dst.s_addr), + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + break; + } +#endif /* INET */ +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp6_output: internal error: " + "sav->replay is null: SPI=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + break; +#endif /* INET6 */ + default: + panic("esp_output: should not reach here"); + } + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_output: unsupported algorithm: " + "SPI=%u\n", (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + spi = sav->spi; + ivlen = sav->ivlen; + /* should be okey */ + if (ivlen < 0) { + panic("invalid ivlen"); + } + + { + /* + * insert ESP header. + * XXX inserts ESP header right after IPv4 header. should + * chase the header chain. + * XXX sequential number + */ +#ifdef INET + struct ip *ip = NULL; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL; +#endif + size_t esplen; /* sizeof(struct esp/newesp) */ + size_t esphlen; /* sizeof(struct esp/newesp) + ivlen */ + size_t hlen = 0; /* ip header len */ + + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { + /* RFC 1827 */ + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + } else { + /* RFC 2406 */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) + esplen = sizeof(struct esp); + else + esplen = sizeof(struct newesp); + } + esphlen = esplen + ivlen; + + for (mprev = m; mprev && mprev->m_next != md; mprev = mprev->m_next) + ; + if (mprev == NULL || mprev->m_next != md) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp%d_output: md is not in chain\n", + afnumber)); + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + + plen = 0; + for (n = md; n; n = n->m_next) + plen += n->m_len; + + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + hlen = sizeof(*ip6); + break; +#endif + } + + /* make the packet over-writable */ + mprev->m_next = NULL; + if ((md = ipsec_copypkt(md)) == NULL) { + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + mprev->m_next = md; + + espoff = m->m_pkthdr.len - plen; + + /* + * grow the mbuf to accomodate ESP header. + * before: IP ... payload + * after: IP ... ESP IV payload + */ + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(md) < esphlen || (md->m_flags & M_EXT) != 0) { + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + n->m_len = esphlen; + mprev->m_next = n; + n->m_next = md; + m->m_pkthdr.len += esphlen; + esp = mtod(n, struct esp *); + } else { + md->m_len += esphlen; + md->m_data -= esphlen; + m->m_pkthdr.len += esphlen; + esp = mtod(md, struct esp *); + } + + nxt = *nexthdrp; + *nexthdrp = IPPROTO_ESP; + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + if (esphlen < (IP_MAXPACKET - ntohs(ip->ip_len))) + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) + esphlen); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "IPv4 ESP output: size exceeds limit\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + /* total packet length will be computed in ip6_output() */ + break; +#endif + } + } + + /* initialize esp header. */ + esp->esp_spi = spi; + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) { + struct newesp *nesp; + nesp = (struct newesp *)esp; + if (sav->replay->count == ~0) { + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { + /* XXX Is it noisy ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, + "replay counter overflowed. %s\n", + ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + stat->out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + } + sav->replay->count++; + /* + * XXX sequence number must not be cycled, if the SA is + * installed by IKE daemon. + */ + nesp->esp_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); + } + + { + /* + * find the last mbuf. make some room for ESP trailer. + */ +#ifdef INET + struct ip *ip = NULL; +#endif + size_t padbound; + u_char *extend; + int i; + int randpadmax; + + if (algo->padbound) + padbound = algo->padbound; + else + padbound = 4; + /* ESP packet, including nxthdr field, must be length of 4n */ + if (padbound < 4) + padbound = 4; + + extendsiz = padbound - (plen % padbound); + if (extendsiz == 1) + extendsiz = padbound + 1; + + /* random padding */ + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + randpadmax = ip4_esp_randpad; + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + randpadmax = ip6_esp_randpad; + break; +#endif + default: + randpadmax = -1; + break; + } + if (randpadmax < 0 || plen + extendsiz >= randpadmax) + ; + else { + int n; + + /* round */ + randpadmax = (randpadmax / padbound) * padbound; + n = (randpadmax - plen + extendsiz) / padbound; + + if (n > 0) + n = (random() % n) * padbound; + else + n = 0; + + /* + * make sure we do not pad too much. + * MLEN limitation comes from the trailer attachment + * code below. + * 256 limitation comes from sequential padding. + * also, the 1-octet length field in ESP trailer imposes + * limitation (but is less strict than sequential padding + * as length field do not count the last 2 octets). + */ + if (extendsiz + n <= MLEN && extendsiz + n < 256) + extendsiz += n; + } + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (extendsiz > MLEN || extendsiz >= 256) + panic("extendsiz too big in esp_output"); +#endif + + n = m; + while (n->m_next) + n = n->m_next; + + /* + * if M_EXT, the external mbuf data may be shared among + * two consequtive TCP packets, and it may be unsafe to use the + * trailing space. + */ + if (!(n->m_flags & M_EXT) && extendsiz < M_TRAILINGSPACE(n)) { + extend = mtod(n, u_char *) + n->m_len; + n->m_len += extendsiz; + m->m_pkthdr.len += extendsiz; + } else { + struct mbuf *nn; + + MGET(nn, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!nn) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp%d_output: can't alloc mbuf", + afnumber)); + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + extend = mtod(nn, u_char *); + nn->m_len = extendsiz; + nn->m_next = NULL; + n->m_next = nn; + n = nn; + m->m_pkthdr.len += extendsiz; + } + switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) { + case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND: + key_randomfill(extend, extendsiz); + break; + case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO: + bzero(extend, extendsiz); + break; + case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ: + for (i = 0; i < extendsiz; i++) + extend[i] = (i + 1) & 0xff; + break; + } + + /* initialize esp trailer. */ + esptail = (struct esptail *) + (mtod(n, u_int8_t *) + n->m_len - sizeof(struct esptail)); + esptail->esp_nxt = nxt; + esptail->esp_padlen = extendsiz - 2; + + /* modify IP header (for ESP header part only) */ + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + if (extendsiz < (IP_MAXPACKET - ntohs(ip->ip_len))) + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) + extendsiz); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "IPv4 ESP output: size exceeds limit\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + /* total packet length will be computed in ip6_output() */ + break; +#endif + } + } + + /* + * pre-compute and cache intermediate key + */ + error = esp_schedule(algo, sav); + if (error) { + m_freem(m); + stat->out_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * encrypt the packet, based on security association + * and the algorithm specified. + */ + if (!algo->encrypt) + panic("internal error: no encrypt function"); + if ((*algo->encrypt)(m, espoff, plen + extendsiz, sav, algo, ivlen)) { + /* m is already freed */ + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "packet encryption failure\n")); + stat->out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* + * calculate ICV if required. + */ + if (!sav->replay) + goto noantireplay; + if (!sav->key_auth) + goto noantireplay; + if (sav->key_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) + goto noantireplay; + + { + const struct ah_algorithm *aalgo; + u_char authbuf[AH_MAXSUMSIZE]; + struct mbuf *n; + u_char *p; + size_t siz; +#ifdef INET + struct ip *ip; +#endif + + aalgo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!aalgo) + goto noantireplay; + siz = ((aalgo->sumsiz)(sav) + 3) & ~(4 - 1); + if (AH_MAXSUMSIZE < siz) + panic("assertion failed for AH_MAXSUMSIZE"); + + if (esp_auth(m, espoff, m->m_pkthdr.len - espoff, sav, authbuf)) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ESP checksum generation failure\n")); + m_freem(m); + error = EINVAL; + stat->out_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + n = m; + while (n->m_next) + n = n->m_next; + + if (!(n->m_flags & M_EXT) && siz < M_TRAILINGSPACE(n)) { /* XXX */ + n->m_len += siz; + m->m_pkthdr.len += siz; + p = mtod(n, u_char *) + n->m_len - siz; + } else { + struct mbuf *nn; + + MGET(nn, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!nn) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "can't alloc mbuf in esp%d_output", + afnumber)); + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + nn->m_len = siz; + nn->m_next = NULL; + n->m_next = nn; + n = nn; + m->m_pkthdr.len += siz; + p = mtod(nn, u_char *); + } + bcopy(authbuf, p, siz); + + /* modify IP header (for ESP header part only) */ + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + if (siz < (IP_MAXPACKET - ntohs(ip->ip_len))) + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) + siz); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "IPv4 ESP output: size exceeds limit\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + /* total packet length will be computed in ip6_output() */ + break; +#endif + } + } + +noantireplay: + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "NULL mbuf after encryption in esp%d_output", afnumber)); + } else + stat->out_success++; + stat->out_esphist[sav->alg_enc]++; + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + return 0; + +fail: +#if 1 + return error; +#else + panic("something bad in esp_output"); +#endif +} + +#ifdef INET +int +esp4_output(m, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + struct ip *ip; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp4_output: first mbuf too short\n")); + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + /* XXX assumes that m->m_next points to payload */ + return esp_output(m, &ip->ip_p, m->m_next, isr, AF_INET); +} +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +int +esp6_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *md; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "esp6_output: first mbuf too short\n")); + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + return esp_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr, AF_INET6); +} +#endif /* INET6 */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/esp_rijndael.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_rijndael.c,v 1.4 2001/03/02 05:53:05 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#include <netinet6/esp_rijndael.h> + +#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h> + +/* as rijndael uses assymetric scheduled keys, we need to do it twice. */ +int +esp_rijndael_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(keyInstance) * 2; +} + +int +esp_rijndael_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + keyInstance *k; + + k = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[0], DIR_DECRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, + _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) + return -1; + if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[1], DIR_ENCRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, + _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +esp_rijndael_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + cipherInstance c; + keyInstance *p; + + /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */ + bzero(&c, sizeof(c)); + if (rijndael_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0) + return -1; + p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (rijndael_blockDecrypt(&c, &p[0], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +esp_rijndael_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + cipherInstance c; + keyInstance *p; + + /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */ + bzero(&c, sizeof(c)); + if (rijndael_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0) + return -1; + p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (rijndael_blockEncrypt(&c, &p[1], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/esp_twofish.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/esp_twofish.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: esp_twofish.c,v 1.4 2001/03/02 07:04:57 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#include <netinet6/esp_twofish.h> + +#include <crypto/twofish/twofish.h> + +/* + * twofish actually do not use assymetric scheduled keys, however, AES C API + * suggests assymetric key setup. + */ +int +esp_twofish_schedlen(algo) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +{ + + return sizeof(keyInstance) * 2; +} + +int +esp_twofish_schedule(algo, sav) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + keyInstance *k; + + k = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (twofish_makeKey(&k[0], DIR_DECRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, + _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) + return -1; + if (twofish_makeKey(&k[1], DIR_ENCRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, + _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +esp_twofish_blockdecrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + cipherInstance c; + keyInstance *p; + + /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */ + bzero(&c, sizeof(c)); + if (twofish_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0) + return -1; + p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (twofish_blockDecrypt(&c, &p[0], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +esp_twofish_blockencrypt(algo, sav, s, d) + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t *s; + u_int8_t *d; +{ + cipherInstance c; + keyInstance *p; + + /* does not take advantage of CBC mode support */ + bzero(&c, sizeof(c)); + if (twofish_cipherInit(&c, MODE_ECB, NULL) < 0) + return -1; + p = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; + if (twofish_blockEncrypt(&c, &p[1], s, algo->padbound * 8, d) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c @@ -0,0 +1,661 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: in6_gif.c,v 1.88 2001/12/21 03:32:34 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* define it if you want to use encap_attach_func (it helps *BSD merge) */ +/*#define USE_ENCAPCHECK*/ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/sockio.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3) +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#endif +#include <sys/queue.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#endif + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#ifdef INET +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#endif +#include <netinet/ip_encap.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#include <netinet6/in6_gif.h> +#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> +#endif +#include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ +#include <netinet/ip_ipsp.h> +#endif + +#include <net/if_gif.h> + +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ +#include "bridge.h" +#endif + +static int gif_validate6 __P((const struct ip6_hdr *, struct gif_softc *, + struct ifnet *)); +static int in6_gif_rtcachettl = 300; /* XXX see in_gif.c */ + +int ip6_gif_hlim = GIF_HLIM; + +extern struct domain inet6domain; +struct ip6protosw in6_gif_protosw = +{ SOCK_RAW, &inet6domain, 0/* IPPROTO_IPV[46] */, PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR, + in6_gif_input, rip6_output, in6_gif_ctlinput, rip6_ctloutput, +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + 0, +#else + rip6_usrreq, +#endif + 0, 0, 0, 0, +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + &rip6_usrreqs +#endif +}; + +extern LIST_HEAD(, gif_softc) gif_softc_list; + +#ifndef offsetof +#define offsetof(s, e) ((int)&((s *)0)->e) +#endif + +int +in6_gif_output(ifp, family, m) + struct ifnet *ifp; + int family; /* family of the packet to be encapsulate. */ + struct mbuf *m; +{ +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + struct gif_softc *sc = (struct gif_softc*)ifp; + struct sockaddr_in6 *dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sc->gif_ro6.ro_dst; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_src = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_psrc; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_pdst; + struct tdb tdb; + struct xformsw xfs; + int error; + int hlen, poff; + struct mbuf *mp; + long time_second; + + if (sin6_src == NULL || sin6_dst == NULL || + sin6_src->sin6_family != AF_INET6 || + sin6_dst->sin6_family != AF_INET6) { + m_freem(m); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + + /* setup dummy tdb. it highly depends on ipip_output() code. */ + bzero(&tdb, sizeof(tdb)); + bzero(&xfs, sizeof(xfs)); + tdb.tdb_src.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + tdb.tdb_src.sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + tdb.tdb_src.sin6.sin6_addr = sin6_src->sin6_addr; + tdb.tdb_dst.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + tdb.tdb_dst.sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + tdb.tdb_dst.sin6.sin6_addr = sin6_dst->sin6_addr; + tdb.tdb_xform = &xfs; + xfs.xf_type = -1; /* not XF_IP4 */ + + switch (family) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + { + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip)); + if (!m) + return ENOBUFS; + } + hlen = (mtod(m, struct ip *)->ip_hl) << 2; + poff = offsetof(struct ip, ip_p); + break; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + { + hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + poff = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt); + break; + } +#endif +#if NBRIDGE > 0 + case AF_LINK: + break; +#endif /* NBRIDGE */ + default: +#ifdef DEBUG + printf("in6_gif_output: warning: unknown family %d passed\n", + family); +#endif + m_freem(m); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + +#if NBRIDGE > 0 + if (family == AF_LINK) { + mp = NULL; + error = etherip_output(m, &tdb, &mp, 0, 0); + if (error) + return error; + else if (mp == NULL) + return EFAULT; + + m = mp; + goto sendit; + } +#endif /* NBRIDGE */ + + /* encapsulate into IPv6 packet */ + mp = NULL; + error = ipip_output(m, &tdb, &mp, hlen, poff); + if (error) + return error; + else if (mp == NULL) + return EFAULT; + + m = mp; + +#if NBRIDGE > 0 + sendit: +#endif /* NBRIDGE */ + /* + * compare address family just for safety. other validity checks + * are made in in6_selectsrc() called from ip6_output(). + */ + if (sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt && (dst->sin6_family != sin6_dst->sin6_family || + sc->rtcache_expire == 0 || + time_second >= sc->rtcache_expire)) { + RTFREE(sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt); + sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt = NULL; + } + +#ifdef IPV6_MINMTU + /* + * force fragmentation to minimum MTU, to avoid path MTU discovery. + * it is too painful to ask for resend of inner packet, to achieve + * path MTU discovery for encapsulated packets. + */ + error = ip6_output(m, 0, &sc->gif_ro6, IPV6_MINMTU, 0, NULL); +#else + error = ip6_output(m, 0, &sc->gif_ro6, 0, 0, NULL); +#endif + + if (sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt && time_second >= sc->rtcache_expire) + sc->rtcache_expire = time_second + in6_gif_rtcachettl; + + return(error); +#else /* !__OpenBSD__ */ + struct gif_softc *sc = (struct gif_softc*)ifp; + struct sockaddr_in6 *dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sc->gif_ro6.ro_dst; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_src = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_psrc; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_pdst; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + int proto, error; + u_int8_t itos, otos; +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3) + long time_second; +#endif + + if (sin6_src == NULL || sin6_dst == NULL || + sin6_src->sin6_family != AF_INET6 || + sin6_dst->sin6_family != AF_INET6) { + m_freem(m); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + + switch (family) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + { + struct ip *ip; + + proto = IPPROTO_IPV4; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); + if (!m) + return ENOBUFS; + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + itos = ip->ip_tos; + break; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + { + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + proto = IPPROTO_IPV6; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); + if (!m) + return ENOBUFS; + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + itos = (ntohl(ip6->ip6_flow) >> 20) & 0xff; + break; + } +#endif +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && defined(ISO) + case AF_ISO: + proto = IPPROTO_EON; + itos = 0; + break; +#endif + default: +#ifdef DEBUG + printf("in6_gif_output: warning: unknown family %d passed\n", + family); +#endif + m_freem(m); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + + /* prepend new IP header */ + M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), M_DONTWAIT); + if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + if (m == NULL) + return ENOBUFS; + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_flow = 0; + ip6->ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; + ip6->ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; + ip6->ip6_plen = htons((u_short)m->m_pkthdr.len); + ip6->ip6_nxt = proto; + ip6->ip6_hlim = ip6_gif_hlim; + ip6->ip6_src = sin6_src->sin6_addr; + /* bidirectional configured tunnel mode */ + if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&sin6_dst->sin6_addr)) + ip6->ip6_dst = sin6_dst->sin6_addr; + else { + m_freem(m); + return ENETUNREACH; + } + if (ifp->if_flags & IFF_LINK1) + ip_ecn_ingress(ECN_ALLOWED, &otos, &itos); + else + ip_ecn_ingress(ECN_NOCARE, &otos, &itos); + ip6->ip6_flow &= ~ntohl(0xff00000); + ip6->ip6_flow |= htonl((u_int32_t)otos << 20); + +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3) + time_second = time.tv_sec; +#endif + /* + * compare address family just for safety. other validity checks + * are made in in6_selectsrc() called from ip6_output(). + */ + if (sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt && (dst->sin6_family != sin6_dst->sin6_family || + sc->rtcache_expire == 0 || + time_second >= sc->rtcache_expire)) { + /* + * If the cached route is not valid or has expired, + * clear the stale cache and let ip6_output make a new cached + * route. + */ + RTFREE(sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt); + sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt = NULL; + } + +#ifdef IPV6_MINMTU + /* + * force fragmentation to minimum MTU, to avoid path MTU discovery. + * it is too painful to ask for resend of inner packet, to achieve + * path MTU discovery for encapsulated packets. + */ + error = ip6_output(m, 0, &sc->gif_ro6, IPV6_MINMTU, 0, NULL); +#else + error = ip6_output(m, 0, &sc->gif_ro6, 0, 0, NULL); +#endif + + /* + * if a (new) cached route has been created in ip6_output(), extend + * the expiration time. + */ + if (sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt && time_second >= sc->rtcache_expire) + sc->rtcache_expire = time_second + in6_gif_rtcachettl; + + return(error); +#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ +} + +int in6_gif_input(mp, offp, proto) + struct mbuf **mp; + int *offp, proto; +{ + struct mbuf *m = *mp; + struct ifnet *gifp = NULL; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; +#ifndef __OpenBSD__ + int af = 0; + u_int32_t otos; +#endif + + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + + gifp = (struct ifnet *)encap_getarg(m); + + if (gifp == NULL || (gifp->if_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) { + m_freem(m); + ip6stat.ip6s_nogif++; + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } +#ifndef USE_ENCAPCHECK + if (!gif_validate6(ip6, (struct gif_softc *)gifp, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif)) { + m_freem(m); + ip6stat.ip6s_nogif++; + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } +#endif + +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = gifp; + gifp->if_ipackets++; + gifp->if_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len; + ipip_input(m, *offp, gifp); + return IPPROTO_DONE; +#else + otos = ip6->ip6_flow; + m_adj(m, *offp); + + switch (proto) { +#ifdef INET + case IPPROTO_IPV4: + { + struct ip *ip; + u_int8_t otos8; + af = AF_INET; + otos8 = (ntohl(otos) >> 20) & 0xff; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip)); + if (!m) + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + if (gifp->if_flags & IFF_LINK1) + ip_ecn_egress(ECN_ALLOWED, &otos8, &ip->ip_tos); + else + ip_ecn_egress(ECN_NOCARE, &otos8, &ip->ip_tos); + break; + } +#endif /* INET */ +#ifdef INET6 + case IPPROTO_IPV6: + { + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + af = AF_INET6; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6)); + if (!m) + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + if (gifp->if_flags & IFF_LINK1) + ip6_ecn_egress(ECN_ALLOWED, &otos, &ip6->ip6_flow); + else + ip6_ecn_egress(ECN_NOCARE, &otos, &ip6->ip6_flow); + break; + } +#endif +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && defined(ISO) + case IPPROTO_EON: + af = AF_ISO; + break; +#endif + default: + ip6stat.ip6s_nogif++; + m_freem(m); + return IPPROTO_DONE; + } + + gif_input(m, af, gifp); + return IPPROTO_DONE; +#endif +} + +/* + * validate outer address. + */ +static int +gif_validate6(ip6, sc, ifp) + const struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct gif_softc *sc; + struct ifnet *ifp; +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *src, *dst; + + src = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_psrc; + dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sc->gif_pdst; + + /* check for address match */ + if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&src->sin6_addr, &ip6->ip6_dst) || + !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&dst->sin6_addr, &ip6->ip6_src)) + return 0; + + /* martian filters on outer source - done in ip6_input */ + + /* ingress filters on outer source */ + if ((sc->gif_if.if_flags & IFF_LINK2) == 0 && ifp) { + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + struct rtentry *rt; + + bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + sin6.sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_src; + /* XXX scopeid */ +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ + rt = rtalloc1((struct sockaddr *)&sin6, 0, 0UL); +#else + rt = rtalloc1((struct sockaddr *)&sin6, 0); +#endif + if (!rt || rt->rt_ifp != ifp) { +#if 0 + log(LOG_WARNING, "%s: packet from %s dropped " + "due to ingress filter\n", if_name(&sc->gif_if), + ip6_sprintf(&sin6.sin6_addr)); +#endif + if (rt) + rtfree(rt); + return 0; + } + rtfree(rt); + } + + return 128 * 2; +} + +/* + * we know that we are in IFF_UP, outer address available, and outer family + * matched the physical addr family. see gif_encapcheck(). + */ +int +gif_encapcheck6(m, off, proto, arg) + const struct mbuf *m; + int off; + int proto; + void *arg; +{ + struct ip6_hdr ip6; + struct gif_softc *sc; + struct ifnet *ifp; + + /* sanity check done in caller */ + sc = (struct gif_softc *)arg; + + /* LINTED const cast */ + m_copydata((struct mbuf *)m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t)&ip6); + ifp = ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) ? m->m_pkthdr.rcvif : NULL; + + return gif_validate6(&ip6, sc, ifp); +} + +int +in6_gif_attach(sc) + struct gif_softc *sc; +{ +#ifndef USE_ENCAPCHECK + struct sockaddr_in6 mask6; + + bzero(&mask6, sizeof(mask6)); + mask6.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[0] = mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[1] = + mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[2] = mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] = ~0; + + if (!sc->gif_psrc || !sc->gif_pdst) + return EINVAL; + sc->encap_cookie6 = encap_attach(AF_INET6, -1, sc->gif_psrc, + (struct sockaddr *)&mask6, sc->gif_pdst, (struct sockaddr *)&mask6, + (struct protosw *)&in6_gif_protosw, sc); +#else + sc->encap_cookie6 = encap_attach_func(AF_INET6, -1, gif_encapcheck, + (struct protosw *)&in6_gif_protosw, sc); +#endif + if (sc->encap_cookie6 == NULL) + return EEXIST; + return 0; +} + +int +in6_gif_detach(sc) + struct gif_softc *sc; +{ + int error; + + error = encap_detach(sc->encap_cookie6); + if (error == 0) + sc->encap_cookie6 = NULL; + return error; +} + +void +in6_gif_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d) + int cmd; + struct sockaddr *sa; + void *d; +{ + struct gif_softc *sc; + struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL; + struct mbuf *m; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + int off; + void *cmdarg; + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src = NULL; + struct sockaddr_in6 *dst6; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 || + sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return; + + if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS) + return; + if (cmd == PRC_HOSTDEAD) + d = NULL; + else if (inet6ctlerrmap[cmd] == 0) + return; + + /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */ + if (d != NULL) { + ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d; + m = ip6cp->ip6c_m; + ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6; + off = ip6cp->ip6c_off; + cmdarg = ip6cp->ip6c_cmdarg; + sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src; + } else { + m = NULL; + ip6 = NULL; + cmdarg = NULL; + sa6_src = &sa6_any; + } + + if (!ip6) + return; + + /* + * for now we don't care which type it was, just flush the route cache. + * XXX slow. sc (or sc->encap_cookie6) should be passed from + * ip_encap.c. + */ + for (sc = LIST_FIRST(&gif_softc_list); sc; + sc = LIST_NEXT(sc, gif_list)) { + if ((sc->gif_if.if_flags & IFF_RUNNING) == 0) + continue; + if (sc->gif_psrc->sa_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (!sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt) + continue; + + dst6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sc->gif_ro6.ro_dst; + /* XXX scope */ + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6->ip6_dst, &dst6->sin6_addr)) { + /* flush route cache */ + RTFREE(sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt); + sc->gif_ro6.ro_rt = NULL; + } + } +}
--- a/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ip6_output.c +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ip6_output.c @@ -2775,10 +2775,10 @@ do { \ struct mbuf **mp = &m; error = soopt_getm(sopt, &m); /* XXX */ - if (error != NULL) + if (error != 0) break; error = soopt_mcopyin(sopt, m); /* XXX */ - if (error != NULL) + if (error != 0) break; #endif if (m) {
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_core.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ipcomp_core.c,v 1.25 2001/07/26 06:53:17 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC2393 IP payload compression protocol (IPComp). + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/netisr.h> +#include <net/zlib.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipcomp.h> +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> + +static void *deflate_alloc __P((void *, u_int, u_int)); +static void deflate_free __P((void *, void *)); +static int deflate_common __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, size_t *, int)); +static int deflate_compress __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, size_t *)); +static int deflate_decompress __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, size_t *)); + +/* + * We need to use default window size (2^15 = 32Kbytes as of writing) for + * inbound case. Otherwise we get interop problem. + * Use negative value to avoid Adler32 checksum. This is an undocumented + * feature in zlib (see ipsec wg mailing list archive in January 2000). + */ +static int deflate_policy = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION; +static int deflate_window_out = -12; +static const int deflate_window_in = -1 * MAX_WBITS; /* don't change it */ +static int deflate_memlevel = MAX_MEM_LEVEL; + +static const struct ipcomp_algorithm ipcomp_algorithms[] = { + { deflate_compress, deflate_decompress, 90 }, +}; + +const struct ipcomp_algorithm * +ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(idx) + int idx; +{ + + if (idx == SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE) + return &ipcomp_algorithms[0]; + return NULL; +} + +static void * +deflate_alloc(aux, items, siz) + void *aux; + u_int items; + u_int siz; +{ + void *ptr; + ptr = malloc(items * siz, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT); + return ptr; +} + +static void +deflate_free(aux, ptr) + void *aux; + void *ptr; +{ + free(ptr, M_TEMP); +} + +static int +deflate_common(m, md, lenp, mode) + struct mbuf *m; + struct mbuf *md; + size_t *lenp; + int mode; /* 0: compress 1: decompress */ +{ + struct mbuf *mprev; + struct mbuf *p; + struct mbuf *n = NULL, *n0 = NULL, **np; + z_stream zs; + int error = 0; + int zerror; + size_t offset; + +#define MOREBLOCK() \ +do { \ + /* keep the reply buffer into our chain */ \ + if (n) { \ + n->m_len = zs.total_out - offset; \ + offset = zs.total_out; \ + *np = n; \ + np = &n->m_next; \ + n = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + /* get a fresh reply buffer */ \ + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); \ + if (n) { \ + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); \ + } \ + if (!n) { \ + error = ENOBUFS; \ + goto fail; \ + } \ + n->m_len = 0; \ + n->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(n); \ + n->m_next = NULL; \ + /* \ + * if this is the first reply buffer, reserve \ + * region for ipcomp header. \ + */ \ + if (*np == NULL) { \ + n->m_len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); \ + n->m_data += sizeof(struct ipcomp); \ + } \ + \ + zs.next_out = mtod(n, u_int8_t *); \ + zs.avail_out = n->m_len; \ +} while (0) + + for (mprev = m; mprev && mprev->m_next != md; mprev = mprev->m_next) + ; + if (!mprev) + panic("md is not in m in deflate_common"); + + bzero(&zs, sizeof(zs)); + zs.zalloc = deflate_alloc; + zs.zfree = deflate_free; + + zerror = mode ? inflateInit2(&zs, deflate_window_in) + : deflateInit2(&zs, deflate_policy, Z_DEFLATED, + deflate_window_out, deflate_memlevel, + Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY); + if (zerror != Z_OK) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + + n0 = n = NULL; + np = &n0; + offset = 0; + zerror = 0; + p = md; + while (p && p->m_len == 0) { + p = p->m_next; + } + + /* input stream and output stream are available */ + while (p && zs.avail_in == 0) { + /* get input buffer */ + if (p && zs.avail_in == 0) { + zs.next_in = mtod(p, u_int8_t *); + zs.avail_in = p->m_len; + p = p->m_next; + while (p && p->m_len == 0) { + p = p->m_next; + } + } + + /* get output buffer */ + if (zs.next_out == NULL || zs.avail_out == 0) { + MOREBLOCK(); + } + + zerror = mode ? inflate(&zs, Z_NO_FLUSH) + : deflate(&zs, Z_NO_FLUSH); + + if (zerror == Z_STREAM_END) + ; /* once more. */ + else if (zerror == Z_OK) { + /* inflate: Z_OK can indicate the end of decode */ + if (mode && !p && zs.avail_out != 0) + goto terminate; + else + ; /* once more. */ + } else { + if (zs.msg) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflate(Z_NO_FLUSH): %s\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zs.msg)); + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflate(Z_NO_FLUSH): unknown error (%d)\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zerror)); + } + mode ? inflateEnd(&zs) : deflateEnd(&zs); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + } + + if (zerror == Z_STREAM_END) + goto terminate; + + /* termination */ + while (1) { + /* get output buffer */ + if (zs.next_out == NULL || zs.avail_out == 0) { + MOREBLOCK(); + } + + zerror = mode ? inflate(&zs, Z_FINISH) + : deflate(&zs, Z_FINISH); + + if (zerror == Z_STREAM_END) + break; + else if (zerror == Z_OK) + ; /* once more. */ + else { + if (zs.msg) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflate(Z_FINISH): %s\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zs.msg)); + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflate(Z_FINISH): unknown error (%d)\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zerror)); + } + mode ? inflateEnd(&zs) : deflateEnd(&zs); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + } + +terminate: + zerror = mode ? inflateEnd(&zs) : deflateEnd(&zs); + if (zerror != Z_OK) { + if (zs.msg) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflateEnd: %s\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zs.msg)); + } else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_%scompress: " + "%sflateEnd: unknown error (%d)\n", + mode ? "de" : "", mode ? "in" : "de", + zerror)); + } + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + /* keep the final reply buffer into our chain */ + if (n) { + n->m_len = zs.total_out - offset; + offset = zs.total_out; + *np = n; + np = &n->m_next; + n = NULL; + } + + /* switch the mbuf to the new one */ + mprev->m_next = n0; + m_freem(md); + *lenp = zs.total_out; + + return 0; + +fail: + if (m) + m_freem(m); + if (n) + m_freem(n); + if (n0) + m_freem(n0); + return error; +#undef MOREBLOCK +} + +static int +deflate_compress(m, md, lenp) + struct mbuf *m; + struct mbuf *md; + size_t *lenp; +{ + if (!m) + panic("m == NULL in deflate_compress"); + if (!md) + panic("md == NULL in deflate_compress"); + if (!lenp) + panic("lenp == NULL in deflate_compress"); + + return deflate_common(m, md, lenp, 0); +} + +static int +deflate_decompress(m, md, lenp) + struct mbuf *m; + struct mbuf *md; + size_t *lenp; +{ + if (!m) + panic("m == NULL in deflate_decompress"); + if (!md) + panic("md == NULL in deflate_decompress"); + if (!lenp) + panic("lenp == NULL in deflate_decompress"); + + return deflate_common(m, md, lenp, 1); +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ipcomp_input.c,v 1.29 2001/09/04 08:43:19 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC2393 IP payload compression protocol (IPComp). + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#endif +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/netisr.h> +#include <net/zlib.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#endif +#include <netinet6/ipcomp.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> + +#define IPLEN_FLIPPED + +#ifdef INET +extern struct protosw inetsw[]; +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(__NetBSD__) +extern u_char ip_protox[]; +#endif + +void +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) +ipcomp4_input(m, off) + struct mbuf *m; + int off; +#else +#if __STDC__ +ipcomp4_input(struct mbuf *m, ...) +#else +ipcomp4_input(m, va_alist) + struct mbuf *m; + va_dcl +#endif +#endif /* (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ +{ + struct mbuf *md; + struct ip *ip; + struct ipcomp *ipcomp; + const struct ipcomp_algorithm *algo; + u_int16_t cpi; /* host order */ + u_int16_t nxt; + size_t hlen; + int error; + size_t newlen, olen; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + int off, proto; + va_list ap; +#endif /* !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) */ + +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4) + va_start(ap, m); + off = va_arg(ap, int); + proto = va_arg(ap, int); + va_end(ap); +#endif + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(struct ipcomp)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 IPComp input: assumption failed " + "(packet too short)\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + + md = m_pulldown(m, off, sizeof(*ipcomp), NULL); + if (!m) { + m = NULL; /* already freed */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 IPComp input: assumption failed " + "(pulldown failure)\n")); + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + ipcomp = mtod(md, struct ipcomp *); + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + nxt = ipcomp->comp_nxt; +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + + cpi = ntohs(ipcomp->comp_cpi); + + if (cpi >= IPCOMP_CPI_NEGOTIATE_MIN) { + sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, + (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst, IPPROTO_IPCOMP, htonl(cpi)); + if (sav != NULL + && (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + || sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)) { + cpi = sav->alg_enc; /* XXX */ + /* other parameters to look at? */ + } + } + algo = ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(cpi); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "IPv4 IPComp input: unknown cpi %u\n", + cpi)); + ipsecstat.in_nosa++; + goto fail; + } + + /* chop ipcomp header */ + ipcomp = NULL; + md->m_data += sizeof(struct ipcomp); + md->m_len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); + m->m_pkthdr.len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - sizeof(struct ipcomp)); +#endif + + olen = m->m_pkthdr.len; + newlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - off; + error = (*algo->decompress)(m, m->m_next, &newlen); + if (error != 0) { + if (error == EINVAL) + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + else if (error == ENOBUFS) + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + m = NULL; + goto fail; + } + ipsecstat.in_comphist[cpi]++; + + /* + * returning decompressed packet onto icmp is meaningless. + * mark it decrypted to prevent icmp from attaching original packet. + */ + m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED; + + m->m_pkthdr.len = off + newlen; + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + { + size_t len; +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + len = ip->ip_len; +#else + len = ntohs(ip->ip_len); +#endif + /* + * be careful about underflow. also, do not assign exact value + * as ip_len is manipulated differently on *BSDs. + */ + len += m->m_pkthdr.len; + len -= olen; + if (len & ~0xffff) { + /* packet too big after decompress */ + ipsecstat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } +#ifdef IPLEN_FLIPPED + ip->ip_len = len & 0xffff; +#else + ip->ip_len = htons(len & 0xffff); +#endif + ip->ip_p = nxt; + } + + if (sav) { + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPCOMP, (u_int32_t)cpi) != 0) { + ipsecstat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + } + + if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) { + if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 && + ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) { + ipsecstat.in_polvio++; + goto fail; + } +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4 + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off); +#else + (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt); +#endif + } else + m_freem(m); + m = NULL; + + ipsecstat.in_success++; + return; + +fail: + if (sav) + key_freesav(sav); + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return; +} +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +int +ipcomp6_input(mp, offp, proto) + struct mbuf **mp; + int *offp, proto; +{ + struct mbuf *m, *md; + int off; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct ipcomp *ipcomp; + const struct ipcomp_algorithm *algo; + u_int16_t cpi; /* host order */ + u_int16_t nxt; + int error; + size_t newlen; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + char *prvnxtp; + + m = *mp; + off = *offp; + + md = m_pulldown(m, off, sizeof(*ipcomp), NULL); + if (!m) { + m = NULL; /* already freed */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 IPComp input: assumption failed " + "(pulldown failure)\n")); + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + goto fail; + } + ipcomp = mtod(md, struct ipcomp *); + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + nxt = ipcomp->comp_nxt; + + cpi = ntohs(ipcomp->comp_cpi); + + if (cpi >= IPCOMP_CPI_NEGOTIATE_MIN) { + sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, + (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst, IPPROTO_IPCOMP, htonl(cpi)); + if (sav != NULL + && (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + || sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)) { + cpi = sav->alg_enc; /* XXX */ + /* other parameters to look at? */ + } + } + algo = ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(cpi); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "IPv6 IPComp input: unknown cpi %u; " + "dropping the packet for simplicity\n", cpi)); + ipsec6stat.in_nosa++; + goto fail; + } + + /* chop ipcomp header */ + ipcomp = NULL; + md->m_data += sizeof(struct ipcomp); + md->m_len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); + m->m_pkthdr.len -= sizeof(struct ipcomp); + + newlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - off; + error = (*algo->decompress)(m, md, &newlen); + if (error != 0) { + if (error == EINVAL) + ipsec6stat.in_inval++; + else if (error == ENOBUFS) + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + m = NULL; + goto fail; + } + ipsec6stat.in_comphist[cpi]++; + m->m_pkthdr.len = off + newlen; + + /* + * returning decompressed packet onto icmp is meaningless. + * mark it decrypted to prevent icmp from attaching original packet. + */ + m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED; + + /* update next header field */ + prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); + *prvnxtp = nxt; + + /* + * no need to adjust payload length, as all the IPv6 protocols + * look at m->m_pkthdr.len + */ + + if (sav) { + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m); + if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPCOMP, (u_int32_t)cpi) != 0) { + ipsec6stat.in_nomem++; + goto fail; + } + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + } + *offp = off; + *mp = m; + ipsec6stat.in_success++; + return nxt; + +fail: + if (m) + m_freem(m); + if (sav) + key_freesav(sav); + return IPPROTO_DONE; +} +#endif /* INET6 */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_output.c @@ -0,0 +1,388 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ipcomp_output.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ipcomp_output.c,v 1.24 2001/07/26 06:53:18 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * RFC2393 IP payload compression protocol (IPComp). + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/netisr.h> +#include <net/zlib.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#endif +#include <netinet6/ipcomp.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> + +static int ipcomp_output __P((struct mbuf *, u_char *, struct mbuf *, + struct ipsecrequest *, int)); + +/* + * Modify the packet so that the payload is compressed. + * The mbuf (m) must start with IPv4 or IPv6 header. + * On failure, free the given mbuf and return non-zero. + * + * on invocation: + * m nexthdrp md + * v v v + * IP ......... payload + * during the encryption: + * m nexthdrp mprev md + * v v v v + * IP ............... ipcomp payload + * <-----><-----> + * complen plen + * <-> hlen + * <-----------------> compoff + */ +static int +ipcomp_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr, af) + struct mbuf *m; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *md; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + int af; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct mbuf *md0; + struct mbuf *mcopy; + struct mbuf *mprev; + struct ipcomp *ipcomp; + struct secasvar *sav = isr->sav; + const struct ipcomp_algorithm *algo; + u_int16_t cpi; /* host order */ + size_t plen0, plen; /* payload length to be compressed */ + size_t compoff; + int afnumber; + int error = 0; + struct ipsecstat *stat; + + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + afnumber = 4; + stat = &ipsecstat; + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + afnumber = 6; + stat = &ipsec6stat; + break; +#endif + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipcomp_output: unsupported af %d\n", af)); + return 0; /* no change at all */ + } + + /* grab parameters */ + algo = ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if ((ntohl(sav->spi) & ~0xffff) != 0 || !algo) { + stat->out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_RAWCPI) == 0) + cpi = sav->alg_enc; + else + cpi = ntohl(sav->spi) & 0xffff; + + /* compute original payload length */ + plen = 0; + for (n = md; n; n = n->m_next) + plen += n->m_len; + + /* if the payload is short enough, we don't need to compress */ + if (plen < algo->minplen) + return 0; + + /* + * retain the original packet for two purposes: + * (1) we need to backout our changes when compression is not necessary. + * (2) byte lifetime computation should use the original packet. + * see RFC2401 page 23. + * compromise two m_copym(). we will be going through every byte of + * the payload during compression process anyways. + */ + mcopy = m_copym(m, 0, M_COPYALL, M_NOWAIT); + if (mcopy == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + return 0; + } + md0 = m_copym(md, 0, M_COPYALL, M_NOWAIT); + if (md0 == NULL) { + m_freem(mcopy); + error = ENOBUFS; + return 0; + } + plen0 = plen; + + /* make the packet over-writable */ + for (mprev = m; mprev && mprev->m_next != md; mprev = mprev->m_next) + ; + if (mprev == NULL || mprev->m_next != md) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ipcomp%d_output: md is not in chain\n", + afnumber)); + stat->out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + m_freem(md0); + m_freem(mcopy); + return EINVAL; + } + mprev->m_next = NULL; + if ((md = ipsec_copypkt(md)) == NULL) { + m_freem(m); + m_freem(md0); + m_freem(mcopy); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + mprev->m_next = md; + + /* compress data part */ + if ((*algo->compress)(m, md, &plen) || mprev->m_next == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "packet compression failure\n")); + m = NULL; + m_freem(md0); + m_freem(mcopy); + stat->out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + stat->out_comphist[sav->alg_enc]++; + md = mprev->m_next; + + /* + * if the packet became bigger, meaningless to use IPComp. + * we've only wasted our cpu time. + */ + if (plen0 < plen) { + m_freem(md); + m_freem(mcopy); + mprev->m_next = md0; + return 0; + } + + /* + * no need to backout change beyond here. + */ + m_freem(md0); + md0 = NULL; + + m->m_pkthdr.len -= plen0; + m->m_pkthdr.len += plen; + + { + /* + * insert IPComp header. + */ +#ifdef INET + struct ip *ip = NULL; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL; +#endif + size_t hlen = 0; /* ip header len */ + size_t complen = sizeof(struct ipcomp); + + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + hlen = sizeof(*ip6); + break; +#endif + } + + compoff = m->m_pkthdr.len - plen; + + /* + * grow the mbuf to accomodate ipcomp header. + * before: IP ... payload + * after: IP ... ipcomp payload + */ + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(md) < complen) { + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + n->m_len = complen; + mprev->m_next = n; + n->m_next = md; + m->m_pkthdr.len += complen; + ipcomp = mtod(n, struct ipcomp *); + } else { + md->m_len += complen; + md->m_data -= complen; + m->m_pkthdr.len += complen; + ipcomp = mtod(md, struct ipcomp *); + } + + bzero(ipcomp, sizeof(*ipcomp)); + ipcomp->comp_nxt = *nexthdrp; + *nexthdrp = IPPROTO_IPCOMP; + ipcomp->comp_cpi = htons(cpi); + switch (af) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + if (compoff + complen + plen < IP_MAXPACKET) + ip->ip_len = htons(compoff + complen + plen); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "IPv4 ESP output: size exceeds limit\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + error = EMSGSIZE; + goto fail; + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + /* total packet length will be computed in ip6_output() */ + break; +#endif + } + } + + if (!m) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "NULL mbuf after compression in ipcomp%d_output", + afnumber)); + stat->out_inval++; + } + stat->out_success++; + + /* compute byte lifetime against original packet */ + key_sa_recordxfer(sav, mcopy); + m_freem(mcopy); + + return 0; + +fail: +#if 1 + return error; +#else + panic("something bad in ipcomp_output"); +#endif +} + +#ifdef INET +int +ipcomp4_output(m, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + struct ip *ip; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ipcomp4_output: first mbuf too short\n")); + ipsecstat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + /* XXX assumes that m->m_next points to payload */ + return ipcomp_output(m, &ip->ip_p, m->m_next, isr, AF_INET); +} +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +int +ipcomp6_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr) + struct mbuf *m; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *md; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ipcomp6_output: first mbuf too short\n")); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + return ipcomp_output(m, nexthdrp, md, isr, AF_INET6); +} +#endif /* INET6 */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netinet6/ipsec.c @@ -0,0 +1,4207 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netinet6/ipsec.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: ipsec.c,v 1.134 2001/12/03 09:08:47 jinmei Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * IPsec controller part. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> +#include <netinet/udp.h> +#include <netinet/udp_var.h> +#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> +#include <netinet/tcp.h> +#include <netinet/udp.h> + +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#endif +#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#if !((defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__bsdi__) && _BSDI_VERSION >= 199802)) +#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> +#endif +#include <netinet/icmp6.h> +#endif + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#endif +#include <netinet6/ipcomp.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_NRL_INPCB +#define in6pcb inpcb +#define in6p_sp inp_sp +#define in6p_socket inp_socket +#define sotoin6pcb(so) ((struct inpcb *)(so)->so_pcb) +#endif + +#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG +int ipsec_debug = 1; +#else +int ipsec_debug = 0; +#endif + +/* 1 if we decapsulate tunnels by sec* device */ +#if defined(NSEC) && NSEC > 0 +#define USE_SEC_DEVICE 1 +#else +#define USE_SEC_DEVICE 0 +#endif + +int ipsec_tunnel_device = USE_SEC_DEVICE; + +#ifndef offsetof /* XXX */ +#define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t)(&((type *)0)->member)) +#endif + +struct ipsecstat ipsecstat; +int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; +int ip4_ah_offsetmask = 0; /* maybe IP_DF? */ +int ip4_ipsec_dfbit = 0; /* DF bit on encap. 0: clear 1: set 2: copy */ +int ip4_esp_trans_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip4_esp_net_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip4_ah_trans_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip4_ah_net_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +struct secpolicy ip4_def_policy; +int ip4_ipsec_ecn = 0; /* ECN ignore(-1)/forbidden(0)/allowed(1) */ +int ip4_esp_randpad = -1; + +static int sp_cachegen = 1; /* cache generation # */ + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#ifdef SYSCTL_DECL +SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ipsec); +#ifdef INET6 +SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet6_ipsec6); +#endif +#endif + +/* net.inet.ipsec */ +SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_STATS, + stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ipsecstat, ipsecstat, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY, + def_policy, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_def_policy.policy, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV, esp_trans_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_esp_trans_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV, esp_net_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_esp_net_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV, ah_trans_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_trans_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV, ah_net_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_net_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_AH_CLEARTOS, + ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_AH_OFFSETMASK, + ah_offsetmask, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_offsetmask, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DFBIT, + dfbit, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ipsec_dfbit, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_ECN, + ecn, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ipsec_ecn, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_DEBUG, + debug, CTLFLAG_RW, &ipsec_debug, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ipsec, IPSECCTL_ESP_RANDPAD, + esp_randpad, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_esp_randpad, 0, ""); +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ + +#ifdef INET6 +struct ipsecstat ipsec6stat; +int ip6_esp_trans_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip6_esp_net_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip6_ah_trans_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +int ip6_ah_net_deflev = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; +struct secpolicy ip6_def_policy; +int ip6_ipsec_ecn = 0; /* ECN ignore(-1)/forbidden(0)/allowed(1) */ +int ip6_esp_randpad = -1; + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +/* net.inet6.ipsec6 */ +SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_STATS, + stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ipsec6stat, ipsecstat, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY, + def_policy, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_def_policy.policy, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV, esp_trans_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_esp_trans_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV, esp_net_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_esp_net_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV, ah_trans_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_ah_trans_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV, ah_net_deflev, + CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_ah_net_deflev, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_ECN, + ecn, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_ipsec_ecn, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_DEBUG, + debug, CTLFLAG_RW, &ipsec_debug, 0, ""); +SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, IPSECCTL_ESP_RANDPAD, + esp_randpad, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip6_esp_randpad, 0, ""); +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ +#endif /* INET6 */ + +static struct secpolicy *ipsec_checkpcbcache __P((struct mbuf *, + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp, int)); +static int ipsec_fillpcbcache __P((struct inpcbpolicy *, struct mbuf *, + struct secpolicy *, int)); +static int ipsec_invalpcbcache __P((struct inpcbpolicy *, int)); +static int ipsec_setspidx_mbuf + __P((struct secpolicyindex *, u_int, u_int, struct mbuf *, int)); +static int ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb __P((struct mbuf *, struct inpcb *pcb)); +#ifdef INET6 +static int ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb __P((struct mbuf *, struct in6pcb *pcb)); +#endif +static int ipsec_setspidx __P((struct mbuf *, struct secpolicyindex *, int)); +static void ipsec4_get_ulp __P((struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicyindex *, int)); +static int ipsec4_setspidx_ipaddr __P((struct mbuf *, struct secpolicyindex *)); +#ifdef INET6 +static void ipsec6_get_ulp __P((struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicyindex *, int)); +static int ipsec6_setspidx_ipaddr __P((struct mbuf *, struct secpolicyindex *)); +#endif +static struct inpcbpolicy *ipsec_newpcbpolicy __P((void)); +static void ipsec_delpcbpolicy __P((struct inpcbpolicy *)); +static struct secpolicy *ipsec_deepcopy_policy __P((struct secpolicy *src)); +static int ipsec_set_policy __P((struct secpolicy **pcb_sp, + int optname, caddr_t request, size_t len, int priv)); +static int ipsec_get_policy __P((struct secpolicy *pcb_sp, struct mbuf **mp)); +static void vshiftl __P((unsigned char *, int, int)); +static int ipsec_in_reject __P((struct secpolicy *, struct mbuf *)); +static size_t ipsec_hdrsiz __P((struct secpolicy *)); +#ifdef INET +static struct mbuf *ipsec4_splithdr __P((struct mbuf *)); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +static struct mbuf *ipsec6_splithdr __P((struct mbuf *)); +#endif +#ifdef INET +static int ipsec4_encapsulate __P((struct mbuf *, struct secasvar *)); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +static int ipsec6_encapsulate __P((struct mbuf *, struct secasvar *)); +#endif +static struct mbuf *ipsec_addaux __P((struct mbuf *)); +static struct mbuf *ipsec_findaux __P((struct mbuf *)); +static void ipsec_optaux __P((struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *)); + +/* + * try to validate and use cached policy on a pcb. + */ +static struct secpolicy * +ipsec_checkpcbcache(m, pcbsp, dir) + struct mbuf *m; + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp; + int dir; +{ + struct secpolicyindex spidx; +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ > 2 + struct timeval mono_time; + + microtime(&mono_time); +#endif + + switch (dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + break; + default: + return NULL; + } +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (dir >= sizeof(pcbsp->cache)/sizeof(pcbsp->cache[0])) + panic("dir too big in ipsec_checkpcbcache"); +#endif + /* SPD table change invalidates all the caches */ + if (pcbsp->cachegen[dir] == 0 || sp_cachegen > pcbsp->cachegen[dir]) { + ipsec_invalpcbcache(pcbsp, dir); + return NULL; + } + if (!pcbsp->cache[dir]) + return NULL; + if ((pcbsp->cacheflags & IPSEC_PCBSP_CONNECTED) == 0) { + if (!pcbsp->cache[dir]) + return NULL; + if (ipsec_setspidx(m, &spidx, 1) != 0) + return NULL; + if (bcmp(&pcbsp->cacheidx[dir], &spidx, sizeof(spidx))) { + if (!key_cmpspidx_withmask(&pcbsp->cache[dir]->spidx, + &spidx)) + return NULL; + pcbsp->cacheidx[dir] = spidx; + } + } else { + /* + * The pcb is connected, and the L4 code is sure that: + * - outgoing side uses inp_[lf]addr + * - incoming side looks up policy after inpcb lookup + * and address pair is known to be stable. We do not need + * to generate spidx again, nor check the address match again. + * + * For IPv4/v6 SOCK_STREAM sockets, this assumption holds + * and there are calls to ipsec_pcbconn() from in_pcbconnect(). + */ + } + + pcbsp->cache[dir]->lastused = mono_time.tv_sec; + pcbsp->cache[dir]->refcnt++; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec_checkpcbcache cause refcnt++:%d SP:%p\n", + pcbsp->cache[dir]->refcnt, pcbsp->cache[dir])); + return pcbsp->cache[dir]; +} + +static int +ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, sp, dir) + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp; + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicy *sp; + int dir; +{ + + switch (dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (dir >= sizeof(pcbsp->cache)/sizeof(pcbsp->cache[0])) + panic("dir too big in ipsec_checkpcbcache"); +#endif + + if (pcbsp->cache[dir]) + key_freesp(pcbsp->cache[dir]); + pcbsp->cache[dir] = NULL; + if (ipsec_setspidx(m, &pcbsp->cacheidx[dir], 1) != 0) { + return EINVAL; + } + pcbsp->cache[dir] = sp; + if (pcbsp->cache[dir]) { + pcbsp->cache[dir]->refcnt++; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec_fillpcbcache cause refcnt++:%d SP:%p\n", + pcbsp->cache[dir]->refcnt, pcbsp->cache[dir])); + } + pcbsp->cachegen[dir] = sp_cachegen; + + return 0; +} + +static int +ipsec_invalpcbcache(pcbsp, dir) + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp; + int dir; +{ + int i; + + for (i = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND; i <= IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND; i++) { + if (dir != IPSEC_DIR_ANY && i != dir) + continue; + if (pcbsp->cache[i]) + key_freesp(pcbsp->cache[i]); + pcbsp->cache[i] = NULL; + pcbsp->cachegen[i] = 0; + bzero(&pcbsp->cacheidx[i], sizeof(pcbsp->cacheidx[i])); + } + return 0; +} + +int +ipsec_pcbconn(pcbsp) + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp; +{ + + pcbsp->cacheflags |= IPSEC_PCBSP_CONNECTED; + ipsec_invalpcbcache(pcbsp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + return 0; +} + +int +ipsec_pcbdisconn(pcbsp) + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp; +{ + + pcbsp->cacheflags &= ~IPSEC_PCBSP_CONNECTED; + ipsec_invalpcbcache(pcbsp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + return 0; +} + +int +ipsec_invalpcbcacheall() +{ + + sp_cachegen++; + return 0; +} + +/* + * For OUTBOUND packet having a socket. Searching SPD for packet, + * and return a pointer to SP. + * OUT: NULL: no apropreate SP found, the following value is set to error. + * 0 : bypass + * EACCES : discard packet. + * ENOENT : ipsec_acquire() in progress, maybe. + * others : error occured. + * others: a pointer to SP + * + * NOTE: IPv6 mapped adddress concern is implemented here. + */ +struct secpolicy * +ipsec4_getpolicybysock(m, dir, so, error) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + struct socket *so; + int *error; +{ + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp = NULL; + struct secpolicy *currsp = NULL; /* policy on socket */ + struct secpolicy *kernsp = NULL; /* policy on kernel */ + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || so == NULL || error == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybysock: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + switch (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family) { + case AF_INET: + pcbsp = sotoinpcb(so)->inp_sp; + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + pcbsp = sotoin6pcb(so)->in6p_sp; + break; +#endif + } + + /* if we have a cached entry, and if it is still valid, use it. */ + ipsecstat.spdcachelookup++; + currsp = ipsec_checkpcbcache(m, pcbsp, dir); + if (currsp) { + *error = 0; + return currsp; + } + ipsecstat.spdcachemiss++; + + /* + * XXX why is it necessary to do this, per-packet? + * we are of course sure that the socket policy do match the packet, + * because policy-on-pcb does not contain selectors, and + * in_pcblookup (inbound) ensures the packet-pcb matching. + */ + switch (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family) { + case AF_INET: + /* set spidx in pcb */ + *error = ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb(m, sotoinpcb(so)); + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + /* set spidx in pcb */ + *error = ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb(m, sotoin6pcb(so)); + break; +#endif + default: + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybysock: unsupported address family\n"); + } + if (*error) + return NULL; + + /* sanity check */ + if (pcbsp == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybysock: pcbsp is NULL.\n"); + + switch (dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + currsp = pcbsp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + currsp = pcbsp->sp_out; + break; + default: + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybysock: illegal direction.\n"); + } + + /* sanity check */ + if (currsp == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybysock: currsp is NULL.\n"); + + /* when privilieged socket */ + if (pcbsp->priv) { + switch (currsp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + /* look for a policy in SPD */ + kernsp = key_allocsp(&currsp->spidx, dir); + + /* SP found */ + if (kernsp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec4_getpolicybysock called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", kernsp)); + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, kernsp, dir); + return kernsp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + if (ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, + "fixed system default policy: %d->%d\n", + ip4_def_policy.policy, IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip4_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip4_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, &ip4_def_policy, dir); + return &ip4_def_policy; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_getpolicybysock: " + "Invalid policy for PCB %d\n", currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + /* when non-privilieged socket */ + /* look for a policy in SPD */ + kernsp = key_allocsp(&currsp->spidx, dir); + + /* SP found */ + if (kernsp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec4_getpolicybysock called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", kernsp)); + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, kernsp, dir); + return kernsp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + switch (currsp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_getpolicybysock: " + "Illegal policy for non-priviliged defined %d\n", + currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + if (ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, + "fixed system default policy: %d->%d\n", + ip4_def_policy.policy, IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip4_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip4_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, &ip4_def_policy, dir); + return &ip4_def_policy; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_getpolicybysock: " + "Invalid policy for PCB %d\n", currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * For FORWADING packet or OUTBOUND without a socket. Searching SPD for packet, + * and return a pointer to SP. + * OUT: positive: a pointer to the entry for security policy leaf matched. + * NULL: no apropreate SP found, the following value is set to error. + * 0 : bypass + * EACCES : discard packet. + * ENOENT : ipsec_acquire() in progress, maybe. + * others : error occured. + */ +struct secpolicy * +ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr(m, dir, flag, error) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + int flag; + int *error; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || error == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + { + struct secpolicyindex spidx; + + bzero(&spidx, sizeof(spidx)); + + /* make a index to look for a policy */ + *error = ipsec_setspidx_mbuf(&spidx, dir, AF_INET, m, + (flag & IP_FORWARDING) ? 0 : 1); + + if (*error != 0) + return NULL; + + sp = key_allocsp(&spidx, dir); + } + + /* SP found */ + if (sp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", sp)); + *error = 0; + return sp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + if (ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip4_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, "fixed system default policy:%d->%d\n", + ip4_def_policy.policy, + IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip4_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip4_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + return &ip4_def_policy; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * For OUTBOUND packet having a socket. Searching SPD for packet, + * and return a pointer to SP. + * OUT: NULL: no apropreate SP found, the following value is set to error. + * 0 : bypass + * EACCES : discard packet. + * ENOENT : ipsec_acquire() in progress, maybe. + * others : error occured. + * others: a pointer to SP + */ +struct secpolicy * +ipsec6_getpolicybysock(m, dir, so, error) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + struct socket *so; + int *error; +{ + struct inpcbpolicy *pcbsp = NULL; + struct secpolicy *currsp = NULL; /* policy on socket */ + struct secpolicy *kernsp = NULL; /* policy on kernel */ + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || so == NULL || error == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybysock: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != AF_INET6) + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybysock: socket domain != inet6\n"); +#endif + + pcbsp = sotoin6pcb(so)->in6p_sp; + + /* if we have a cached entry, and if it is still valid, use it. */ + ipsec6stat.spdcachelookup++; + currsp = ipsec_checkpcbcache(m, pcbsp, dir); + if (currsp) { + *error = 0; + return currsp; + } + ipsec6stat.spdcachemiss++; + + /* set spidx in pcb */ + /* XXX why is it necessary to do this? */ + ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb(m, sotoin6pcb(so)); + + /* sanity check */ + if (pcbsp == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybysock: pcbsp is NULL.\n"); + + switch (dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + currsp = pcbsp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + currsp = pcbsp->sp_out; + break; + default: + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybysock: illegal direction.\n"); + } + + /* sanity check */ + if (currsp == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybysock: currsp is NULL.\n"); + + /* when privilieged socket */ + if (pcbsp->priv) { + switch (currsp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + /* look for a policy in SPD */ + kernsp = key_allocsp(&currsp->spidx, dir); + + /* SP found */ + if (kernsp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec6_getpolicybysock called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", kernsp)); + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, kernsp, dir); + return kernsp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + if (ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, + "fixed system default policy: %d->%d\n", + ip6_def_policy.policy, IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip6_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip6_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, &ip6_def_policy, dir); + return &ip6_def_policy; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_getpolicybysock: " + "Invalid policy for PCB %d\n", currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + /* when non-privilieged socket */ + /* look for a policy in SPD */ + kernsp = key_allocsp(&currsp->spidx, dir); + + /* SP found */ + if (kernsp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec6_getpolicybysock called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", kernsp)); + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, kernsp, dir); + return kernsp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + switch (currsp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_getpolicybysock: " + "Illegal policy for non-priviliged defined %d\n", + currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + if (ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, + "fixed system default policy: %d->%d\n", + ip6_def_policy.policy, IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip6_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip6_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, &ip6_def_policy, dir); + return &ip6_def_policy; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + currsp->refcnt++; + *error = 0; + ipsec_fillpcbcache(pcbsp, m, currsp, dir); + return currsp; + + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ipsec6_policybysock: Invalid policy for PCB %d\n", + currsp->policy)); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * For FORWADING packet or OUTBOUND without a socket. Searching SPD for packet, + * and return a pointer to SP. + * `flag' means that packet is to be forwarded whether or not. + * flag = 1: forwad + * OUT: positive: a pointer to the entry for security policy leaf matched. + * NULL: no apropreate SP found, the following value is set to error. + * 0 : bypass + * EACCES : discard packet. + * ENOENT : ipsec_acquire() in progress, maybe. + * others : error occured. + */ +#ifndef IP_FORWARDING +#define IP_FORWARDING 1 +#endif + +struct secpolicy * +ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr(m, dir, flag, error) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + int flag; + int *error; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || error == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + /* get a policy entry matched with the packet */ + { + struct secpolicyindex spidx; + + bzero(&spidx, sizeof(spidx)); + + /* make a index to look for a policy */ + *error = ipsec_setspidx_mbuf(&spidx, dir, AF_INET6, m, + (flag & IP_FORWARDING) ? 0 : 1); + + if (*error != 0) + return NULL; + + sp = key_allocsp(&spidx, dir); + } + + /* SP found */ + if (sp != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr called " + "to allocate SP:%p\n", sp)); + *error = 0; + return sp; + } + + /* no SP found */ + if (ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + && ip6_def_policy.policy != IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_INFO, "fixed system default policy: %d->%d\n", + ip6_def_policy.policy, IPSEC_POLICY_NONE)); + ip6_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + } + ip6_def_policy.refcnt++; + *error = 0; + return &ip6_def_policy; +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +/* + * set IP address into spidx from mbuf. + * When Forwarding packet and ICMP echo reply, this function is used. + * + * IN: get the followings from mbuf. + * protocol family, src, dst, next protocol + * OUT: + * 0: success. + * other: failure, and set errno. + */ +int +ipsec_setspidx_mbuf(spidx, dir, family, m, needport) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + u_int dir, family; + struct mbuf *m; + int needport; +{ + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (spidx == NULL || m == NULL) + panic("ipsec_setspidx_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + bzero(spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + + error = ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, needport); + if (error) + goto bad; + spidx->dir = dir; + + return 0; + + bad: + /* XXX initialize */ + bzero(spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + return EINVAL; +} + +static int +ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb(m, pcb) + struct mbuf *m; + struct inpcb *pcb; +{ + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (pcb == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb: no PCB found.\n"); + if (pcb->inp_sp == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb: no inp_sp found.\n"); + if (pcb->inp_sp->sp_out == NULL || pcb->inp_sp->sp_in == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_setspidx_inpcb: no sp_in/out found.\n"); + + bzero(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_in->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + bzero(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_out->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + + spidx = &pcb->inp_sp->sp_in->spidx; + error = ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, 1); + if (error) + goto bad; + spidx->dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND; + + spidx = &pcb->inp_sp->sp_out->spidx; + error = ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, 1); + if (error) + goto bad; + spidx->dir = IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND; + + return 0; + +bad: + bzero(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_in->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + bzero(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_out->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + return error; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +static int +ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb(m, pcb) + struct mbuf *m; + struct in6pcb *pcb; +{ + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (pcb == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb: no PCB found.\n"); + if (pcb->in6p_sp == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb: no in6p_sp found.\n"); + if (pcb->in6p_sp->sp_out == NULL || pcb->in6p_sp->sp_in == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_setspidx_in6pcb: no sp_in/out found.\n"); + + bzero(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_in->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + bzero(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_out->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + + spidx = &pcb->in6p_sp->sp_in->spidx; + error = ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, 1); + if (error) + goto bad; + spidx->dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND; + + spidx = &pcb->in6p_sp->sp_out->spidx; + error = ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, 1); + if (error) + goto bad; + spidx->dir = IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND; + + return 0; + +bad: + bzero(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_in->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + bzero(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_out->spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + return error; +} +#endif + +/* + * configure security policy index (src/dst/proto/sport/dport) + * by looking at the content of mbuf. + * the caller is responsible for error recovery (like clearing up spidx). + */ +static int +ipsec_setspidx(m, spidx, needport) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + int needport; +{ + struct ip *ip = NULL; + struct ip ipbuf; + u_int v; + struct mbuf *n; + int len; + int error; + + if (m == NULL) + panic("ipsec_setspidx: m == 0 passed.\n"); + + bzero(spidx, sizeof(*spidx)); + + /* + * validate m->m_pkthdr.len. we see incorrect length if we + * mistakenly call this function with inconsistent mbuf chain + * (like 4.4BSD tcp/udp processing). XXX should we panic here? + */ + len = 0; + for (n = m; n; n = n->m_next) + len += n->m_len; + if (m->m_pkthdr.len != len) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_setspidx: " + "total of m_len(%d) != pkthdr.len(%d), " + "ignored.\n", + len, m->m_pkthdr.len)); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < sizeof(struct ip)) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_setspidx: " + "pkthdr.len(%d) < sizeof(struct ip), ignored.\n", + m->m_pkthdr.len)); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (m->m_len >= sizeof(*ip)) + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + else { + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ipbuf), (caddr_t)&ipbuf); + ip = &ipbuf; + } +#ifdef _IP_VHL + v = _IP_VHL_V(ip->ip_vhl); +#else + v = ip->ip_v; +#endif + switch (v) { + case 4: + error = ipsec4_setspidx_ipaddr(m, spidx); + if (error) + return error; + ipsec4_get_ulp(m, spidx, needport); + return 0; +#ifdef INET6 + case 6: + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_setspidx: " + "pkthdr.len(%d) < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), " + "ignored.\n", m->m_pkthdr.len)); + return EINVAL; + } + error = ipsec6_setspidx_ipaddr(m, spidx); + if (error) + return error; + ipsec6_get_ulp(m, spidx, needport); + return 0; +#endif + default: + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_setspidx: " + "unknown IP version %u, ignored.\n", v)); + return EINVAL; + } +} + +static void +ipsec4_get_ulp(m, spidx, needport) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + int needport; +{ + struct ip ip; + struct ip6_ext ip6e; + u_int8_t nxt; + int off; + struct tcphdr th; + struct udphdr uh; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_get_ulp: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < sizeof(ip)) + panic("ipsec4_get_ulp: too short\n"); + + /* set default */ + spidx->ul_proto = IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->src)->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->dst)->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip), (caddr_t)&ip); + /* ip_input() flips it into host endian XXX need more checking */ + if (ip.ip_off & (IP_MF | IP_OFFMASK)) + return; + + nxt = ip.ip_p; +#ifdef _IP_VHL + off = _IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + off = ip.ip_hl << 2; +#endif + while (off < m->m_pkthdr.len) { + switch (nxt) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + if (!needport) + return; + if (off + sizeof(struct tcphdr) > m->m_pkthdr.len) + return; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(th), (caddr_t)&th); + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->src)->sin_port = + th.th_sport; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->dst)->sin_port = + th.th_dport; + return; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + if (!needport) + return; + if (off + sizeof(struct udphdr) > m->m_pkthdr.len) + return; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(uh), (caddr_t)&uh); + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->src)->sin_port = + uh.uh_sport; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->dst)->sin_port = + uh.uh_dport; + return; + case IPPROTO_AH: + if (m->m_pkthdr.len > off + sizeof(ip6e)) + return; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ip6e), (caddr_t)&ip6e); + off += (ip6e.ip6e_len + 2) << 2; + nxt = ip6e.ip6e_nxt; + break; + case IPPROTO_ICMP: + default: + /* XXX intermediate headers??? */ + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + return; + } + } +} + +/* assumes that m is sane */ +static int +ipsec4_setspidx_ipaddr(m, spidx) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + struct ip *ip = NULL; + struct ip ipbuf; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + + if (m->m_len >= sizeof(*ip)) + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + else { + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ipbuf), (caddr_t)&ipbuf); + ip = &ipbuf; + } + + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->src; + bzero(sin, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + bcopy(&ip->ip_src, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(ip->ip_src)); + spidx->prefs = sizeof(struct in_addr) << 3; + + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&spidx->dst; + bzero(sin, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + bcopy(&ip->ip_dst, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(ip->ip_dst)); + spidx->prefd = sizeof(struct in_addr) << 3; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +static void +ipsec6_get_ulp(m, spidx, needport) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + int needport; +{ + int off, nxt; + struct tcphdr th; + struct udphdr uh; + struct icmp6_hdr ih; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_get_ulp: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec6_get_ulp:\n"); kdebug_mbuf(m)); + + /* set default */ + spidx->ul_proto = IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY; + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->src)->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->dst)->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + + nxt = -1; + off = ip6_lasthdr(m, 0, IPPROTO_IPV6, &nxt); + if (off < 0 || m->m_pkthdr.len < off) + return; + + switch (nxt) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + if (!needport) + break; + if (off + sizeof(struct tcphdr) > m->m_pkthdr.len) + break; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(th), (caddr_t)&th); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->src)->sin6_port = th.th_sport; + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->dst)->sin6_port = th.th_dport; + break; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + if (!needport) + break; + if (off + sizeof(struct udphdr) > m->m_pkthdr.len) + break; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(uh), (caddr_t)&uh); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->src)->sin6_port = uh.uh_sport; + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->dst)->sin6_port = uh.uh_dport; + break; + case IPPROTO_ICMPV6: + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + if (off + sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) > m->m_pkthdr.len) + break; + m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ih), (caddr_t)&ih); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->src)->sin6_port = + htons((u_short)ih.icmp6_type); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->dst)->sin6_port = + htons((u_short)ih.icmp6_code); + break; + default: + /* XXX intermediate headers??? */ + spidx->ul_proto = nxt; + break; + } +} + +/* assumes that m is sane */ +static int +ipsec6_setspidx_ipaddr(m, spidx) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL; + struct ip6_hdr ip6buf; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + + if (m->m_len >= sizeof(*ip6)) + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + else { + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6buf), (caddr_t)&ip6buf); + ip6 = &ip6buf; + } + + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->src; + bzero(sin6, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_src, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src)) { + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1]); + } + spidx->prefs = sizeof(struct in6_addr) << 3; + + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&spidx->dst; + bzero(sin6, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_dst, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1]); + } + spidx->prefd = sizeof(struct in6_addr) << 3; + + return 0; +} +#endif + +static struct inpcbpolicy * +ipsec_newpcbpolicy() +{ + struct inpcbpolicy *p; + + p = (struct inpcbpolicy *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + return p; +} + +static void +ipsec_delpcbpolicy(p) + struct inpcbpolicy *p; +{ + + free(p, M_SECA); +} + +/* initialize policy in PCB */ +int +ipsec_init_policy(so, pcb_sp) + struct socket *so; + struct inpcbpolicy **pcb_sp; +{ + struct inpcbpolicy *new; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (so == NULL || pcb_sp == NULL) + panic("ipsec_init_policy: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + new = ipsec_newpcbpolicy(); + if (new == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ipsec_init_policy: No more memory.\n")); + return ENOBUFS; + } + bzero(new, sizeof(*new)); + + new->priv = 1; + + if ((new->sp_in = key_newsp()) == NULL) { + ipsec_delpcbpolicy(new); + return ENOBUFS; + } + new->sp_in->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_ALIVE; + new->sp_in->policy = IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST; + + if ((new->sp_out = key_newsp()) == NULL) { + key_freesp(new->sp_in); + ipsec_delpcbpolicy(new); + return ENOBUFS; + } + new->sp_out->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_ALIVE; + new->sp_out->policy = IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST; + + *pcb_sp = new; + + return 0; +} + +/* copy old ipsec policy into new */ +int +ipsec_copy_policy(old, new) + struct inpcbpolicy *old, *new; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + + sp = ipsec_deepcopy_policy(old->sp_in); + if (sp) { + key_freesp(new->sp_in); + new->sp_in = sp; + } else + return ENOBUFS; + + sp = ipsec_deepcopy_policy(old->sp_out); + if (sp) { + key_freesp(new->sp_out); + new->sp_out = sp; + } else + return ENOBUFS; + + new->priv = old->priv; + + return 0; +} + +/* deep-copy a policy in PCB */ +static struct secpolicy * +ipsec_deepcopy_policy(src) + struct secpolicy *src; +{ + struct ipsecrequest *newchain = NULL; + struct ipsecrequest *p; + struct ipsecrequest **q; + struct ipsecrequest *r; + struct secpolicy *dst; + + dst = key_newsp(); + if (src == NULL || dst == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* + * deep-copy IPsec request chain. This is required since struct + * ipsecrequest is not reference counted. + */ + q = &newchain; + for (p = src->req; p; p = p->next) { + *q = (struct ipsecrequest *)malloc(sizeof(struct ipsecrequest), + M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (*q == NULL) + goto fail; + bzero(*q, sizeof(**q)); + (*q)->next = NULL; + + (*q)->saidx.proto = p->saidx.proto; + (*q)->saidx.mode = p->saidx.mode; + (*q)->level = p->level; + (*q)->saidx.reqid = p->saidx.reqid; + + bcopy(&p->saidx.src, &(*q)->saidx.src, sizeof((*q)->saidx.src)); + bcopy(&p->saidx.dst, &(*q)->saidx.dst, sizeof((*q)->saidx.dst)); + + (*q)->sav = NULL; + (*q)->sp = dst; + + q = &((*q)->next); + } + + dst->req = newchain; + dst->state = src->state; + dst->policy = src->policy; + /* do not touch the refcnt fields */ + + return dst; + +fail: + for (p = newchain; p; p = r) { + r = p->next; + free(p, M_SECA); + p = NULL; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* set policy and ipsec request if present. */ +static int +ipsec_set_policy(pcb_sp, optname, request, len, priv) + struct secpolicy **pcb_sp; + int optname; + caddr_t request; + size_t len; + int priv; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + struct secpolicy *newsp = NULL; + int error; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (pcb_sp == NULL || *pcb_sp == NULL || request == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if (len < sizeof(*xpl)) + return EINVAL; + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)request; + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_set_policy: passed policy\n"); + kdebug_sadb_x_policy((struct sadb_ext *)xpl)); + + /* check policy type */ + /* ipsec_set_policy() accepts IPSEC, ENTRUST and BYPASS. */ + if (xpl->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD + || xpl->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_NONE) + return EINVAL; + + /* check privileged socket */ + if (priv == 0 && xpl->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS) + return EACCES; + + /* allocation new SP entry */ + if ((newsp = key_msg2sp(xpl, len, &error)) == NULL) + return error; + + newsp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_ALIVE; + + /* clear old SP and set new SP */ + key_freesp(*pcb_sp); + *pcb_sp = newsp; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_set_policy: new policy\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(newsp)); + + return 0; +} + +static int +ipsec_get_policy(pcb_sp, mp) + struct secpolicy *pcb_sp; + struct mbuf **mp; +{ + + /* sanity check. */ + if (pcb_sp == NULL || mp == NULL) + return EINVAL; + + *mp = key_sp2msg(pcb_sp); + if (!*mp) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "ipsec_get_policy: No more memory.\n")); + return ENOBUFS; + } + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + (*mp)->m_type = MT_DATA; +#else + (*mp)->m_type = MT_SOOPTS; +#endif + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_get_policy:\n"); + kdebug_mbuf(*mp)); + + return 0; +} + +int +ipsec4_set_policy(inp, optname, request, len, priv) + struct inpcb *inp; + int optname; + caddr_t request; + size_t len; + int priv; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + struct secpolicy **pcb_sp; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (inp == NULL || request == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if (len < sizeof(*xpl)) + return EINVAL; + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)request; + + /* select direction */ + switch (xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + pcb_sp = &inp->inp_sp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + pcb_sp = &inp->inp_sp->sp_out; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_set_policy: invalid direction=%u\n", + xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir)); + return EINVAL; + } + + ipsec_invalpcbcache(inp->inp_sp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + return ipsec_set_policy(pcb_sp, optname, request, len, priv); +} + +int +ipsec4_get_policy(inp, request, len, mp) + struct inpcb *inp; + caddr_t request; + size_t len; + struct mbuf **mp; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + struct secpolicy *pcb_sp; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (inp == NULL || request == NULL || mp == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if (inp->inp_sp == NULL) + panic("policy in PCB is NULL\n"); + if (len < sizeof(*xpl)) + return EINVAL; + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)request; + + /* select direction */ + switch (xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + pcb_sp = inp->inp_sp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + pcb_sp = inp->inp_sp->sp_out; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_set_policy: invalid direction=%u\n", + xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir)); + return EINVAL; + } + + return ipsec_get_policy(pcb_sp, mp); +} + +/* delete policy in PCB */ +int +ipsec4_delete_pcbpolicy(inp) + struct inpcb *inp; +{ + /* sanity check. */ + if (inp == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_delete_pcbpolicy: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + if (inp->inp_sp == NULL) + return 0; + + if (inp->inp_sp->sp_in != NULL) { + key_freesp(inp->inp_sp->sp_in); + inp->inp_sp->sp_in = NULL; + } + + if (inp->inp_sp->sp_out != NULL) { + key_freesp(inp->inp_sp->sp_out); + inp->inp_sp->sp_out = NULL; + } + + ipsec_invalpcbcache(inp->inp_sp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + + ipsec_delpcbpolicy(inp->inp_sp); + inp->inp_sp = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +int +ipsec6_set_policy(in6p, optname, request, len, priv) + struct in6pcb *in6p; + int optname; + caddr_t request; + size_t len; + int priv; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + struct secpolicy **pcb_sp; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (in6p == NULL || request == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if (len < sizeof(*xpl)) + return EINVAL; + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)request; + + /* select direction */ + switch (xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + pcb_sp = &in6p->in6p_sp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + pcb_sp = &in6p->in6p_sp->sp_out; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_set_policy: invalid direction=%u\n", + xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir)); + return EINVAL; + } + + ipsec_invalpcbcache(in6p->in6p_sp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + return ipsec_set_policy(pcb_sp, optname, request, len, priv); +} + +int +ipsec6_get_policy(in6p, request, len, mp) + struct in6pcb *in6p; + caddr_t request; + size_t len; + struct mbuf **mp; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + struct secpolicy *pcb_sp; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (in6p == NULL || request == NULL || mp == NULL) + return EINVAL; + if (in6p->in6p_sp == NULL) + panic("policy in PCB is NULL\n"); + if (len < sizeof(*xpl)) + return EINVAL; + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)request; + + /* select direction */ + switch (xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + pcb_sp = in6p->in6p_sp->sp_in; + break; + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + pcb_sp = in6p->in6p_sp->sp_out; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_set_policy: invalid direction=%u\n", + xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir)); + return EINVAL; + } + + return ipsec_get_policy(pcb_sp, mp); +} + +int +ipsec6_delete_pcbpolicy(in6p) + struct in6pcb *in6p; +{ + /* sanity check. */ + if (in6p == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_delete_pcbpolicy: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + if (in6p->in6p_sp == NULL) + return 0; + + if (in6p->in6p_sp->sp_in != NULL) { + key_freesp(in6p->in6p_sp->sp_in); + in6p->in6p_sp->sp_in = NULL; + } + + if (in6p->in6p_sp->sp_out != NULL) { + key_freesp(in6p->in6p_sp->sp_out); + in6p->in6p_sp->sp_out = NULL; + } + + ipsec_invalpcbcache(in6p->in6p_sp, IPSEC_DIR_ANY); + + ipsec_delpcbpolicy(in6p->in6p_sp); + in6p->in6p_sp = NULL; + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * return current level. + * Either IPSEC_LEVEL_USE or IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE are always returned. + */ +u_int +ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr) + struct ipsecrequest *isr; +{ + u_int level = 0; + u_int esp_trans_deflev=0, esp_net_deflev=0, ah_trans_deflev, ah_net_deflev; + + /* sanity check */ + if (isr == NULL || isr->sp == NULL) + panic("ipsec_get_reqlevel: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + if (((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sp->spidx.src)->sa_family + != ((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sp->spidx.dst)->sa_family) + panic("ipsec_get_reqlevel: family mismatched.\n"); + +/* XXX note that we have ipseclog() expanded here - code sync issue */ +#define IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(lev) \ + (((lev) != IPSEC_LEVEL_USE && (lev) != IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE \ + && (lev) != IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE) \ + ? (lev) = IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE, \ + (lev) \ + : (lev)) + + /* set default level */ + switch (((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sp->spidx.src)->sa_family) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + esp_trans_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip4_esp_trans_deflev); + esp_net_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip4_esp_net_deflev); + ah_trans_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip4_ah_trans_deflev); + ah_net_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip4_ah_net_deflev); + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + esp_trans_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip6_esp_trans_deflev); + esp_net_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip6_esp_net_deflev); + ah_trans_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip6_ah_trans_deflev); + ah_net_deflev = IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT(ip6_ah_net_deflev); + break; +#endif /* INET6 */ + default: + panic("key_get_reqlevel: Unknown family. %d\n", + ((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sp->spidx.src)->sa_family); + } + +#undef IPSEC_CHECK_DEFAULT + + /* set level */ + switch (isr->level) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_DEFAULT: + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) + level = esp_net_deflev; + else + level = esp_trans_deflev; + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) + level = ah_net_deflev; + else + level = ah_trans_deflev; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + /* + * we don't really care, as IPcomp document says that + * we shouldn't compress small packets + */ + level = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE; + break; + default: + panic("ipsec_get_reqlevel: " + "Illegal protocol defined %u\n", + isr->saidx.proto); + } + break; + + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + level = isr->level; + break; + case IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE: + level = IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE; + break; + + default: + panic("ipsec_get_reqlevel: Illegal IPsec level %u\n", + isr->level); + } + + return level; +} + +/* + * Check AH/ESP integrity. + * OUT: + * 0: valid + * 1: invalid + */ +static int +ipsec_in_reject(sp, m) + struct secpolicy *sp; + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + u_int level; + int need_auth, need_conf, need_icv; + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec_in_reject: using SP\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(sp)); + + /* check policy */ + switch (sp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + return 1; + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + return 0; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + break; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + default: + panic("ipsec_hdrsiz: Invalid policy found. %d\n", sp->policy); + } + + need_auth = 0; + need_conf = 0; + need_icv = 0; + + /* XXX should compare policy against ipsec header history */ + + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + + /* get current level */ + level = ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr); + + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: + if (level == IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE) { + need_conf++; + + if (isr->sav != NULL + && isr->sav->flags == SADB_X_EXT_NONE + && isr->sav->alg_auth != SADB_AALG_NONE) + need_icv++; + } + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + if (level == IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE) { + need_auth++; + need_icv++; + } + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + /* + * we don't really care, as IPcomp document says that + * we shouldn't compress small packets, IPComp policy + * should always be treated as being in "use" level. + */ + break; + } + } + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DUMP, + printf("ipsec_in_reject: auth:%d conf:%d icv:%d m_flags:%x\n", + need_auth, need_conf, need_icv, m->m_flags)); + + if ((need_conf && !(m->m_flags & M_DECRYPTED)) + || (!need_auth && need_icv && !(m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM)) + || (need_auth && !(m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR))) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check AH/ESP integrity. + * This function is called from tcp_input(), udp_input(), + * and {ah,esp}4_input for tunnel mode + */ +int +ipsec4_in_reject_so(m, so) + struct mbuf *m; + struct socket *so; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + int error; + int result; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? */ + + /* get SP for this packet. + * When we are called from ip_forward(), we call + * ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr() with IP_FORWARDING flag. + */ + if (so == NULL) + sp = ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, IP_FORWARDING, &error); + else + sp = ipsec4_getpolicybysock(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, so, &error); + + if (sp == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? + * -> No, there may be error. */ + + result = ipsec_in_reject(sp, m); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec4_in_reject_so call free SP:%p\n", sp)); + key_freesp(sp); + + return result; +} + +int +ipsec4_in_reject(m, inp) + struct mbuf *m; + struct inpcb *inp; +{ + if (inp == NULL) + return ipsec4_in_reject_so(m, NULL); + if (inp->inp_socket) + return ipsec4_in_reject_so(m, inp->inp_socket); + else + panic("ipsec4_in_reject: invalid inpcb/socket"); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * Check AH/ESP integrity. + * This function is called from tcp6_input(), udp6_input(), + * and {ah,esp}6_input for tunnel mode + */ +int +ipsec6_in_reject_so(m, so) + struct mbuf *m; + struct socket *so; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + int error; + int result; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? */ + + /* get SP for this packet. + * When we are called from ip_forward(), we call + * ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr() with IP_FORWARDING flag. + */ + if (so == NULL) + sp = ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, IP_FORWARDING, &error); + else + sp = ipsec6_getpolicybysock(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, so, &error); + + if (sp == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? */ + + result = ipsec_in_reject(sp, m); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec6_in_reject_so call free SP:%p\n", sp)); + key_freesp(sp); + + return result; +} + +int +ipsec6_in_reject(m, in6p) + struct mbuf *m; + struct in6pcb *in6p; +{ + if (in6p == NULL) + return ipsec6_in_reject_so(m, NULL); + if (in6p->in6p_socket) + return ipsec6_in_reject_so(m, in6p->in6p_socket); + else + panic("ipsec6_in_reject: invalid in6p/socket"); + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * compute the byte size to be occupied by IPsec header. + * in case it is tunneled, it includes the size of outer IP header. + * NOTE: SP passed is free in this function. + */ +static size_t +ipsec_hdrsiz(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + size_t siz, clen; + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec_hdrsiz: using SP\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(sp)); + + /* check policy */ + switch (sp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + return 0; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + break; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + default: + panic("ipsec_hdrsiz: Invalid policy found. %d\n", sp->policy); + } + + siz = 0; + + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + + clen = 0; + + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + clen = esp_hdrsiz(isr); +#else + clen = 0; /* XXX */ +#endif + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + clen = ah_hdrsiz(isr); + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + clen = sizeof(struct ipcomp); + break; + } + + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) { + switch (((struct sockaddr *)&isr->saidx.dst)->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + clen += sizeof(struct ip); + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + clen += sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + break; +#endif + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec_hdrsiz: " + "unknown AF %d in IPsec tunnel SA\n", + ((struct sockaddr *)&isr->saidx.dst)->sa_family)); + break; + } + } + siz += clen; + } + + return siz; +} + +/* This function is called from ip_forward() and ipsec4_hdrsize_tcp(). */ +size_t +ipsec4_hdrsiz(m, dir, inp) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + struct inpcb *inp; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + int error; + size_t size; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? */ + if (inp != NULL && inp->inp_socket == NULL) + panic("ipsec4_hdrsize: why is socket NULL but there is PCB."); + + /* get SP for this packet. + * When we are called from ip_forward(), we call + * ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr() with IP_FORWARDING flag. + */ + if (inp == NULL) + sp = ipsec4_getpolicybyaddr(m, dir, IP_FORWARDING, &error); + else + sp = ipsec4_getpolicybysock(m, dir, inp->inp_socket, &error); + + if (sp == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX should be panic ? */ + + size = ipsec_hdrsiz(sp); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec4_hdrsiz call free SP:%p\n", sp)); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec4_hdrsiz: size:%lu.\n", (unsigned long)size)); + key_freesp(sp); + + return size; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* This function is called from ipsec6_hdrsize_tcp(), + * and maybe from ip6_forward.() + */ +size_t +ipsec6_hdrsiz(m, dir, in6p) + struct mbuf *m; + u_int dir; + struct in6pcb *in6p; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; + int error; + size_t size; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return 0; /* XXX shoud be panic ? */ + if (in6p != NULL && in6p->in6p_socket == NULL) + panic("ipsec6_hdrsize: why is socket NULL but there is PCB."); + + /* get SP for this packet */ + /* XXX Is it right to call with IP_FORWARDING. */ + if (in6p == NULL) + sp = ipsec6_getpolicybyaddr(m, dir, IP_FORWARDING, &error); + else + sp = ipsec6_getpolicybysock(m, dir, in6p->in6p_socket, &error); + + if (sp == NULL) + return 0; + size = ipsec_hdrsiz(sp); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP ipsec6_hdrsiz call free SP:%p\n", sp)); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec6_hdrsiz: size:%lu.\n", (unsigned long)size)); + key_freesp(sp); + + return size; +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#ifdef INET +/* + * encapsulate for ipsec tunnel. + * ip->ip_src must be fixed later on. + */ +static int +ipsec4_encapsulate(m, sav) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + struct ip *oip; + struct ip *ip; + size_t hlen; + size_t plen; + + /* can't tunnel between different AFs */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family + != ((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)->sa_family + || ((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family != AF_INET) { + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#if 0 + /* XXX if the dst is myself, perform nothing. */ + if (key_ismyaddr((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)) { + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#endif + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) + panic("ipsec4_encapsulate: assumption failed (first mbuf length)"); + + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = _IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + + if (m->m_len != hlen) + panic("ipsec4_encapsulate: assumption failed (first mbuf length)"); + + /* generate header checksum */ + ip->ip_sum = 0; +#ifdef _IP_VHL + if (ip->ip_vhl == IP_VHL_BORING) + ip->ip_sum = in_cksum_hdr(ip); + else + ip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, hlen); +#else + ip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, hlen); +#endif + + plen = m->m_pkthdr.len; + + /* + * grow the mbuf to accomodate the new IPv4 header. + * NOTE: IPv4 options will never be copied. + */ + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(m->m_next) < hlen) { + struct mbuf *n; + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + n->m_len = hlen; + n->m_next = m->m_next; + m->m_next = n; + m->m_pkthdr.len += hlen; + oip = mtod(n, struct ip *); + } else { + m->m_next->m_len += hlen; + m->m_next->m_data -= hlen; + m->m_pkthdr.len += hlen; + oip = mtod(m->m_next, struct ip *); + } + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)oip, hlen); + m->m_len = sizeof(struct ip); + m->m_pkthdr.len -= (hlen - sizeof(struct ip)); + + /* construct new IPv4 header. see RFC 2401 5.1.2.1 */ + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip_ecn_ingress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &ip->ip_tos, &oip->ip_tos); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + ip->ip_vhl = IP_MAKE_VHL(IPVERSION, sizeof(struct ip) >> 2); +#else + ip->ip_hl = sizeof(struct ip) >> 2; +#endif + ip->ip_off &= htons(~IP_OFFMASK); + ip->ip_off &= htons(~IP_MF); + switch (ip4_ipsec_dfbit) { + case 0: /* clear DF bit */ + ip->ip_off &= htons(~IP_DF); + break; + case 1: /* set DF bit */ + ip->ip_off |= htons(IP_DF); + break; + default: /* copy DF bit */ + break; + } + ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_IPIP; + if (plen + sizeof(struct ip) < IP_MAXPACKET) + ip->ip_len = htons(plen + sizeof(struct ip)); + else { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv4 ipsec: size exceeds limit: " + "leave ip_len as is (invalid packet)\n")); + } + ip->ip_id = htons(ip_id++); + bcopy(&((struct sockaddr_in *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sin_addr, + &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src)); + bcopy(&((struct sockaddr_in *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)->sin_addr, + &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst)); + ip->ip_ttl = IPDEFTTL; + + /* XXX Should ip_src be updated later ? */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* INET */ + +#ifdef INET6 +static int +ipsec6_encapsulate(m, sav) + struct mbuf *m; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + struct ip6_hdr *oip6; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + size_t plen; + + /* can't tunnel between different AFs */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family + != ((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)->sa_family + || ((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family != AF_INET6) { + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#if 0 + /* XXX if the dst is myself, perform nothing. */ + if (key_ismyaddr((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)) { + m_freem(m); + return EINVAL; + } +#endif + + plen = m->m_pkthdr.len; + + /* + * grow the mbuf to accomodate the new IPv6 header. + */ + if (m->m_len != sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + panic("ipsec6_encapsulate: assumption failed (first mbuf length)"); + if (M_LEADINGSPACE(m->m_next) < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { + struct mbuf *n; + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + n->m_len = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + n->m_next = m->m_next; + m->m_next = n; + m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + oip6 = mtod(n, struct ip6_hdr *); + } else { + m->m_next->m_len += sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + m->m_next->m_data -= sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + oip6 = mtod(m->m_next, struct ip6_hdr *); + } + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, (caddr_t)oip6, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); + + /* Fake link-local scope-class addresses */ + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&oip6->ip6_src)) + oip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&oip6->ip6_dst)) + oip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + + /* construct new IPv6 header. see RFC 2401 5.1.2.2 */ + /* ECN consideration. */ + ip6_ecn_ingress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &ip6->ip6_flow, &oip6->ip6_flow); + if (plen < IPV6_MAXPACKET - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(plen); + else { + /* ip6->ip6_plen will be updated in ip6_output() */ + } + ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_IPV6; + bcopy(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sin6_addr, + &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src)); + bcopy(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)->sin6_addr, + &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst)); + ip6->ip6_hlim = IPV6_DEFHLIM; + + /* XXX Should ip6_src be updated later ? */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +/* + * Check the variable replay window. + * ipsec_chkreplay() performs replay check before ICV verification. + * ipsec_updatereplay() updates replay bitmap. This must be called after + * ICV verification (it also performs replay check, which is usually done + * beforehand). + * 0 (zero) is returned if packet disallowed, 1 if packet permitted. + * + * based on RFC 2401. + */ +int +ipsec_chkreplay(seq, sav) + u_int32_t seq; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + const struct secreplay *replay; + u_int32_t diff; + int fr; + u_int32_t wsizeb; /* constant: bits of window size */ + int frlast; /* constant: last frame */ + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("ipsec_chkreplay: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + replay = sav->replay; + + if (replay->wsize == 0) + return 1; /* no need to check replay. */ + + /* constant */ + frlast = replay->wsize - 1; + wsizeb = replay->wsize << 3; + + /* sequence number of 0 is invalid */ + if (seq == 0) + return 0; + + /* first time is always okay */ + if (replay->count == 0) + return 1; + + if (seq > replay->lastseq) { + /* larger sequences are okay */ + return 1; + } else { + /* seq is equal or less than lastseq. */ + diff = replay->lastseq - seq; + + /* over range to check, i.e. too old or wrapped */ + if (diff >= wsizeb) + return 0; + + fr = frlast - diff / 8; + + /* this packet already seen ? */ + if ((replay->bitmap)[fr] & (1 << (diff % 8))) + return 0; + + /* out of order but good */ + return 1; + } +} + +/* + * check replay counter whether to update or not. + * OUT: 0: OK + * 1: NG + */ +int +ipsec_updatereplay(seq, sav) + u_int32_t seq; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + struct secreplay *replay; + u_int32_t diff; + int fr; + u_int32_t wsizeb; /* constant: bits of window size */ + int frlast; /* constant: last frame */ + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("ipsec_chkreplay: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + replay = sav->replay; + + if (replay->wsize == 0) + goto ok; /* no need to check replay. */ + + /* constant */ + frlast = replay->wsize - 1; + wsizeb = replay->wsize << 3; + + /* sequence number of 0 is invalid */ + if (seq == 0) + return 1; + + /* first time */ + if (replay->count == 0) { + replay->lastseq = seq; + bzero(replay->bitmap, replay->wsize); + (replay->bitmap)[frlast] = 1; + goto ok; + } + + if (seq > replay->lastseq) { + /* seq is larger than lastseq. */ + diff = seq - replay->lastseq; + + /* new larger sequence number */ + if (diff < wsizeb) { + /* In window */ + /* set bit for this packet */ + vshiftl(replay->bitmap, diff, replay->wsize); + (replay->bitmap)[frlast] |= 1; + } else { + /* this packet has a "way larger" */ + bzero(replay->bitmap, replay->wsize); + (replay->bitmap)[frlast] = 1; + } + replay->lastseq = seq; + + /* larger is good */ + } else { + /* seq is equal or less than lastseq. */ + diff = replay->lastseq - seq; + + /* over range to check, i.e. too old or wrapped */ + if (diff >= wsizeb) + return 1; + + fr = frlast - diff / 8; + + /* this packet already seen ? */ + if ((replay->bitmap)[fr] & (1 << (diff % 8))) + return 1; + + /* mark as seen */ + (replay->bitmap)[fr] |= (1 << (diff % 8)); + + /* out of order but good */ + } + +ok: + if (replay->count == ~0) { + + /* set overflow flag */ + replay->overflow++; + + /* don't increment, no more packets accepted */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) + return 1; + + ipseclog((LOG_WARNING, "replay counter made %d cycle. %s\n", + replay->overflow, ipsec_logsastr(sav))); + } + + replay->count++; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * shift variable length buffer to left. + * IN: bitmap: pointer to the buffer + * nbit: the number of to shift. + * wsize: buffer size (bytes). + */ +static void +vshiftl(bitmap, nbit, wsize) + unsigned char *bitmap; + int nbit, wsize; +{ + int s, j, i; + unsigned char over; + + for (j = 0; j < nbit; j += 8) { + s = (nbit - j < 8) ? (nbit - j): 8; + bitmap[0] <<= s; + for (i = 1; i < wsize; i++) { + over = (bitmap[i] >> (8 - s)); + bitmap[i] <<= s; + bitmap[i-1] |= over; + } + } + + return; +} + +const char * +ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi) + struct ip *ip; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + static char buf[256]; + char *p; + u_int8_t *s, *d; + + s = (u_int8_t *)(&ip->ip_src); + d = (u_int8_t *)(&ip->ip_dst); + + p = buf; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "packet(SPI=%u ", (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), "src=%u.%u.%u.%u", + s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), " dst=%u.%u.%u.%u", + d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3]); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), ")"); + + return buf; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +const char * +ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi) + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + static char buf[256]; + char *p; + + p = buf; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "packet(SPI=%u ", (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), "src=%s", + ip6_sprintf(&ip6->ip6_src)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), " dst=%s", + ip6_sprintf(&ip6->ip6_dst)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), ")"); + + return buf; +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +const char * +ipsec_logsastr(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + static char buf[256]; + char *p; + struct secasindex *saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; + + /* validity check */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family + != ((struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst)->sa_family) + panic("ipsec_logsastr: family mismatched.\n"); + + p = buf; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "SA(SPI=%u ", (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + if (((struct sockaddr *)&saidx->src)->sa_family == AF_INET) { + u_int8_t *s, *d; + s = (u_int8_t *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&saidx->src)->sin_addr; + d = (u_int8_t *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&saidx->dst)->sin_addr; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), + "src=%d.%d.%d.%d dst=%d.%d.%d.%d", + s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3], d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3]); + } +#ifdef INET6 + else if (((struct sockaddr *)&saidx->src)->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), + "src=%s", + ip6_sprintf(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->src)->sin6_addr)); + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), + " dst=%s", + ip6_sprintf(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx->dst)->sin6_addr)); + } +#endif + while (p && *p) + p++; + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - (p - buf), ")"); + + return buf; +} + +void +ipsec_dumpmbuf(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + int totlen; + int i; + u_char *p; + + totlen = 0; + printf("---\n"); + while (m) { + p = mtod(m, u_char *); + for (i = 0; i < m->m_len; i++) { + printf("%02x ", p[i]); + totlen++; + if (totlen % 16 == 0) + printf("\n"); + } + m = m->m_next; + } + if (totlen % 16 != 0) + printf("\n"); + printf("---\n"); +} + +#ifdef INET +/* + * IPsec output logic for IPv4. + */ +int +ipsec4_output(state, sp, flags) + struct ipsec_output_state *state; + struct secpolicy *sp; + int flags; +{ + struct ip *ip = NULL; + struct ipsecrequest *isr = NULL; + struct secasindex saidx; + int s; + int error; + struct sockaddr_in *dst4; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + + if (!state) + panic("state == NULL in ipsec4_output"); + if (!state->m) + panic("state->m == NULL in ipsec4_output"); + if (!state->ro) + panic("state->ro == NULL in ipsec4_output"); + if (!state->dst) + panic("state->dst == NULL in ipsec4_output"); + state->encap = 0; + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec4_output: applyed SP\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(sp)); + + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + +#if 0 /* give up to check restriction of transport mode */ + /* XXX but should be checked somewhere */ + /* + * some of the IPsec operation must be performed only in + * originating case. + */ + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT + && (flags & IP_FORWARDING)) + continue; +#endif + + /* make SA index for search proper SA */ + ip = mtod(state->m, struct ip *); + bcopy(&isr->saidx, &saidx, sizeof(saidx)); + saidx.mode = isr->saidx.mode; + saidx.reqid = isr->saidx.reqid; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&saidx.src; + if (sin->sin_len == 0) { + sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip->ip_src, &sin->sin_addr, + sizeof(sin->sin_addr)); + } + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&saidx.dst; + if (sin->sin_len == 0) { + sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip->ip_dst, &sin->sin_addr, + sizeof(sin->sin_addr)); + } + + if ((error = key_checkrequest(isr, &saidx)) != 0) { + /* + * IPsec processing is required, but no SA found. + * I assume that key_acquire() had been called + * to get/establish the SA. Here I discard + * this packet because it is responsibility for + * upper layer to retransmit the packet. + */ + ipsecstat.out_nosa++; + goto bad; + } + + /* validity check */ + if (isr->sav == NULL) { + switch (ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr)) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + continue; + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + /* must be not reached here. */ + panic("ipsec4_output: no SA found, but required."); + } + } + + /* + * If there is no valid SA, we give up to process any + * more. In such a case, the SA's status is changed + * from DYING to DEAD after allocating. If a packet + * send to the receiver by dead SA, the receiver can + * not decode a packet because SA has been dead. + */ + if (isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipsecstat.out_nosa++; + error = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + + /* + * There may be the case that SA status will be changed when + * we are refering to one. So calling splsoftnet(). + */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) { + /* + * build IPsec tunnel. + */ + /* XXX should be processed with other familiy */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family != AF_INET) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec4_output: " + "family mismatched between inner and outer spi=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(isr->sav->spi))); + splx(s); + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + goto bad; + } + + state->m = ipsec4_splithdr(state->m); + if (!state->m) { + splx(s); + error = ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + error = ipsec4_encapsulate(state->m, isr->sav); + splx(s); + if (error) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + ip = mtod(state->m, struct ip *); + + state->ro = &isr->sav->sah->sa_route; + state->dst = (struct sockaddr *)&state->ro->ro_dst; + dst4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)state->dst; + if (state->ro->ro_rt + && ((state->ro->ro_rt->rt_flags & RTF_UP) == 0 + || dst4->sin_addr.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr)) { + RTFREE(state->ro->ro_rt); + state->ro->ro_rt = NULL; + } + if (state->ro->ro_rt == 0) { + dst4->sin_family = AF_INET; + dst4->sin_len = sizeof(*dst4); + dst4->sin_addr = ip->ip_dst; + rtalloc(state->ro); + } + if (state->ro->ro_rt == 0) { + ipstat.ips_noroute++; + error = EHOSTUNREACH; + goto bad; + } + + /* adjust state->dst if tunnel endpoint is offlink */ + if (state->ro->ro_rt->rt_flags & RTF_GATEWAY) { + state->dst = (struct sockaddr *)state->ro->ro_rt->rt_gateway; + dst4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)state->dst; + } + + state->encap++; + } else + splx(s); + + state->m = ipsec4_splithdr(state->m); + if (!state->m) { + error = ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + if ((error = esp4_output(state->m, isr)) != 0) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + break; +#else + m_freem(state->m); + state->m = NULL; + error = EINVAL; + goto bad; +#endif + case IPPROTO_AH: + if ((error = ah4_output(state->m, isr)) != 0) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + if ((error = ipcomp4_output(state->m, isr)) != 0) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, + "ipsec4_output: unknown ipsec protocol %d\n", + isr->saidx.proto)); + m_freem(state->m); + state->m = NULL; + error = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + + if (state->m == 0) { + error = ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + ip = mtod(state->m, struct ip *); + } + + return 0; + +bad: + m_freem(state->m); + state->m = NULL; + return error; +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * IPsec output logic for IPv6, transport mode. + */ +int +ipsec6_output_trans(state, nexthdrp, mprev, sp, flags, tun) + struct ipsec_output_state *state; + u_char *nexthdrp; + struct mbuf *mprev; + struct secpolicy *sp; + int flags; + int *tun; +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct ipsecrequest *isr = NULL; + struct secasindex saidx; + int error = 0; + int plen; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + + if (!state) + panic("state == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + if (!state->m) + panic("state->m == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + if (!nexthdrp) + panic("nexthdrp == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + if (!mprev) + panic("mprev == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + if (!sp) + panic("sp == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + if (!tun) + panic("tun == NULL in ipsec6_output_trans"); + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec6_output_trans: applyed SP\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(sp)); + + *tun = 0; + for (isr = sp->req; isr; isr = isr->next) { + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) { + /* the rest will be handled by ipsec6_output_tunnel() */ + break; + } + + /* make SA index for search proper SA */ + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + bcopy(&isr->saidx, &saidx, sizeof(saidx)); + saidx.mode = isr->saidx.mode; + saidx.reqid = isr->saidx.reqid; + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx.src; + if (sin6->sin6_len == 0) { + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_src, &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(ip6->ip6_src)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx.dst; + if (sin6->sin6_len == 0) { + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_dst, &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + + if (key_checkrequest(isr, &saidx) == ENOENT) { + /* + * IPsec processing is required, but no SA found. + * I assume that key_acquire() had been called + * to get/establish the SA. Here I discard + * this packet because it is responsibility for + * upper layer to retransmit the packet. + */ + ipsec6stat.out_nosa++; + error = ENOENT; + + /* + * Notify the fact that the packet is discarded + * to ourselves. I believe this is better than + * just silently discarding. (jinmei@kame.net) + * XXX: should we restrict the error to TCP packets? + * XXX: should we directly notify sockets via + * pfctlinputs? + * + * Noone have initialized rcvif until this point, + * so clear it. + */ + if ((state->m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) + state->m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL; + icmp6_error(state->m, ICMP6_DST_UNREACH, + ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADMIN, 0); + state->m = NULL; /* icmp6_error freed the mbuf */ + goto bad; + } + + /* validity check */ + if (isr->sav == NULL) { + switch (ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr)) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + continue; + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + /* must be not reached here. */ + panic("ipsec6_output_trans: no SA found, but required."); + } + } + + /* + * If there is no valid SA, we give up to process. + * see same place at ipsec4_output(). + */ + if (isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipsec6stat.out_nosa++; + error = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + error = esp6_output(state->m, nexthdrp, mprev->m_next, isr); +#else + m_freem(state->m); + error = EINVAL; +#endif + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + error = ah6_output(state->m, nexthdrp, mprev->m_next, isr); + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + error = ipcomp6_output(state->m, nexthdrp, mprev->m_next, isr); + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_output_trans: " + "unknown ipsec protocol %d\n", isr->saidx.proto)); + m_freem(state->m); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; + break; + } + if (error) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + plen = state->m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + if (plen > IPV6_MAXPACKET) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_output_trans: " + "IPsec with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported\n")); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; /* XXX */ + goto bad; + } + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(plen); + } + + /* if we have more to go, we need a tunnel mode processing */ + if (isr != NULL) + *tun = 1; + + return 0; + +bad: + m_freem(state->m); + state->m = NULL; + return error; +} + +/* + * IPsec output logic for IPv6, tunnel mode. + */ +int +ipsec6_output_tunnel(state, sp, flags) + struct ipsec_output_state *state; + struct secpolicy *sp; + int flags; +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + struct ipsecrequest *isr = NULL; + struct secasindex saidx; + int error = 0; + int plen; + struct sockaddr_in6* dst6; + int s; + + if (!state) + panic("state == NULL in ipsec6_output_tunnel"); + if (!state->m) + panic("state->m == NULL in ipsec6_output_tunnel"); + if (!sp) + panic("sp == NULL in ipsec6_output_tunnel"); + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("ipsec6_output_tunnel: applyed SP\n"); + kdebug_secpolicy(sp)); + + /* + * transport mode ipsec (before the 1st tunnel mode) is already + * processed by ipsec6_output_trans(). + */ + for (isr = sp->req; isr; isr = isr->next) { + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) + break; + } + + for (/* already initialized */; isr; isr = isr->next) { + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) { + /* When tunnel mode, SA peers must be specified. */ + bcopy(&isr->saidx, &saidx, sizeof(saidx)); + } else { + /* make SA index to look for a proper SA */ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + + bzero(&saidx, sizeof(saidx)); + saidx.proto = isr->saidx.proto; + saidx.mode = isr->saidx.mode; + saidx.reqid = isr->saidx.reqid; + + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx.src; + if (sin6->sin6_len == 0) { + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_src, &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(ip6->ip6_src)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_src.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&saidx.dst; + if (sin6->sin6_len == 0) { + sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = IPSEC_PORT_ANY; + bcopy(&ip6->ip6_dst, &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) { + /* fix scope id for comparing SPD */ + sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + sin6->sin6_scope_id = ntohs(ip6->ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1]); + } + } + } + + if (key_checkrequest(isr, &saidx) == ENOENT) { + /* + * IPsec processing is required, but no SA found. + * I assume that key_acquire() had been called + * to get/establish the SA. Here I discard + * this packet because it is responsibility for + * upper layer to retransmit the packet. + */ + ipsec6stat.out_nosa++; + error = ENOENT; + goto bad; + } + + /* validity check */ + if (isr->sav == NULL) { + switch (ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr)) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + continue; + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + /* must be not reached here. */ + panic("ipsec6_output_tunnel: no SA found, but required."); + } + } + + /* + * If there is no valid SA, we give up to process. + * see same place at ipsec4_output(). + */ + if (isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE + && isr->sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) { + ipsec6stat.out_nosa++; + error = EINVAL; + goto bad; + } + + /* + * There may be the case that SA status will be changed when + * we are refering to one. So calling splsoftnet(). + */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + + if (isr->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) { + /* + * build IPsec tunnel. + */ + /* XXX should be processed with other familiy */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)&isr->sav->sah->saidx.src)->sa_family != AF_INET6) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_output_tunnel: " + "family mismatched between inner and outer, spi=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(isr->sav->spi))); + splx(s); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + goto bad; + } + + state->m = ipsec6_splithdr(state->m); + if (!state->m) { + splx(s); + ipsec6stat.out_nomem++; + error = ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + error = ipsec6_encapsulate(state->m, isr->sav); + splx(s); + if (error) { + state->m = 0; + goto bad; + } + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + + state->ro = &isr->sav->sah->sa_route; + state->dst = (struct sockaddr *)&state->ro->ro_dst; + dst6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)state->dst; + if (state->ro->ro_rt + && ((state->ro->ro_rt->rt_flags & RTF_UP) == 0 + || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&dst6->sin6_addr, &ip6->ip6_dst))) { + RTFREE(state->ro->ro_rt); + state->ro->ro_rt = NULL; + } + if (state->ro->ro_rt == 0) { + bzero(dst6, sizeof(*dst6)); + dst6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + dst6->sin6_len = sizeof(*dst6); + dst6->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst; + rtalloc(state->ro); + } + if (state->ro->ro_rt == 0) { + ip6stat.ip6s_noroute++; + ipsec6stat.out_noroute++; + error = EHOSTUNREACH; + goto bad; + } + + /* adjust state->dst if tunnel endpoint is offlink */ + if (state->ro->ro_rt->rt_flags & RTF_GATEWAY) { + state->dst = (struct sockaddr *)state->ro->ro_rt->rt_gateway; + dst6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)state->dst; + } + } else + splx(s); + + state->m = ipsec6_splithdr(state->m); + if (!state->m) { + ipsec6stat.out_nomem++; + error = ENOMEM; + goto bad; + } + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + switch (isr->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + error = esp6_output(state->m, &ip6->ip6_nxt, state->m->m_next, isr); +#else + m_freem(state->m); + error = EINVAL; +#endif + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + error = ah6_output(state->m, &ip6->ip6_nxt, state->m->m_next, isr); + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + /* XXX code should be here */ + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_output_tunnel: " + "unknown ipsec protocol %d\n", isr->saidx.proto)); + m_freem(state->m); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; + break; + } + if (error) { + state->m = NULL; + goto bad; + } + plen = state->m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + if (plen > IPV6_MAXPACKET) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "ipsec6_output_tunnel: " + "IPsec with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported\n")); + ipsec6stat.out_inval++; + error = EINVAL; /* XXX */ + goto bad; + } + ip6 = mtod(state->m, struct ip6_hdr *); + ip6->ip6_plen = htons(plen); + } + + return 0; + +bad: + m_freem(state->m); + state->m = NULL; + return error; +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#ifdef INET +/* + * Chop IP header and option off from the payload. + */ +static struct mbuf * +ipsec4_splithdr(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *mh; + struct ip *ip; + int hlen; + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) + panic("ipsec4_splithdr: first mbuf too short"); + ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = _IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + if (m->m_len > hlen) { + MGETHDR(mh, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER); + if (!mh) { + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + M_COPY_PKTHDR(mh, m); + MH_ALIGN(mh, hlen); + m->m_flags &= ~M_PKTHDR; + m->m_len -= hlen; + m->m_data += hlen; + mh->m_next = m; + m = mh; + m->m_len = hlen; + bcopy((caddr_t)ip, mtod(m, caddr_t), hlen); + } else if (m->m_len < hlen) { + m = m_pullup(m, hlen); + if (!m) + return NULL; + } + return m; +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +static struct mbuf * +ipsec6_splithdr(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *mh; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6; + int hlen; + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + panic("ipsec6_splithdr: first mbuf too short"); + ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); + if (m->m_len > hlen) { + MGETHDR(mh, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER); + if (!mh) { + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + M_COPY_PKTHDR(mh, m); + MH_ALIGN(mh, hlen); + m->m_flags &= ~M_PKTHDR; + m->m_len -= hlen; + m->m_data += hlen; + mh->m_next = m; + m = mh; + m->m_len = hlen; + bcopy((caddr_t)ip6, mtod(m, caddr_t), hlen); + } else if (m->m_len < hlen) { + m = m_pullup(m, hlen); + if (!m) + return NULL; + } + return m; +} +#endif + +/* validate inbound IPsec tunnel packet. */ +int +ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off, nxt0, sav) + struct mbuf *m; /* no pullup permitted, m->m_len >= ip */ + int off; + u_int nxt0; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_int8_t nxt = nxt0 & 0xff; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct sockaddr_in osrc, odst, isrc, idst; + int hlen; + struct secpolicy *sp; + struct ip *oip; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) + panic("too short mbuf on ipsec4_tunnel_validate"); +#endif + if (nxt != IPPROTO_IPV4) + return 0; + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(struct ip)) + return 0; + /* do not decapsulate if the SA is for transport mode only */ + if (sav->sah->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) + return 0; + + oip = mtod(m, struct ip *); +#ifdef _IP_VHL + hlen = _IP_VHL_HL(oip->ip_vhl) << 2; +#else + hlen = oip->ip_hl << 2; +#endif + if (hlen != sizeof(struct ip)) + return 0; + + /* AF_INET6 should be supported, but at this moment we don't. */ + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst; + if (sin->sin_family != AF_INET) + return 0; + if (bcmp(&oip->ip_dst, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(oip->ip_dst)) != 0) + return 0; + + /* XXX slow */ + bzero(&osrc, sizeof(osrc)); + bzero(&odst, sizeof(odst)); + bzero(&isrc, sizeof(isrc)); + bzero(&idst, sizeof(idst)); + osrc.sin_family = odst.sin_family = isrc.sin_family = idst.sin_family = + AF_INET; + osrc.sin_len = odst.sin_len = isrc.sin_len = idst.sin_len = + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + osrc.sin_addr = oip->ip_src; + odst.sin_addr = oip->ip_dst; + m_copydata(m, off + offsetof(struct ip, ip_src), sizeof(isrc.sin_addr), + (caddr_t)&isrc.sin_addr); + m_copydata(m, off + offsetof(struct ip, ip_dst), sizeof(idst.sin_addr), + (caddr_t)&idst.sin_addr); + + /* + * RFC2401 5.2.1 (b): (assume that we are using tunnel mode) + * - if the inner destination is multicast address, there can be + * multiple permissible inner source address. implementation + * may want to skip verification of inner source address against + * SPD selector. + * - if the inner protocol is ICMP, the packet may be an error report + * from routers on the other side of the VPN cloud (R in the + * following diagram). in this case, we cannot verify inner source + * address against SPD selector. + * me -- gw === gw -- R -- you + * + * we consider the first bullet to be users responsibility on SPD entry + * configuration (if you need to encrypt multicast traffic, set + * the source range of SPD selector to 0.0.0.0/0, or have explicit + * address ranges for possible senders). + * the second bullet is not taken care of (yet). + * + * therefore, we do not do anything special about inner source. + */ + + sp = key_gettunnel((struct sockaddr *)&osrc, (struct sockaddr *)&odst, + (struct sockaddr *)&isrc, (struct sockaddr *)&idst); + /* + * when there is no suitable inbound policy for the packet of the ipsec + * tunnel mode, the kernel never decapsulate the tunneled packet + * as the ipsec tunnel mode even when the system wide policy is "none". + * then the kernel leaves the generic tunnel module to process this + * packet. if there is no rule of the generic tunnel, the packet + * is rejected and the statistics will be counted up. + */ + if (!sp) + return 0; + key_freesp(sp); + + return 1; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* validate inbound IPsec tunnel packet. */ +int +ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off, nxt0, sav) + struct mbuf *m; /* no pullup permitted, m->m_len >= ip */ + int off; + u_int nxt0; + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + u_int8_t nxt = nxt0 & 0xff; + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + struct sockaddr_in6 osrc, odst, isrc, idst; + struct secpolicy *sp; + struct ip6_hdr *oip6; + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + panic("too short mbuf on ipsec6_tunnel_validate"); +#endif + if (nxt != IPPROTO_IPV6) + return 0; + if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) + return 0; + /* do not decapsulate if the SA is for transport mode only */ + if (sav->sah->saidx.mode == IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT) + return 0; + + oip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *); + /* AF_INET should be supported, but at this moment we don't. */ + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst; + if (sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6) + return 0; + if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&oip6->ip6_dst, &sin6->sin6_addr)) + return 0; + + /* XXX slow */ + bzero(&osrc, sizeof(osrc)); + bzero(&odst, sizeof(odst)); + bzero(&isrc, sizeof(isrc)); + bzero(&idst, sizeof(idst)); + osrc.sin6_family = odst.sin6_family = isrc.sin6_family = + idst.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + osrc.sin6_len = odst.sin6_len = isrc.sin6_len = idst.sin6_len = + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + osrc.sin6_addr = oip6->ip6_src; + odst.sin6_addr = oip6->ip6_dst; + m_copydata(m, off + offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_src), + sizeof(isrc.sin6_addr), (caddr_t)&isrc.sin6_addr); + m_copydata(m, off + offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_dst), + sizeof(idst.sin6_addr), (caddr_t)&idst.sin6_addr); + + /* + * regarding to inner source address validation, see a long comment + * in ipsec4_tunnel_validate. + */ + + sp = key_gettunnel((struct sockaddr *)&osrc, (struct sockaddr *)&odst, + (struct sockaddr *)&isrc, (struct sockaddr *)&idst); + if (!sp) + return 0; + key_freesp(sp); + + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Make a mbuf chain for encryption. + * If the original mbuf chain contains a mbuf with a cluster, + * allocate a new cluster and copy the data to the new cluster. + * XXX: this hack is inefficient, but is necessary to handle cases + * of TCP retransmission... + */ +struct mbuf * +ipsec_copypkt(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n, **mpp, *mnew; + + for (n = m, mpp = &m; n; n = n->m_next) { + if (n->m_flags & M_EXT) { + /* + * Make a copy only if there is more than one + * references to the cluster. + * XXX: is this approach effective? + */ + if ( +#ifdef __bsdi__ + n->m_ext.ext_func || +#else + n->m_ext.ext_free || +#endif +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + MCLISREFERENCED(n) +#else + mclrefcnt[mtocl(n->m_ext.ext_buf)] > 1 +#endif + ) + { + int remain, copied; + struct mbuf *mm; + + if (n->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) { + MGETHDR(mnew, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER); + if (mnew == NULL) + goto fail; + mnew->m_pkthdr = n->m_pkthdr; +#if 0 + if (n->m_pkthdr.aux) { + mnew->m_pkthdr.aux = + m_copym(n->m_pkthdr.aux, + 0, M_COPYALL, M_DONTWAIT); + } +#endif + M_COPY_PKTHDR(mnew, n); + mnew->m_flags = n->m_flags & M_COPYFLAGS; + } + else { + MGET(mnew, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (mnew == NULL) + goto fail; + } + mnew->m_len = 0; + mm = mnew; + + /* + * Copy data. If we don't have enough space to + * store the whole data, allocate a cluster + * or additional mbufs. + * XXX: we don't use m_copyback(), since the + * function does not use clusters and thus is + * inefficient. + */ + remain = n->m_len; + copied = 0; + while (1) { + int len; + struct mbuf *mn; + + if (remain <= (mm->m_flags & M_PKTHDR ? MHLEN : MLEN)) + len = remain; + else { /* allocate a cluster */ + MCLGET(mm, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!(mm->m_flags & M_EXT)) { + m_free(mm); + goto fail; + } + len = remain < MCLBYTES ? + remain : MCLBYTES; + } + + bcopy(n->m_data + copied, mm->m_data, + len); + + copied += len; + remain -= len; + mm->m_len = len; + + if (remain <= 0) /* completed? */ + break; + + /* need another mbuf */ + MGETHDR(mn, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER); + if (mn == NULL) + goto fail; + mn->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL; + mm->m_next = mn; + mm = mn; + } + + /* adjust chain */ + mm->m_next = m_free(n); + n = mm; + *mpp = mnew; + mpp = &n->m_next; + + continue; + } + } + *mpp = n; + mpp = &n->m_next; + } + + return(m); + fail: + m_freem(m); + return(NULL); +} + +static struct mbuf * +ipsec_addaux(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_aux_find(m, AF_INET, IPPROTO_ESP); + if (!n) + n = m_aux_add(m, AF_INET, IPPROTO_ESP); + if (!n) + return n; /* ENOBUFS */ + n->m_len = sizeof(struct ipsecaux); + bzero(mtod(n, void *), n->m_len); + return n; +} + +static struct mbuf * +ipsec_findaux(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_aux_find(m, AF_INET, IPPROTO_ESP); +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (n && n->m_len < sizeof(struct socket *)) + panic("invalid ipsec m_aux"); +#endif + return n; +} + +void +ipsec_delaux(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = m_aux_find(m, AF_INET, IPPROTO_ESP); + if (n) + m_aux_delete(m, n); +} + +/* if the aux buffer is unnecessary, nuke it. */ +static void +ipsec_optaux(m, n) + struct mbuf *m; + struct mbuf *n; +{ + struct ipsecaux *aux; + + if (!n) + return; + if (sizeof(*aux) > n->m_len) { + ipsec_delaux(m); + return; + } + aux = mtod(n, struct ipsecaux *); + if (!aux->so && !aux->sp) + ipsec_delaux(m); +} + +int +ipsec_setsocket(m, so) + struct mbuf *m; + struct socket *so; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct ipsecaux *aux; + + /* if so == NULL, don't insist on getting the aux mbuf */ + if (so) { + n = ipsec_addaux(m); + if (!n) + return ENOBUFS; + } else + n = ipsec_findaux(m); + if (n && n->m_len >= sizeof(*aux)) { + aux = mtod(n, struct ipsecaux *); + aux->so = so; + } + ipsec_optaux(m, n); + return 0; +} + +struct socket * +ipsec_getsocket(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct ipsecaux *aux; + + n = ipsec_findaux(m); + if (n && n->m_len >= sizeof(*aux)) { + aux = mtod(n, struct ipsecaux *); + return aux->so; + } else + return NULL; +} + +int +ipsec_addhist(m, proto, spi) + struct mbuf *m; + int proto; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct ipsecaux *aux; + + n = ipsec_addaux(m); + if (!n) + return ENOBUFS; + if (sizeof(*aux) > n->m_len) + return ENOSPC; /* XXX */ + aux = mtod(n, struct ipsecaux *); + aux->hdrs++; + return 0; +} + +int +ipsec_getnhist(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct ipsecaux *aux; + + n = ipsec_findaux(m); + if (!n) + return 0; + if (sizeof(*aux) > n->m_len) + return 0; + aux = mtod(n, struct ipsecaux *); + return aux->hdrs; +} + +struct ipsec_history * +ipsec_gethist(m, lenp) + struct mbuf *m; + int *lenp; +{ + + panic("ipsec_gethist: obsolete API"); + return NULL; +} + +void +ipsec_clearhist(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + + n = ipsec_findaux(m); + if ((n) && n->m_len > sizeof(struct ipsecaux)) + n->m_len = sizeof(struct ipsecaux); + ipsec_optaux(m, n); +} + +#ifdef __bsdi__ +/* + * System control for IP + */ +u_char ipsecctlerrmap[PRC_NCMDS] = { + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, EMSGSIZE, EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, + EHOSTUNREACH, EHOSTUNREACH, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNREFUSED, + EMSGSIZE, EHOSTUNREACH, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + ENOPROTOOPT +}; + +int *ipsec_sysvars[] = IPSECCTL_VARS; + +int +ipsec_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + if (name[0] >= IPSECCTL_MAXID) + return (EOPNOTSUPP); + + switch (name[0]) { + case IPSECCTL_STATS: + return sysctl_rdtrunc(oldp, oldlenp, newp, &ipsecstat, + sizeof(ipsecstat)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + default: + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + } +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * System control for IP6 + */ +u_char ipsec6ctlerrmap[PRC_NCMDS] = { + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, EMSGSIZE, EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, + EHOSTUNREACH, EHOSTUNREACH, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNREFUSED, + EMSGSIZE, EHOSTUNREACH, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + ENOPROTOOPT +}; + +int *ipsec6_sysvars[] = IPSEC6CTL_VARS; + +int +ipsec6_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + if (name[0] >= IPSECCTL_MAXID) /* xxx no 6 in this definition */ + return (EOPNOTSUPP); + + switch (name[0]) { + case IPSECCTL_STATS: /* xxx no 6 in this definition */ + return sysctl_rdtrunc(oldp, oldlenp, newp, &ipsec6stat, + sizeof(ipsec6stat)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec6_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec6_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + default: + return (sysctl_int_arr(ipsec6_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen)); + } +} +#endif /* INET6 */ +#endif /* __bsdi__ */ + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ +/* + * System control for IPSEC + */ +u_char ipsecctlermap[PRC_NCMDS] = { + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, EMSGSIZE, EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, + EHOSTUNREACH, EHOSTUNREACH, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNREFUSED, + EMSGSIZE, EHOSTUNREACH, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + ENOPROTOOPT +}; + +int +ipsec_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + /* All sysctl names at this level are terminal. */ + if (namelen != 1) + return ENOTDIR; + + /* common sanity checks */ + switch (name[0]) { + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + } + } + + switch (name[0]) { + + case IPSECCTL_STATS: + return sysctl_struct(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ipsecstat, sizeof(ipsecstat)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_def_policy.policy); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_esp_trans_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_esp_net_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_ah_trans_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_ah_net_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_AH_CLEARTOS: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_ah_cleartos); + case IPSECCTL_AH_OFFSETMASK: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_ah_offsetmask); + case IPSECCTL_DFBIT: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_ipsec_dfbit); + case IPSECCTL_ECN: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, &ip4_ipsec_ecn); + case IPSECCTL_DEBUG: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, &ipsec_debug); + case IPSECCTL_ESP_RANDPAD: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip4_esp_randpad); + default: + return EOPNOTSUPP; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * System control for IPSEC6 + */ +u_char ipsec6ctlermap[PRC_NCMDS] = { + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, EMSGSIZE, EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, + EHOSTUNREACH, EHOSTUNREACH, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNREFUSED, + EMSGSIZE, EHOSTUNREACH, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + ENOPROTOOPT +}; + +int +ipsec6_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + /* All sysctl names at this level are terminal. */ + if (namelen != 1) + return ENOTDIR; + + /* common sanity checks */ + switch (name[0]) { + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + } + } + + switch (name[0]) { + + case IPSECCTL_STATS: + return sysctl_struct(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ipsec6stat, sizeof(ipsec6stat)); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_POLICY: + if (newp != NULL && newlen == sizeof(int)) { + switch (*(int *)newp) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + break; + default: + return EINVAL; + } + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + } + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_def_policy.policy); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_TRANSLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_esp_trans_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_ESP_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_esp_net_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_TRANSLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_ah_trans_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_DEF_AH_NETLEV: + if (newp != NULL) + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_ah_net_deflev); + case IPSECCTL_ECN: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, &ip6_ipsec_ecn); + case IPSECCTL_DEBUG: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, &ipsec_debug); + case IPSECCTL_ESP_RANDPAD: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ip6_esp_randpad); + default: + return EOPNOTSUPP; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#endif /* __NetBSD__ */
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netkey/key.c @@ -0,0 +1,7776 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netkey/key.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: key.c,v 1.221 2001/11/06 05:14:30 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This code is referd to RFC 2367 + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#ifdef __NetBSD__ +#include <sys/callout.h> +#endif +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#endif +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> +#include <net/raw_cb.h> +#include <net/if_sec.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/in_systm.h> +#include <netinet/ip.h> +#include <netinet/in_var.h> + +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet/ip6.h> +#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> +#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#ifdef INET +#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +#if !(defined(__bsdi__) && _BSDI_VERSION >= 199802) +#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h> +#endif +#endif /* INET6 */ + +#include <net/pfkeyv2.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keysock.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> +#include <netinet6/ah.h> +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP +#include <netinet6/esp.h> +#endif +#include <netinet6/ipcomp.h> + +#ifndef offsetof +#define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t)(&((type *)0)->member)) +#endif +#ifndef satosin +#define satosin(s) ((struct sockaddr_in *)s) +#endif + +#define FULLMASK 0xff + +/* + * Note on SA reference counting: + * - SAs that are not in DEAD state will have (total external reference + 1) + * following value in reference count field. they cannot be freed and are + * referenced from SA header. + * - SAs that are in DEAD state will have (total external reference) + * in reference count field. they are ready to be freed. reference from + * SA header will be removed in key_delsav(), when the reference count + * field hits 0 (= no external reference other than from SA header. + */ + +u_int32_t key_debug_level = 0; +static u_int key_spi_trycnt = 1000; +static u_int32_t key_spi_minval = 0x100; +static u_int32_t key_spi_maxval = 0x0fffffff; /* XXX */ +static u_int32_t policy_id = 0; +static u_int key_int_random = 60; /*interval to initialize randseed,1(m)*/ +static u_int key_larval_lifetime = 30; /* interval to expire acquiring, 30(s)*/ +static int key_blockacq_count = 10; /* counter for blocking SADB_ACQUIRE.*/ +static int key_blockacq_lifetime = 20; /* lifetime for blocking SADB_ACQUIRE.*/ +static int key_preferred_oldsa = 1; /*preferred old sa rather than new sa.*/ + +static u_int32_t acq_seq = 0; +static int key_tick_init_random = 0; + +static LIST_HEAD(_sptree, secpolicy) sptree[IPSEC_DIR_MAX]; /* SPD */ +static LIST_HEAD(_sahtree, secashead) sahtree; /* SAD */ +static LIST_HEAD(_regtree, secreg) regtree[SADB_SATYPE_MAX + 1]; + /* registed list */ +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE +static LIST_HEAD(_acqtree, secacq) acqtree; /* acquiring list */ +#endif +static LIST_HEAD(_spacqtree, secspacq) spacqtree; /* SP acquiring list */ + +struct key_cb key_cb; + +/* search order for SAs */ +static u_int saorder_state_valid[] = { + SADB_SASTATE_DYING, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, + /* + * This order is important because we must select a oldest SA + * for outbound processing. For inbound, This is not important. + */ +}; +static u_int saorder_state_alive[] = { + /* except DEAD */ + SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, SADB_SASTATE_DYING, SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL +}; +static u_int saorder_state_any[] = { + SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, SADB_SASTATE_DYING, + SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD +}; + +static const int minsize[] = { + sizeof(struct sadb_msg), /* SADB_EXT_RESERVED */ + sizeof(struct sadb_sa), /* SADB_EXT_SA */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_address), /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC */ + sizeof(struct sadb_address), /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST */ + sizeof(struct sadb_address), /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY */ + sizeof(struct sadb_key), /* SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH */ + sizeof(struct sadb_key), /* SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_ident), /* SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC */ + sizeof(struct sadb_ident), /* SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST */ + sizeof(struct sadb_sens), /* SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY */ + sizeof(struct sadb_prop), /* SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL */ + sizeof(struct sadb_supported), /* SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH */ + sizeof(struct sadb_supported), /* SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_spirange), /* SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE */ + 0, /* SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE */ + sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy), /* SADB_X_EXT_POLICY */ + sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2), /* SADB_X_SA2 */ +}; +static const int maxsize[] = { + sizeof(struct sadb_msg), /* SADB_EXT_RESERVED */ + sizeof(struct sadb_sa), /* SADB_EXT_SA */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD */ + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime), /* SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH */ + 0, /* SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT */ + sizeof(struct sadb_spirange), /* SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE */ + 0, /* SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE */ + 0, /* SADB_X_EXT_POLICY */ + sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2), /* SADB_X_SA2 */ +}; + +static int ipsec_esp_keymin = 256; +static int ipsec_esp_auth = 0; +static int ipsec_ah_keymin = 128; + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#ifdef SYSCTL_DECL +SYSCTL_DECL(_net_key); +#endif + +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_DEBUG_LEVEL, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_debug_level, 0, ""); + +/* max count of trial for the decision of spi value */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_SPI_TRY, spi_trycnt, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_spi_trycnt, 0, ""); + +/* minimum spi value to allocate automatically. */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_SPI_MIN_VALUE, spi_minval, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_spi_minval, 0, ""); + +/* maximun spi value to allocate automatically. */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_SPI_MAX_VALUE, spi_maxval, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_spi_maxval, 0, ""); + +/* interval to initialize randseed */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_RANDOM_INT, int_random, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_int_random, 0, ""); + +/* lifetime for larval SA */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_LARVAL_LIFETIME, larval_lifetime, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_larval_lifetime, 0, ""); + +/* counter for blocking to send SADB_ACQUIRE to IKEd */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_BLOCKACQ_COUNT, blockacq_count, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_blockacq_count, 0, ""); + +/* lifetime for blocking to send SADB_ACQUIRE to IKEd */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_BLOCKACQ_LIFETIME, blockacq_lifetime, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &key_blockacq_lifetime, 0, ""); + +/* minimum ESP key length */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_ESP_KEYMIN, esp_keymin, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &ipsec_esp_keymin, 0, ""); + +/* minimum AH key length */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_AH_KEYMIN, ah_keymin, CTLFLAG_RW, \ + &ipsec_ah_keymin, 0, ""); + +/* perfered old SA rather than new SA */ +SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, KEYCTL_PREFERED_OLDSA, preferred_oldsa, CTLFLAG_RW,\ + &key_preferred_oldsa, 0, ""); +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ + +#ifndef LIST_FOREACH +#define LIST_FOREACH(elm, head, field) \ + for (elm = LIST_FIRST(head); elm; elm = LIST_NEXT(elm, field)) +#endif +#define __LIST_CHAINED(elm) \ + (!((elm)->chain.le_next == NULL && (elm)->chain.le_prev == NULL)) +#define LIST_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, type, field) \ +do {\ + struct type *curelm = LIST_FIRST(head); \ + if (curelm == NULL) {\ + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field); \ + } else { \ + while (LIST_NEXT(curelm, field)) \ + curelm = LIST_NEXT(curelm, field);\ + LIST_INSERT_AFTER(curelm, elm, field);\ + }\ +} while (0) + +#define KEY_CHKSASTATE(head, sav, name) \ +do { \ + if ((head) != (sav)) { \ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "%s: state mismatched (TREE=%d SA=%d)\n", \ + (name), (head), (sav))); \ + continue; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define KEY_CHKSPDIR(head, sp, name) \ +do { \ + if ((head) != (sp)) { \ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "%s: direction mismatched (TREE=%d SP=%d), " \ + "anyway continue.\n", \ + (name), (head), (sp))); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#if 1 +#define KMALLOC(p, t, n) \ + ((p) = (t) malloc((unsigned long)(n), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT)) +#define KFREE(p) \ + free((caddr_t)(p), M_SECA) +#else +#define KMALLOC(p, t, n) \ +do { \ + ((p) = (t)malloc((unsigned long)(n), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT)); \ + printf("%s %d: %p <- KMALLOC(%s, %d)\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__, (p), #t, n); \ +} while (0) + +#define KFREE(p) \ + do { \ + printf("%s %d: %p -> KFREE()\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, (p)); \ + free((caddr_t)(p), M_SECA); \ + } while (0) +#endif + +/* + * set parameters into secpolicyindex buffer. + * Must allocate secpolicyindex buffer passed to this function. + */ +#define KEY_SETSECSPIDX(_dir, s, d, ps, pd, ulp, idx) \ +do { \ + bzero((idx), sizeof(struct secpolicyindex)); \ + (idx)->dir = (_dir); \ + (idx)->prefs = (ps); \ + (idx)->prefd = (pd); \ + (idx)->ul_proto = (ulp); \ + bcopy((s), &(idx)->src, ((struct sockaddr *)(s))->sa_len); \ + bcopy((d), &(idx)->dst, ((struct sockaddr *)(d))->sa_len); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * set parameters into secasindex buffer. + * Must allocate secasindex buffer before calling this function. + */ +#define KEY_SETSECASIDX(p, m, r, s, d, idx) \ +do { \ + bzero((idx), sizeof(struct secasindex)); \ + (idx)->proto = (p); \ + (idx)->mode = (m); \ + (idx)->reqid = (r); \ + bcopy((s), &(idx)->src, ((struct sockaddr *)(s))->sa_len); \ + bcopy((d), &(idx)->dst, ((struct sockaddr *)(d))->sa_len); \ +} while (0) + +/* key statistics */ +struct _keystat { + u_long getspi_count; /* the avarage of count to try to get new SPI */ +} keystat; + +struct sadb_msghdr { + struct sadb_msg *msg; + struct sadb_ext *ext[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]; + int extoff[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]; + int extlen[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]; +}; + +static struct secasvar *key_allocsa_policy __P((struct secasindex *)); +static void key_freesp_so __P((struct secpolicy **)); +static struct secasvar *key_do_allocsa_policy __P((struct secashead *, u_int)); +static void key_delsp __P((struct secpolicy *)); +static struct secpolicy *key_getsp __P((struct secpolicyindex *)); +static struct secpolicy *key_getspbyid __P((u_int32_t)); +static u_int32_t key_newreqid __P((void)); +static struct mbuf *key_gather_mbuf __P((struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *, int, int, ...)); +static int key_spdadd __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static u_int32_t key_getnewspid __P((void)); +static int key_spddelete __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_spddelete2 __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_spdget __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_spdflush __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_spddump __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static struct mbuf *key_setdumpsp __P((struct secpolicy *, + u_int8_t, u_int32_t, u_int32_t)); +static u_int key_getspreqmsglen __P((struct secpolicy *)); +static int key_spdexpire __P((struct secpolicy *)); +static struct secashead *key_newsah __P((struct secasindex *)); +static void key_delsah __P((struct secashead *)); +static struct secasvar *key_newsav __P((struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *, struct secashead *, int *)); +static void key_delsav __P((struct secasvar *)); +static struct secashead *key_getsah __P((struct secasindex *)); +static struct secasvar *key_checkspidup __P((struct secasindex *, u_int32_t)); +static struct secasvar *key_getsavbyspi __P((struct secashead *, u_int32_t)); +static int key_setsaval __P((struct secasvar *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_mature __P((struct secasvar *)); +static struct mbuf *key_setdumpsa __P((struct secasvar *, u_int8_t, + u_int8_t, u_int32_t, u_int32_t)); +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbmsg __P((u_int8_t, u_int16_t, u_int8_t, + u_int32_t, pid_t, u_int16_t)); +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbsa __P((struct secasvar *)); +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbaddr __P((u_int16_t, + struct sockaddr *, u_int8_t, u_int16_t)); +#if 0 +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbident __P((u_int16_t, u_int16_t, caddr_t, + int, u_int64_t)); +#endif +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbxsa2 __P((u_int8_t, u_int32_t, u_int32_t)); +static struct mbuf *key_setsadblifetime __P((u_int16_t, u_int32_t, + u_int64_t, u_int64_t, u_int64_t)); +static struct mbuf *key_setsadbxpolicy __P((u_int16_t, u_int8_t, + u_int32_t)); +static void *key_newbuf __P((const void *, u_int)); +#ifdef INET6 +static int key_ismyaddr6 __P((struct sockaddr_in6 *)); +#endif + +/* flags for key_cmpsaidx() */ +#define CMP_HEAD 1 /* protocol, addresses. */ +#define CMP_MODE_REQID 2 /* additionally HEAD, reqid, mode. */ +#define CMP_REQID 3 /* additionally HEAD, reaid. */ +#define CMP_EXACTLY 4 /* all elements. */ +static int key_cmpsaidx + __P((struct secasindex *, struct secasindex *, int)); + +static int key_sockaddrcmp __P((struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, int)); +static int key_bbcmp __P((caddr_t, caddr_t, u_int)); +static void key_srandom __P((void)); +static u_int16_t key_satype2proto __P((u_int8_t)); +static u_int8_t key_proto2satype __P((u_int16_t)); + +static int key_getspi __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static u_int32_t key_do_getnewspi __P((struct sadb_spirange *, + struct secasindex *)); +static int key_update __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +#ifdef IPSEC_DOSEQCHECK +static struct secasvar *key_getsavbyseq __P((struct secashead *, u_int32_t)); +#endif +static int key_add __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_setident __P((struct secashead *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static struct mbuf *key_getmsgbuf_x1 __P((struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_delete __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_get __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); + +static void key_getcomb_setlifetime __P((struct sadb_comb *)); +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP +static struct mbuf *key_getcomb_esp __P((void)); +#endif +static struct mbuf *key_getcomb_ah __P((void)); +static struct mbuf *key_getcomb_ipcomp __P((void)); +static struct mbuf *key_getprop __P((const struct secasindex *)); + +static int key_acquire __P((struct secasindex *, struct secpolicy *)); +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE +static struct secacq *key_newacq __P((struct secasindex *)); +static struct secacq *key_getacq __P((struct secasindex *)); +static struct secacq *key_getacqbyseq __P((u_int32_t)); +#endif +static struct secspacq *key_newspacq __P((struct secpolicyindex *)); +static struct secspacq *key_getspacq __P((struct secpolicyindex *)); +static int key_acquire2 __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_register __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_expire __P((struct secasvar *)); +static int key_flush __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_dump __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_promisc __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)); +static int key_senderror __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, int)); +static int key_validate_ext __P((const struct sadb_ext *, int)); +static int key_align __P((struct mbuf *, struct sadb_msghdr *)); +#if 0 +static const char *key_getfqdn __P((void)); +static const char *key_getuserfqdn __P((void)); +#endif +static void key_sa_chgstate __P((struct secasvar *, u_int8_t)); +static struct mbuf *key_alloc_mbuf __P((int)); +#ifdef __NetBSD__ +struct callout key_timehandler_ch; +#endif + +/* %%% IPsec policy management */ +/* + * allocating a SP for OUTBOUND or INBOUND packet. + * Must call key_freesp() later. + * OUT: NULL: not found + * others: found and return the pointer. + */ +struct secpolicy * +key_allocsp(spidx, dir) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; + u_int dir; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + int s; + + /* sanity check */ + if (spidx == NULL) + panic("key_allocsp: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* check direction */ + switch (dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + break; + default: + panic("key_allocsp: Invalid direction is passed.\n"); + } + + /* get a SP entry */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("*** objects\n"); + kdebug_secpolicyindex(spidx)); + + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[dir], chain) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_DATA, + printf("*** in SPD\n"); + kdebug_secpolicyindex(&sp->spidx)); + + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpspidx_withmask(&sp->spidx, spidx)) + goto found; + } + + splx(s); + return NULL; + +found: + /* sanity check */ + KEY_CHKSPDIR(sp->spidx.dir, dir, "key_allocsp"); + + /* found a SPD entry */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + sp->lastused = time_second; +#else + sp->lastused = time.tv_sec; +#endif + sp->refcnt++; + splx(s); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP key_allocsp cause refcnt++:%d SP:%p\n", + sp->refcnt, sp)); + + return sp; +} + +/* + * return a policy that matches this particular inbound packet. + * XXX slow + */ +struct secpolicy * +key_gettunnel(osrc, odst, isrc, idst) + struct sockaddr *osrc, *odst, *isrc, *idst; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + const int dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND; + int s; + struct ipsecrequest *r1, *r2, *p; + struct sockaddr *os, *od, *is, *id; + struct secpolicyindex spidx; + + if (isrc->sa_family != idst->sa_family) { + ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "protocol family mismatched %d != %d\n.", + isrc->sa_family, idst->sa_family)); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[dir], chain) { + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) + continue; + + r1 = r2 = NULL; + for (p = sp->req; p; p = p->next) { + if (p->saidx.mode != IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) + continue; + + r1 = r2; + r2 = p; + + if (!r1) { + /* here we look at address matches only */ + spidx = sp->spidx; + if (isrc->sa_len > sizeof(spidx.src) || + idst->sa_len > sizeof(spidx.dst)) + continue; + bcopy(isrc, &spidx.src, isrc->sa_len); + bcopy(idst, &spidx.dst, idst->sa_len); + if (!key_cmpspidx_withmask(&sp->spidx, &spidx)) + continue; + } else { + is = (struct sockaddr *)&r1->saidx.src; + id = (struct sockaddr *)&r1->saidx.dst; + if (key_sockaddrcmp(is, isrc, 0) || + key_sockaddrcmp(id, idst, 0)) + continue; + } + + os = (struct sockaddr *)&r2->saidx.src; + od = (struct sockaddr *)&r2->saidx.dst; + if (key_sockaddrcmp(os, osrc, 0) || + key_sockaddrcmp(od, odst, 0)) + continue; + + goto found; + } + } + splx(s); + return NULL; + +found: +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + sp->lastused = time_second; +#else + sp->lastused = time.tv_sec; +#endif + sp->refcnt++; + splx(s); + return sp; +} + +/* + * allocating an SA entry for an *OUTBOUND* packet. + * checking each request entries in SP, and acquire an SA if need. + * OUT: 0: there are valid requests. + * ENOENT: policy may be valid, but SA with REQUIRE is on acquiring. + */ +int +key_checkrequest(isr, saidx) + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + u_int level; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (isr == NULL || saidx == NULL) + panic("key_checkrequest: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* check mode */ + switch (saidx->mode) { + case IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT: + case IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL: + break; + case IPSEC_MODE_ANY: + default: + panic("key_checkrequest: Invalid policy defined.\n"); + } + + /* get current level */ + level = ipsec_get_reqlevel(isr); + +#if 0 + /* + * We do allocate new SA only if the state of SA in the holder is + * SADB_SASTATE_DEAD. The SA for outbound must be the oldest. + */ + if (isr->sav != NULL) { + if (isr->sav->sah == NULL) + panic("key_checkrequest: sah is null.\n"); + if (isr->sav == (struct secasvar *)LIST_FIRST( + &isr->sav->sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_DEAD])) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP checkrequest calls free SA:%p\n", + isr->sav)); + key_freesav(isr->sav); + isr->sav = NULL; + } + } +#else + /* + * we free any SA stashed in the IPsec request because a different + * SA may be involved each time this request is checked, either + * because new SAs are being configured, or this request is + * associated with an unconnected datagram socket, or this request + * is associated with a system default policy. + * + * The operation may have negative impact to performance. We may + * want to check cached SA carefully, rather than picking new SA + * every time. + */ + if (isr->sav != NULL) { + key_freesav(isr->sav); + isr->sav = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* + * new SA allocation if no SA found. + * key_allocsa_policy should allocate the oldest SA available. + * See key_do_allocsa_policy(), and draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-03.txt. + */ + if (isr->sav == NULL) + isr->sav = key_allocsa_policy(saidx); + + /* When there is SA. */ + if (isr->sav != NULL) + return 0; + + /* there is no SA */ + if ((error = key_acquire(saidx, isr->sp)) != 0) { + /* XXX What should I do ? */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_checkrequest: error %d returned " + "from key_acquire.\n", error)); + return error; + } + + return level == IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE ? ENOENT : 0; +} + +/* + * allocating a SA for policy entry from SAD. + * NOTE: searching SAD of aliving state. + * OUT: NULL: not found. + * others: found and return the pointer. + */ +static struct secasvar * +key_allocsa_policy(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int stateidx, state; + + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, saidx, CMP_MODE_REQID)) + goto found; + } + + return NULL; + + found: + + /* search valid state */ + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_valid); + stateidx++) { + + state = saorder_state_valid[stateidx]; + + sav = key_do_allocsa_policy(sah, state); + if (sav != NULL) + return sav; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * searching SAD with direction, protocol, mode and state. + * called by key_allocsa_policy(). + * OUT: + * NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SA. + */ +static struct secasvar * +key_do_allocsa_policy(sah, state) + struct secashead *sah; + u_int state; +{ + struct secasvar *sav, *nextsav, *candidate, *d; + + /* initilize */ + candidate = NULL; + + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[state]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + /* sanity check */ + KEY_CHKSASTATE(sav->state, state, "key_do_allocsa_policy"); + + /* initialize */ + if (candidate == NULL) { + candidate = sav; + continue; + } + + /* Which SA is the better ? */ + + /* sanity check 2 */ + if (candidate->lft_c == NULL || sav->lft_c == NULL) + panic("key_do_allocsa_policy: " + "lifetime_current is NULL.\n"); + + /* What the best method is to compare ? */ + if (key_preferred_oldsa) { + if (candidate->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime > + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime) { + candidate = sav; + } + continue; + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } + + /* preferred new sa rather than old sa */ + if (candidate->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime < + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime) { + d = candidate; + candidate = sav; + } else + d = sav; + + /* + * prepared to delete the SA when there is more + * suitable candidate and the lifetime of the SA is not + * permanent. + */ + if (d->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime != 0) { + + struct mbuf *m, *result; + + key_sa_chgstate(d, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(d); + + m = key_setsadbmsg(SADB_DELETE, 0, + sav->sah->saidx.proto, 0, 0, d->refcnt); + if (!m) + return NULL; + result = m; + + /* set sadb_address for saidx's. */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&d->sah->saidx.src, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) + return NULL; + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set sadb_address for saidx's. */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&d->sah->saidx.dst, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) + return NULL; + m_cat(result, m); + + /* create SA extension */ + m = key_setsadbsa(d); + if (!m) + return NULL; + m_cat(result, m); + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, + sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) + return NULL; + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + if (key_sendup_mbuf(NULL, result, + KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED)) + return NULL; + } + } + + if (candidate) { + candidate->refcnt++; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP allocsa_policy cause " + "refcnt++:%d SA:%p\n", + candidate->refcnt, candidate)); + } + return candidate; +} + +/* + * allocating a SA entry for a *INBOUND* packet. + * Must call key_freesav() later. + * OUT: positive: pointer to a sav. + * NULL: not found, or error occured. + * + * In the comparison, source address will be ignored for RFC2401 conformance. + * To quote, from section 4.1: + * A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting + * of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a + * security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. + * Note that, however, we do need to keep source address in IPsec SA. + * IKE specification and PF_KEY specification do assume that we + * keep source address in IPsec SA. We see a tricky situation here. + */ +struct secasvar * +key_allocsa(family, src, dst, proto, spi) + u_int family, proto; + caddr_t src, dst; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int stateidx, state; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + int s; + + /* sanity check */ + if (src == NULL || dst == NULL) + panic("key_allocsa: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* + * searching SAD. + * XXX: to be checked internal IP header somewhere. Also when + * IPsec tunnel packet is received. But ESP tunnel mode is + * encrypted so we can't check internal IP header. + */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + /* search valid state */ + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_valid); + stateidx++) { + state = saorder_state_valid[stateidx]; + LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { + /* sanity check */ + KEY_CHKSASTATE(sav->state, state, "key_allocsav"); + if (proto != sav->sah->saidx.proto) + continue; + if (spi != sav->spi) + continue; + if (family != sav->sah->saidx.src.ss_family || + family != sav->sah->saidx.dst.ss_family) + continue; + +#if 0 /* don't check src */ + /* check src address */ + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin); + bcopy(src, &sin.sin_addr, + sizeof(sin.sin_addr)); + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr*)&sin, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src, 0) != 0) + continue; + + break; + case AF_INET6: + bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6); + bcopy(src, &sin6.sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin6.sin6_addr)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&sin6.sin6_addr)) { + /* kame fake scopeid */ + sin6.sin6_scope_id = + ntohs(sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]); + sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + } + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr*)&sin6, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src, 0) != 0) + continue; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_allocsa: " + "unknown address family=%d.\n", + family)); + continue; + } + +#endif + /* check dst address */ + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin); + bcopy(dst, &sin.sin_addr, + sizeof(sin.sin_addr)); + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr*)&sin, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst, 0) != 0) + continue; + + break; + case AF_INET6: + bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6); + bcopy(dst, &sin6.sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin6.sin6_addr)); + if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&sin6.sin6_addr)) { + /* kame fake scopeid */ + sin6.sin6_scope_id = + ntohs(sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]); + sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1] = 0; + } + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr*)&sin6, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst, 0) != 0) + continue; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_allocsa: " + "unknown address family=%d.\n", + family)); + continue; + } + + goto found; + } + } + } + + /* not found */ + splx(s); + return NULL; + +found: + sav->refcnt++; + splx(s); + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP allocsa cause refcnt++:%d SA:%p\n", + sav->refcnt, sav)); + return sav; +} + +/* + * Must be called after calling key_allocsp(). + * For both the packet without socket and key_freeso(). + */ +void +key_freesp(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("key_freesp: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + sp->refcnt--; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP freesp cause refcnt--:%d SP:%p\n", + sp->refcnt, sp)); + + if (sp->refcnt == 0) + key_delsp(sp); + + return; +} + +/* + * Must be called after calling key_allocsp(). + * For the packet with socket. + */ +void +key_freeso(so) + struct socket *so; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL) + panic("key_freeso: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + switch (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family) { +#ifdef INET + case PF_INET: + { + struct inpcb *pcb = sotoinpcb(so); + + /* Does it have a PCB ? */ + if (pcb == NULL) + return; + key_freesp_so(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_in); + key_freesp_so(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_out); + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case PF_INET6: + { +#ifdef HAVE_NRL_INPCB + struct inpcb *pcb = sotoinpcb(so); + + /* Does it have a PCB ? */ + if (pcb == NULL) + return; + key_freesp_so(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_in); + key_freesp_so(&pcb->inp_sp->sp_out); +#else + struct in6pcb *pcb = sotoin6pcb(so); + + /* Does it have a PCB ? */ + if (pcb == NULL) + return; + key_freesp_so(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_in); + key_freesp_so(&pcb->in6p_sp->sp_out); +#endif + } + break; +#endif /* INET6 */ + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_freeso: unknown address family=%d.\n", + so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family)); + return; + } + + return; +} + +static void +key_freesp_so(sp) + struct secpolicy **sp; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL || *sp == NULL) + panic("key_freesp_so: sp == NULL\n"); + + switch ((*sp)->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP freeso calls free SP:%p\n", *sp)); + key_freesp(*sp); + *sp = NULL; + break; + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + return; + default: + panic("key_freesp_so: Invalid policy found %d", (*sp)->policy); + } + + return; +} + +/* + * Must be called after calling key_allocsa(). + * This function is called by key_freesp() to free some SA allocated + * for a policy. + */ +void +key_freesav(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("key_freesav: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + sav->refcnt--; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP freesav cause refcnt--:%d SA:%p SPI %u\n", + sav->refcnt, sav, (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + + if (sav->refcnt == 0) + key_delsav(sav); + + return; +} + +/* %%% SPD management */ +/* + * free security policy entry. + */ +static void +key_delsp(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + int s; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("key_delsp: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + sp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + + if (sp->refcnt > 0) + return; /* can't free */ + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + /* remove from SP index */ + if (__LIST_CHAINED(sp)) + LIST_REMOVE(sp, chain); + + { + struct ipsecrequest *isr = sp->req, *nextisr; + + while (isr != NULL) { + if (isr->sav != NULL) { + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP delsp calls free SA:%p\n", + isr->sav)); + key_freesav(isr->sav); + isr->sav = NULL; + } + +#if defined(NSEC) && NSEC > 0 + if (isr->tunifp) { + int s; + + s = splimp(); + sec_demolish(isr->tunifp); + splx(s); + + /* XXX more garbage-collection */ + isr->tunifp = NULL; + } +#endif + + nextisr = isr->next; + KFREE(isr); + isr = nextisr; + } + } + + keydb_delsecpolicy(sp); + + splx(s); + + return; +} + +/* + * search SPD + * OUT: NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SP. + */ +static struct secpolicy * +key_getsp(spidx) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + + /* sanity check */ + if (spidx == NULL) + panic("key_getsp: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[spidx->dir], chain) { + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpspidx_exactly(spidx, &sp->spidx)) { + sp->refcnt++; + return sp; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * get SP by index. + * OUT: NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SP. + */ +static struct secpolicy * +key_getspbyid(id) + u_int32_t id; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND], chain) { + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (sp->id == id) { + sp->refcnt++; + return sp; + } + } + + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND], chain) { + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (sp->id == id) { + sp->refcnt++; + return sp; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +struct secpolicy * +key_newsp() +{ + struct secpolicy *newsp = NULL; + + newsp = keydb_newsecpolicy(); + if (!newsp) + return newsp; + + newsp->refcnt = 1; + newsp->req = NULL; + + return newsp; +} + +/* + * create secpolicy structure from sadb_x_policy structure. + * NOTE: `state', `secpolicyindex' in secpolicy structure are not set, + * so must be set properly later. + */ +struct secpolicy * +key_msg2sp(xpl0, len, error) + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl0; + size_t len; + int *error; +{ + struct secpolicy *newsp; + + /* sanity check */ + if (xpl0 == NULL) + panic("key_msg2sp: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + if (len < sizeof(*xpl0)) + panic("key_msg2sp: invalid length.\n"); + if (len != PFKEY_EXTLEN(xpl0)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: Invalid msg length.\n")); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + if ((newsp = key_newsp()) == NULL) { + *error = ENOBUFS; + return NULL; + } + + newsp->spidx.dir = xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir; + newsp->policy = xpl0->sadb_x_policy_type; + + /* check policy */ + switch (xpl0->sadb_x_policy_type) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + newsp->req = NULL; + break; + + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + { + int tlen; + struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *xisr; + struct ipsecrequest **p_isr = &newsp->req; + + /* validity check */ + if (PFKEY_EXTLEN(xpl0) < sizeof(*xpl0)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_msg2sp: Invalid msg length.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + tlen = PFKEY_EXTLEN(xpl0) - sizeof(*xpl0); + xisr = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)(xpl0 + 1); + + while (tlen > 0) { + + /* length check */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len < sizeof(*xisr)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: " + "invalid ipsecrequest length.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + /* allocate request buffer */ + KMALLOC(*p_isr, struct ipsecrequest *, sizeof(**p_isr)); + if ((*p_isr) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_msg2sp: No more memory.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = ENOBUFS; + return NULL; + } + bzero(*p_isr, sizeof(**p_isr)); + + /* set values */ + (*p_isr)->next = NULL; + + switch (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: + case IPPROTO_AH: + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_msg2sp: invalid proto type=%u\n", + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto)); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EPROTONOSUPPORT; + return NULL; + } + (*p_isr)->saidx.proto = xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto; + + switch (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode) { + case IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT: + case IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL: + break; + case IPSEC_MODE_ANY: + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_msg2sp: invalid mode=%u\n", + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode)); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + (*p_isr)->saidx.mode = xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode; + + switch (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level) { + case IPSEC_LEVEL_DEFAULT: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_USE: + case IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE: + break; + case IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE: + /* validity check */ + /* + * If range violation of reqid, kernel will + * update it, don't refuse it. + */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid + > IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_msg2sp: reqid=%d range " + "violation, updated by kernel.\n", + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid)); + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = 0; + } + + /* allocate new reqid id if reqid is zero. */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid == 0) { + u_int32_t reqid; + if ((reqid = key_newreqid()) == 0) { + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = ENOBUFS; + return NULL; + } + (*p_isr)->saidx.reqid = reqid; + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = reqid; + } else { + /* set it for manual keying. */ + (*p_isr)->saidx.reqid = + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid; + } + break; + + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: invalid level=%u\n", + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level)); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + (*p_isr)->level = xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level; + + /* set IP addresses if there */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len > sizeof(*xisr)) { + struct sockaddr *paddr; + + paddr = (struct sockaddr *)(xisr + 1); + + /* validity check */ + if (paddr->sa_len + > sizeof((*p_isr)->saidx.src)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: invalid request " + "address length.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + bcopy(paddr, &(*p_isr)->saidx.src, + paddr->sa_len); + + paddr = (struct sockaddr *)((caddr_t)paddr + + paddr->sa_len); + + /* validity check */ + if (paddr->sa_len + > sizeof((*p_isr)->saidx.dst)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: invalid request " + "address length.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + bcopy(paddr, &(*p_isr)->saidx.dst, + paddr->sa_len); + } + + (*p_isr)->sav = NULL; + (*p_isr)->sp = newsp; + + /* initialization for the next. */ + p_isr = &(*p_isr)->next; + tlen -= xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len; + + /* validity check */ + if (tlen < 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: becoming tlen < 0.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + xisr = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)((caddr_t)xisr + + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len); + } + } + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_msg2sp: invalid policy type.\n")); + key_freesp(newsp); + *error = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + *error = 0; + return newsp; +} + +static u_int32_t +key_newreqid() +{ + static u_int32_t auto_reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX + 1; + + auto_reqid = (auto_reqid == ~0 + ? IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX + 1 : auto_reqid + 1); + + /* XXX should be unique check */ + + return auto_reqid; +} + +/* + * copy secpolicy struct to sadb_x_policy structure indicated. + */ +struct mbuf * +key_sp2msg(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl; + int tlen; + caddr_t p; + struct mbuf *m; + + /* sanity check. */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("key_sp2msg: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + tlen = key_getspreqmsglen(sp); + + m = key_alloc_mbuf(tlen); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + m->m_len = tlen; + m->m_next = NULL; + xpl = mtod(m, struct sadb_x_policy *); + bzero(xpl, tlen); + + xpl->sadb_x_policy_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(tlen); + xpl->sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY; + xpl->sadb_x_policy_type = sp->policy; + xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir = sp->spidx.dir; + xpl->sadb_x_policy_id = sp->id; + p = (caddr_t)xpl + sizeof(*xpl); + + /* if is the policy for ipsec ? */ + if (sp->policy == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC) { + struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *xisr; + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + + xisr = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)p; + + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto = isr->saidx.proto; + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode = isr->saidx.mode; + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = isr->level; + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = isr->saidx.reqid; + + p += sizeof(*xisr); + bcopy(&isr->saidx.src, p, isr->saidx.src.ss_len); + p += isr->saidx.src.ss_len; + bcopy(&isr->saidx.dst, p, isr->saidx.dst.ss_len); + p += isr->saidx.src.ss_len; + + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len = + PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*xisr) + + isr->saidx.src.ss_len + + isr->saidx.dst.ss_len); + } + } + + return m; +} + +/* m will not be freed nor modified */ +static struct mbuf * +#ifdef __STDC__ +key_gather_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp, + int ndeep, int nitem, ...) +#else +key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, ndeep, nitem, va_alist) + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; + int ndeep; + int nitem; + va_dcl +#endif +{ + va_list ap; + int idx; + int i; + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *n; + int len; + + if (m == NULL || mhp == NULL) + panic("null pointer passed to key_gather"); + + va_start(ap, nitem); + for (i = 0; i < nitem; i++) { + idx = va_arg(ap, int); + if (idx < 0 || idx > SADB_EXT_MAX) + goto fail; + /* don't attempt to pull empty extension */ + if (idx == SADB_EXT_RESERVED && mhp->msg == NULL) + continue; + if (idx != SADB_EXT_RESERVED && + (mhp->ext[idx] == NULL || mhp->extlen[idx] == 0)) + continue; + + if (idx == SADB_EXT_RESERVED) { + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (len > MHLEN) + panic("assumption failed"); +#endif + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (!n) + goto fail; + n->m_len = len; + n->m_next = NULL; + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), + mtod(n, caddr_t)); + } else if (i < ndeep) { + len = mhp->extlen[idx]; + n = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!n || n->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (n) + m_freem(n); + goto fail; + } + m_copydata(m, mhp->extoff[idx], mhp->extlen[idx], + mtod(n, caddr_t)); + } else { + n = m_copym(m, mhp->extoff[idx], mhp->extlen[idx], + M_DONTWAIT); + } + if (n == NULL) + goto fail; + + if (result) + m_cat(result, n); + else + result = n; + } + va_end(ap); + + if ((result->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) { + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (n = result; n; n = n->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_len; + } + + return result; + +fail: + m_freem(result); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * SADB_X_SPDADD, SADB_X_SPDSETIDX or SADB_X_SPDUPDATE processing + * add a entry to SP database, when received + * <base, address(SD), (lifetime(H),) policy> + * from the user(?). + * Adding to SP database, + * and send + * <base, address(SD), (lifetime(H),) policy> + * to the socket which was send. + * + * SPDADD set a unique policy entry. + * SPDSETIDX like SPDADD without a part of policy requests. + * SPDUPDATE replace a unique policy entry. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spdadd(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl0, *xpl; + struct sadb_lifetime *lft = NULL; + struct secpolicyindex spidx; + struct secpolicy *newsp; + struct ipsecrequest *req; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spdadd: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] != NULL) { + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] + < sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + lft = (struct sadb_lifetime *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD]; + } + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]; + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]; + xpl0 = (struct sadb_x_policy *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY]; + + /* make secindex */ + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECSPIDX(xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir, + src0 + 1, + dst0 + 1, + src0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + dst0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + src0->sadb_address_proto, + &spidx); + + /* checking the direciton. */ + switch (xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: Invalid SP direction.\n")); + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_errno = EINVAL; + return 0; + } + + /* check policy */ + /* key_spdadd() accepts DISCARD, NONE and IPSEC. */ + if (xpl0->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST + || xpl0->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: Invalid policy type.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* policy requests are mandatory when action is ipsec. */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_type != SADB_X_SPDSETIDX + && xpl0->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC + && mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] <= sizeof(*xpl0)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: some policy requests part required.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* + * checking there is SP already or not. + * SPDUPDATE doesn't depend on whether there is a SP or not. + * If the type is either SPDADD or SPDSETIDX AND a SP is found, + * then error. + */ + newsp = key_getsp(&spidx); + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_SPDUPDATE) { + if (newsp) { + newsp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + key_freesp(newsp); + } + } else { + if (newsp != NULL) { + key_freesp(newsp); + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdadd: a SP entry exists already.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EEXIST); + } + } + + /* allocation new SP entry */ + if ((newsp = key_msg2sp(xpl0, PFKEY_EXTLEN(xpl0), &error)) == NULL) { + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + if ((newsp->id = key_getnewspid()) == 0) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECSPIDX(xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir, + src0 + 1, + dst0 + 1, + src0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + dst0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + src0->sadb_address_proto, + &newsp->spidx); + + /* sanity check on addr pair */ + if (((struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1))->sa_family != + ((struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1))->sa_family) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (((struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1))->sa_len != + ((struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1))->sa_len) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* + * bark if we have different address family on tunnel address + * specification. applies only if we decapsulate in RFC2401 IPsec + * (implementation limitation). + */ + if (!ipsec_tunnel_device) { + for (req = newsp->req; req; req = req->next) { + if (req->saidx.src.ss_family) { + struct sockaddr *sa; + sa = (struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1); + if (sa->sa_family != req->saidx.src.ss_family) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + } + if (req->saidx.dst.ss_family) { + struct sockaddr *sa; + sa = (struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1); + if (sa->sa_family != req->saidx.dst.ss_family) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + } + } + } + +#if defined(NSEC) && NSEC > 0 + /* + * based on newsp->req, create/configure tunnels. + * TODO: reuse devices + * TODO: conflicting devices + */ + if (ipsec_tunnel_device) { + for (req = newsp->req; req; req = req->next) { + struct ifnet *ifp; + int s; + struct sockaddr *me, *you; + + if (req->saidx.mode != IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL) + continue; + + if (newsp->spidx.dir == IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND) { + me = (struct sockaddr *)&req->saidx.src; + you = (struct sockaddr *)&req->saidx.dst; + } else { + me = (struct sockaddr *)&req->saidx.dst; + you = (struct sockaddr *)&req->saidx.src; + } + + s = splimp(); + ifp = sec_establish(me, you); + /* bring the interface up, we are willing to receive */ + if (ifp) + if_up(ifp); + splx(s); + if (!ifp) { + keydb_delsecpolicy(newsp); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + req->tunifp = ifp; + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + newsp->created = time_second; + newsp->lastused = time_second; +#else + newsp->created = time.tv_sec; + newsp->lastused = time.tv_sec; +#endif + newsp->lifetime = lft ? lft->sadb_lifetime_addtime : 0; + newsp->validtime = lft ? lft->sadb_lifetime_usetime : 0; + + newsp->refcnt = 1; /* do not reclaim until I say I do */ + newsp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_ALIVE; + LIST_INSERT_TAIL(&sptree[newsp->spidx.dir], newsp, secpolicy, chain); + + /* delete the entry in spacqtree */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_SPDUPDATE) { + struct secspacq *spacq; + if ((spacq = key_getspacq(&spidx)) != NULL) { + /* reset counter in order to deletion by timehandler. */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + spacq->created = time_second; +#else + spacq->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + spacq->count = 0; + } + } + + /* invalidate all cached SPD pointers on pcb */ + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + + { + struct mbuf *n, *mpolicy; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + int off; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + if (lft) { + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 2, 5, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_X_EXT_POLICY, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + } else { + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 2, 4, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_X_EXT_POLICY, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + } + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + if (n->m_len < sizeof(*newmsg)) { + n = m_pullup(n, sizeof(*newmsg)); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + off = 0; + mpolicy = m_pulldown(n, PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)), + sizeof(*xpl), &off); + if (mpolicy == NULL) { + /* n is already freed */ + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)(mtod(mpolicy, caddr_t) + off); + if (xpl->sadb_x_policy_exttype != SADB_X_EXT_POLICY) { + m_freem(n); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + xpl->sadb_x_policy_id = newsp->id; + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * get new policy id. + * OUT: + * 0: failure. + * others: success. + */ +static u_int32_t +key_getnewspid() +{ + u_int32_t newid = 0; + int count = key_spi_trycnt; /* XXX */ + struct secpolicy *sp; + + /* when requesting to allocate spi ranged */ + while (count--) { + newid = (policy_id = (policy_id == ~0 ? 1 : policy_id + 1)); + + if ((sp = key_getspbyid(newid)) == NULL) + break; + + key_freesp(sp); + } + + if (count == 0 || newid == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getnewspid: to allocate policy id is failed.\n")); + return 0; + } + + return newid; +} + +/* + * SADB_SPDDELETE processing + * receive + * <base, address(SD), policy(*)> + * from the user(?), and set SADB_SASTATE_DEAD, + * and send, + * <base, address(SD), policy(*)> + * to the ikmpd. + * policy(*) including direction of policy. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spddelete(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl0; + struct secpolicyindex spidx; + struct secpolicy *sp; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spddelete: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]; + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]; + xpl0 = (struct sadb_x_policy *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY]; + + /* make secindex */ + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECSPIDX(xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir, + src0 + 1, + dst0 + 1, + src0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + dst0->sadb_address_prefixlen, + src0->sadb_address_proto, + &spidx); + + /* checking the direciton. */ + switch (xpl0->sadb_x_policy_dir) { + case IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND: + case IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND: + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete: Invalid SP direction.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* Is there SP in SPD ? */ + if ((sp = key_getsp(&spidx)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete: no SP found.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* save policy id to buffer to be returned. */ + xpl0->sadb_x_policy_id = sp->id; + + sp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + key_freesp(sp); + + /* invalidate all cached SPD pointers on pcb */ + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + + { + struct mbuf *n; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 1, 4, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_X_EXT_POLICY, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * SADB_SPDDELETE2 processing + * receive + * <base, policy(*)> + * from the user(?), and set SADB_SASTATE_DEAD, + * and send, + * <base, policy(*)> + * to the ikmpd. + * policy(*) including direction of policy. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spddelete2(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + u_int32_t id; + struct secpolicy *sp; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spddelete2: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] == NULL || + mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete2: invalid message is passed.\n")); + key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + return 0; + } + + id = ((struct sadb_x_policy *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY])->sadb_x_policy_id; + + /* Is there SP in SPD ? */ + if ((sp = key_getspbyid(id)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spddelete2: no SP found id:%u.\n", id)); + key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + sp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + key_freesp(sp); + + /* invalidate all cached SPD pointers on pcb */ + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + + { + struct mbuf *n, *nn; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + int off, len; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + + if (len > MCLBYTES) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && len > MHLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_freem(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + n->m_len = len; + n->m_next = NULL; + off = 0; + + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (off != len) + panic("length inconsistency in key_spddelete2"); +#endif + + n->m_next = m_copym(m, mhp->extoff[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY], + mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY], M_DONTWAIT); + if (!n->m_next) { + m_freem(n); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + n->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (nn = n; nn; nn = nn->m_next) + n->m_pkthdr.len += nn->m_len; + + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * SADB_X_GET processing + * receive + * <base, policy(*)> + * from the user(?), + * and send, + * <base, address(SD), policy> + * to the ikmpd. + * policy(*) including direction of policy. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spdget(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + u_int32_t id; + struct secpolicy *sp; + struct mbuf *n; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spdget: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] == NULL || + mhp->extlen[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY] < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdget: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + id = ((struct sadb_x_policy *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY])->sadb_x_policy_id; + + /* Is there SP in SPD ? */ + if ((sp = key_getspbyid(id)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdget: no SP found id:%u.\n", id)); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + } + + n = key_setdumpsp(sp, SADB_X_SPDGET, 0, mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid); + if (n != NULL) { + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } else + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); +} + +/* + * SADB_X_SPDACQUIRE processing. + * Acquire policy and SA(s) for a *OUTBOUND* packet. + * send + * <base, policy(*)> + * to KMD, and expect to receive + * <base> with SADB_X_SPDACQUIRE if error occured, + * or + * <base, policy> + * with SADB_X_SPDUPDATE from KMD by PF_KEY. + * policy(*) is without policy requests. + * + * 0 : succeed + * others: error number + */ +int +key_spdacquire(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m; + struct secspacq *newspacq; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("key_spdacquire: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + if (sp->req != NULL) + panic("key_spdacquire: called but there is request.\n"); + if (sp->policy != IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC) + panic("key_spdacquire: policy mismathed. IPsec is expected.\n"); + + /* get a entry to check whether sent message or not. */ + if ((newspacq = key_getspacq(&sp->spidx)) != NULL) { + if (key_blockacq_count < newspacq->count) { + /* reset counter and do send message. */ + newspacq->count = 0; + } else { + /* increment counter and do nothing. */ + newspacq->count++; + return 0; + } + } else { + /* make new entry for blocking to send SADB_ACQUIRE. */ + if ((newspacq = key_newspacq(&sp->spidx)) == NULL) + return ENOBUFS; + + /* add to acqtree */ + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&spacqtree, newspacq, chain); + } + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + m = key_setsadbmsg(SADB_X_SPDACQUIRE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + result = m; + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(NULL, m, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); + +fail: + if (result) + m_freem(result); + return error; +} + +/* + * SADB_SPDFLUSH processing + * receive + * <base> + * from the user, and free all entries in secpctree. + * and send, + * <base> + * to the user. + * NOTE: what to do is only marking SADB_SASTATE_DEAD. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spdflush(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + struct secpolicy *sp; + u_int dir; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spdflush: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (m->m_len != PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + + for (dir = 0; dir < IPSEC_DIR_MAX; dir++) { + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[dir], chain) { + sp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + } + } + + /* invalidate all cached SPD pointers on pcb */ + ipsec_invalpcbcacheall(); + + if (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) > m->m_len + M_TRAILINGSPACE(m)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_spdflush: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + if (m->m_next) + m_freem(m->m_next); + m->m_next = NULL; + m->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + newmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); +} + +/* + * SADB_SPDDUMP processing + * receive + * <base> + * from the user, and dump all SP leaves + * and send, + * <base> ..... + * to the ikmpd. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_spddump(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct secpolicy *sp; + int cnt; + u_int dir; + struct mbuf *n; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_spddump: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* search SPD entry and get buffer size. */ + cnt = 0; + for (dir = 0; dir < IPSEC_DIR_MAX; dir++) { + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[dir], chain) { + cnt++; + } + } + + if (cnt == 0) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + + for (dir = 0; dir < IPSEC_DIR_MAX; dir++) { + LIST_FOREACH(sp, &sptree[dir], chain) { + --cnt; + n = key_setdumpsp(sp, SADB_X_SPDDUMP, cnt, + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid); + + if (n) + key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } + } + + m_freem(m); + return 0; +} + +static struct mbuf * +key_setdumpsp(sp, type, seq, pid) + struct secpolicy *sp; + u_int8_t type; + u_int32_t seq, pid; +{ + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m; + + m = key_setsadbmsg(type, 0, SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC, seq, pid, sp->refcnt); + if (!m) + goto fail; + result = m; + + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&sp->spidx.src, sp->spidx.prefs, + sp->spidx.ul_proto); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_cat(result, m); + + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&sp->spidx.dst, sp->spidx.prefd, + sp->spidx.ul_proto); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_cat(result, m); + + m = key_sp2msg(sp); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_cat(result, m); + + m = key_setsadblifetime(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT, + 0, 0, (u_int64_t)sp->created, (u_int64_t)sp->lastused); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_cat(result, m); + + m = key_setsadblifetime(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD, + 0, 0, (u_int64_t)sp->lifetime, (u_int64_t)sp->validtime); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_cat(result, m); + + if ((result->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) + goto fail; + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) + goto fail; + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return result; + +fail: + m_freem(result); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * get PFKEY message length for security policy and request. + */ +static u_int +key_getspreqmsglen(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + u_int tlen; + + tlen = sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy); + + /* if is the policy for ipsec ? */ + if (sp->policy != IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC) + return tlen; + + /* get length of ipsec requests */ + { + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + int len; + + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + len = sizeof(struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest) + + isr->saidx.src.ss_len + + isr->saidx.dst.ss_len; + + tlen += PFKEY_ALIGN8(len); + } + } + + return tlen; +} + +/* + * SADB_SPDEXPIRE processing + * send + * <base, address(SD), lifetime(CH), policy> + * to KMD by PF_KEY. + * + * OUT: 0 : succeed + * others : error number + */ +static int +key_spdexpire(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + int s; + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m; + int len; + int error = -1; + struct sadb_lifetime *lt; + + /* XXX: Why do we lock ? */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("key_spdexpire: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* set msg header */ + m = key_setsadbmsg(SADB_X_SPDEXPIRE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + result = m; + + /* create lifetime extension (current and hard) */ + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*lt)) * 2; + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + bzero(mtod(m, caddr_t), len); + lt = mtod(m, struct sadb_lifetime *); + lt->sadb_lifetime_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + lt->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT; + lt->sadb_lifetime_allocations = 0; + lt->sadb_lifetime_bytes = 0; + lt->sadb_lifetime_addtime = sp->created; + lt->sadb_lifetime_usetime = sp->lastused; + lt = (struct sadb_lifetime *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + len / 2); + lt->sadb_lifetime_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + lt->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD; + lt->sadb_lifetime_allocations = 0; + lt->sadb_lifetime_bytes = 0; + lt->sadb_lifetime_addtime = sp->lifetime; + lt->sadb_lifetime_usetime = sp->validtime; + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set sadb_address for source */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&sp->spidx.src, + sp->spidx.prefs, sp->spidx.ul_proto); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set sadb_address for destination */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&sp->spidx.dst, + sp->spidx.prefd, sp->spidx.ul_proto); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set secpolicy */ + m = key_sp2msg(sp); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + if ((result->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(NULL, result, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); + + fail: + if (result) + m_freem(result); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* %%% SAD management */ +/* + * allocating a memory for new SA head, and copy from the values of mhp. + * OUT: NULL : failure due to the lack of memory. + * others : pointer to new SA head. + */ +static struct secashead * +key_newsah(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct secashead *newsah; + + /* sanity check */ + if (saidx == NULL) + panic("key_newsaidx: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + newsah = keydb_newsecashead(); + if (newsah == NULL) + return NULL; + + bcopy(saidx, &newsah->saidx, sizeof(newsah->saidx)); + + /* add to saidxtree */ + newsah->state = SADB_SASTATE_MATURE; + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&sahtree, newsah, chain); + + return(newsah); +} + +/* + * delete SA index and all SA registerd. + */ +static void +key_delsah(sah) + struct secashead *sah; +{ + struct secasvar *sav, *nextsav; + u_int stateidx, state; + int s; + int zombie = 0; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sah == NULL) + panic("key_delsah: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + + /* searching all SA registerd in the secindex. */ + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_any); + stateidx++) { + + state = saorder_state_any[stateidx]; + for (sav = (struct secasvar *)LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[state]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + if (sav->refcnt > 0) { + /* give up to delete this sa */ + zombie++; + continue; + } + + /* sanity check */ + KEY_CHKSASTATE(state, sav->state, "key_delsah"); + + key_freesav(sav); + + /* remove back pointer */ + sav->sah = NULL; + sav = NULL; + } + } + + /* don't delete sah only if there are savs. */ + if (zombie) { + splx(s); + return; + } + + if (sah->sa_route.ro_rt) { + RTFREE(sah->sa_route.ro_rt); + sah->sa_route.ro_rt = (struct rtentry *)NULL; + } + + /* remove from tree of SA index */ + if (__LIST_CHAINED(sah)) + LIST_REMOVE(sah, chain); + + KFREE(sah); + + splx(s); + return; +} + +/* + * allocating a new SA with LARVAL state. key_add() and key_getspi() call, + * and copy the values of mhp into new buffer. + * When SAD message type is GETSPI: + * to set sequence number from acq_seq++, + * to set zero to SPI. + * not to call key_setsava(). + * OUT: NULL : fail + * others : pointer to new secasvar. + * + * does not modify mbuf. does not free mbuf on error. + */ +static struct secasvar * +key_newsav(m, mhp, sah, errp) + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; + struct secashead *sah; + int *errp; +{ + struct secasvar *newsav; + const struct sadb_sa *xsa; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL || sah == NULL) + panic("key_newsa: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + KMALLOC(newsav, struct secasvar *, sizeof(struct secasvar)); + if (newsav == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_newsa: No more memory.\n")); + *errp = ENOBUFS; + return NULL; + } + bzero((caddr_t)newsav, sizeof(struct secasvar)); + + switch (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_type) { + case SADB_GETSPI: + newsav->spi = 0; + +#ifdef IPSEC_DOSEQCHECK + /* sync sequence number */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq == 0) + newsav->seq = + (acq_seq = (acq_seq == ~0 ? 1 : ++acq_seq)); + else +#endif + newsav->seq = mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq; + break; + + case SADB_ADD: + /* sanity check */ + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] == NULL) { + KFREE(newsav); + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_newsa: invalid message is passed.\n")); + *errp = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + xsa = (const struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + newsav->spi = xsa->sadb_sa_spi; + newsav->seq = mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq; + break; + default: + KFREE(newsav); + *errp = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + /* copy sav values */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_type != SADB_GETSPI) { + *errp = key_setsaval(newsav, m, mhp); + if (*errp) { + KFREE(newsav); + return NULL; + } + } + + /* reset created */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + newsav->created = time_second; +#else + newsav->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + + newsav->pid = mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid; + + /* add to satree */ + newsav->sah = sah; + newsav->refcnt = 1; + newsav->state = SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL; + LIST_INSERT_TAIL(&sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL], newsav, + secasvar, chain); + + return newsav; +} + +/* + * free() SA variable entry. + */ +static void +key_delsav(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("key_delsav: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (sav->refcnt > 0) + return; /* can't free */ + + /* remove from SA header */ + if (__LIST_CHAINED(sav)) + LIST_REMOVE(sav, chain); + + if (sav->key_auth != NULL) { + bzero(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); + KFREE(sav->key_auth); + sav->key_auth = NULL; + } + if (sav->key_enc != NULL) { + bzero(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); + KFREE(sav->key_enc); + sav->key_enc = NULL; + } + if (sav->sched) { + bzero(sav->sched, sav->schedlen); + KFREE(sav->sched); + sav->sched = NULL; + } + if (sav->replay != NULL) { + keydb_delsecreplay(sav->replay); + sav->replay = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_c != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_c); + sav->lft_c = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_h != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_h); + sav->lft_h = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_s != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_s); + sav->lft_s = NULL; + } + if (sav->iv != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->iv); + sav->iv = NULL; + } + + KFREE(sav); + + return; +} + +/* + * search SAD. + * OUT: + * NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SA. + */ +static struct secashead * +key_getsah(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, saidx, CMP_REQID)) + return sah; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * check not to be duplicated SPI. + * NOTE: this function is too slow due to searching all SAD. + * OUT: + * NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SA. + */ +static struct secasvar * +key_checkspidup(saidx, spi) + struct secasindex *saidx; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav; + + /* check address family */ + if (saidx->src.ss_family != saidx->dst.ss_family) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_checkspidup: address family mismatched.\n")); + return NULL; + } + + /* check all SAD */ + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (!key_ismyaddr((struct sockaddr *)&sah->saidx.dst)) + continue; + sav = key_getsavbyspi(sah, spi); + if (sav != NULL) + return sav; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * search SAD litmited alive SA, protocol, SPI. + * OUT: + * NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SA. + */ +static struct secasvar * +key_getsavbyspi(sah, spi) + struct secashead *sah; + u_int32_t spi; +{ + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int stateidx, state; + + /* search all status */ + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_alive); + stateidx++) { + + state = saorder_state_alive[stateidx]; + LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->state != state) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getsavbyspi: " + "invalid sav->state (queue: %d SA: %d)\n", + state, sav->state)); + continue; + } + + if (sav->spi == spi) + return sav; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * copy SA values from PF_KEY message except *SPI, SEQ, PID, STATE and TYPE*. + * You must update these if need. + * OUT: 0: success. + * !0: failure. + * + * does not modify mbuf. does not free mbuf on error. + */ +static int +key_setsaval(sav, m, mhp) + struct secasvar *sav; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; +#endif + int error = 0; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_setsaval: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* initialization */ + sav->replay = NULL; + sav->key_auth = NULL; + sav->key_enc = NULL; + sav->sched = NULL; + sav->schedlen = 0; + sav->iv = NULL; + sav->lft_c = NULL; + sav->lft_h = NULL; + sav->lft_s = NULL; + + /* SA */ + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] != NULL) { + const struct sadb_sa *sa0; + + sa0 = (const struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_SA] < sizeof(*sa0)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + sav->alg_auth = sa0->sadb_sa_auth; + sav->alg_enc = sa0->sadb_sa_encrypt; + sav->flags = sa0->sadb_sa_flags; + + /* replay window */ + if ((sa0->sadb_sa_flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) { + sav->replay = keydb_newsecreplay(sa0->sadb_sa_replay); + if (sav->replay == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + } + } + + /* Authentication keys */ + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH] != NULL) { + const struct sadb_key *key0; + int len; + + key0 = (const struct sadb_key *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH]; + len = mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH]; + + error = 0; + if (len < sizeof(*key0)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + switch (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype) { + case SADB_SATYPE_AH: + case SADB_SATYPE_ESP: + if (len == PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_key)) && + sav->alg_auth != SADB_X_AALG_NULL) + error = EINVAL; + break; + case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP: + default: + error = EINVAL; + break; + } + if (error) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: invalid key_auth values.\n")); + goto fail; + } + + sav->key_auth = (struct sadb_key *)key_newbuf(key0, len); + if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* Encryption key */ + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT] != NULL) { + const struct sadb_key *key0; + int len; + + key0 = (const struct sadb_key *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT]; + len = mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT]; + + error = 0; + if (len < sizeof(*key0)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + switch (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype) { + case SADB_SATYPE_ESP: + if (len == PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_key)) && + sav->alg_enc != SADB_EALG_NULL) { + error = EINVAL; + break; + } + sav->key_enc = (struct sadb_key *)key_newbuf(key0, len); + if (sav->key_enc == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + break; + case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP: + if (len != PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_key))) + error = EINVAL; + sav->key_enc = NULL; /*just in case*/ + break; + case SADB_SATYPE_AH: + default: + error = EINVAL; + break; + } + if (error) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsatval: invalid key_enc value.\n")); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* set iv */ + sav->ivlen = 0; + + switch (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype) { + case SADB_SATYPE_ESP: +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (algo && algo->ivlen) + sav->ivlen = (*algo->ivlen)(algo, sav); + if (sav->ivlen == 0) + break; + KMALLOC(sav->iv, caddr_t, sav->ivlen); + if (sav->iv == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + + /* initialize */ + key_randomfill(sav->iv, sav->ivlen); +#endif + break; + case SADB_SATYPE_AH: + case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP: + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: invalid SA type.\n")); + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* reset created */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + sav->created = time_second; +#else + sav->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + + /* make lifetime for CURRENT */ + KMALLOC(sav->lft_c, struct sadb_lifetime *, + sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + if (sav->lft_c == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT; + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_allocations = 0; + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_bytes = 0; +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime = time_second; +#else + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime = time.tv_sec; +#endif + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_usetime = 0; + + /* lifetimes for HARD and SOFT */ + { + const struct sadb_lifetime *lft0; + + lft0 = (struct sadb_lifetime *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD]; + if (lft0 != NULL) { + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] < sizeof(*lft0)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + sav->lft_h = (struct sadb_lifetime *)key_newbuf(lft0, + sizeof(*lft0)); + if (sav->lft_h == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + /* we no longer support byte lifetime */ + if (sav->lft_h->sadb_lifetime_bytes) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + /* initialize? */ + } + + lft0 = (struct sadb_lifetime *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT]; + if (lft0 != NULL) { + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT] < sizeof(*lft0)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + sav->lft_s = (struct sadb_lifetime *)key_newbuf(lft0, + sizeof(*lft0)); + if (sav->lft_s == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setsaval: No more memory.\n")); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + /* we no longer support byte lifetime */ + if (sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_bytes) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + /* initialize? */ + } + } + + return 0; + + fail: + /* initialization */ + if (sav->replay != NULL) { + keydb_delsecreplay(sav->replay); + sav->replay = NULL; + } + if (sav->key_auth != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->key_auth); + sav->key_auth = NULL; + } + if (sav->key_enc != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->key_enc); + sav->key_enc = NULL; + } + if (sav->sched) { + KFREE(sav->sched); + sav->sched = NULL; + } + if (sav->iv != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->iv); + sav->iv = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_c != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_c); + sav->lft_c = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_h != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_h); + sav->lft_h = NULL; + } + if (sav->lft_s != NULL) { + KFREE(sav->lft_s); + sav->lft_s = NULL; + } + + return error; +} + +/* + * validation with a secasvar entry, and set SADB_SATYPE_MATURE. + * OUT: 0: valid + * other: errno + */ +static int +key_mature(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int mature; + int checkmask = 0; /* 2^0: ealg 2^1: aalg 2^2: calg */ + int mustmask = 0; /* 2^0: ealg 2^1: aalg 2^2: calg */ + + mature = 0; + + /* check SPI value */ + switch (sav->sah->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: + case IPPROTO_AH: + if (ntohl(sav->spi) >= 0 && ntohl(sav->spi) <= 255) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_mature: illegal range of SPI %u.\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi))); + return EINVAL; + } + break; + } + + /* check satype */ + switch (sav->sah->saidx.proto) { + case IPPROTO_ESP: + /* check flags */ + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) + && (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: " + "invalid flag (derived) given to old-esp.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + if (sav->alg_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) + checkmask = 1; + else + checkmask = 3; + mustmask = 1; + break; + case IPPROTO_AH: + /* check flags */ + if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: " + "invalid flag (derived) given to AH SA.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + if (sav->alg_enc != SADB_EALG_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: " + "protocol and algorithm mismated.\n")); + return(EINVAL); + } + checkmask = 2; + mustmask = 2; + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + if (sav->alg_auth != SADB_AALG_NONE) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: " + "protocol and algorithm mismated.\n")); + return(EINVAL); + } + if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_RAWCPI) == 0 + && ntohl(sav->spi) >= 0x10000) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: invalid cpi for IPComp.\n")); + return(EINVAL); + } + checkmask = 4; + mustmask = 4; + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: Invalid satype.\n")); + return EPROTONOSUPPORT; + } + + /* check authentication algorithm */ + if ((checkmask & 2) != 0) { + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + int keylen; + + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG,"key_mature: " + "unknown authentication algorithm.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* algorithm-dependent check */ + if (sav->key_auth) + keylen = sav->key_auth->sadb_key_bits; + else + keylen = 0; + if (keylen < algo->keymin || algo->keymax < keylen) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_mature: invalid AH key length %d " + "(%d-%d allowed)\n", + keylen, algo->keymin, algo->keymax)); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (algo->mature) { + if ((*algo->mature)(sav)) { + /* message generated in per-algorithm function*/ + return EINVAL; + } else + mature = SADB_SATYPE_AH; + } + + if ((mustmask & 2) != 0 && mature != SADB_SATYPE_AH) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: no satisfy algorithm for AH\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + } + + /* check encryption algorithm */ + if ((checkmask & 1) != 0) { +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + int keylen; + + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: unknown encryption algorithm.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + + /* algorithm-dependent check */ + if (sav->key_enc) + keylen = sav->key_enc->sadb_key_bits; + else + keylen = 0; + if (keylen < algo->keymin || algo->keymax < keylen) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_mature: invalid ESP key length %d " + "(%d-%d allowed)\n", + keylen, algo->keymin, algo->keymax)); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (algo->mature) { + if ((*algo->mature)(sav)) { + /* message generated in per-algorithm function*/ + return EINVAL; + } else + mature = SADB_SATYPE_ESP; + } + + if ((mustmask & 1) != 0 && mature != SADB_SATYPE_ESP) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: no satisfy algorithm for ESP\n")); + return EINVAL; + } +#else /*IPSEC_ESP*/ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: ESP not supported in this configuration\n")); + return EINVAL; +#endif + } + + /* check compression algorithm */ + if ((checkmask & 4) != 0) { + const struct ipcomp_algorithm *algo; + + /* algorithm-dependent check */ + algo = ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); + if (!algo) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_mature: unknown compression algorithm.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + } + + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * subroutine for SADB_GET and SADB_DUMP. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setdumpsa(sav, type, satype, seq, pid) + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t type, satype; + u_int32_t seq, pid; +{ + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *tres = NULL, *m; + int l = 0; + int i; + void *p; + int dumporder[] = { + SADB_EXT_SA, SADB_X_EXT_SA2, + SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT, + SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY, SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH, + SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT, SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC, + SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST, SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY, + }; + + m = key_setsadbmsg(type, 0, satype, seq, pid, sav->refcnt); + if (m == NULL) + goto fail; + result = m; + + for (i = sizeof(dumporder)/sizeof(dumporder[0]) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + m = NULL; + p = NULL; + switch (dumporder[i]) { + case SADB_EXT_SA: + m = key_setsadbsa(sav); + if (!m) + goto fail; + break; + + case SADB_X_EXT_SA2: + m = key_setsadbxsa2(sav->sah->saidx.mode, + sav->replay ? sav->replay->count : 0, + sav->sah->saidx.reqid); + if (!m) + goto fail; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC: + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) + goto fail; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST: + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) + goto fail; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH: + if (!sav->key_auth) + continue; + l = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(sav->key_auth->sadb_key_len); + p = sav->key_auth; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT: + if (!sav->key_enc) + continue; + l = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(sav->key_enc->sadb_key_len); + p = sav->key_enc; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT: + if (!sav->lft_c) + continue; + l = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_c)->sadb_ext_len); + p = sav->lft_c; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD: + if (!sav->lft_h) + continue; + l = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_h)->sadb_ext_len); + p = sav->lft_h; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT: + if (!sav->lft_s) + continue; + l = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_s)->sadb_ext_len); + p = sav->lft_s; + break; + + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST: + /* XXX: should we brought from SPD ? */ + case SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY: + default: + continue; + } + + if ((!m && !p) || (m && p)) + goto fail; + if (p && tres) { + M_PREPEND(tres, l, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!tres) + goto fail; + bcopy(p, mtod(tres, caddr_t), l); + continue; + } + if (p) { + m = key_alloc_mbuf(l); + if (!m) + goto fail; + m_copyback(m, 0, l, p); + } + + if (tres) + m_cat(m, tres); + tres = m; + } + + m_cat(result, tres); + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) + goto fail; + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return result; + +fail: + m_freem(result); + m_freem(tres); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * set data into sadb_msg. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbmsg(type, tlen, satype, seq, pid, reserved) + u_int8_t type, satype; + u_int16_t tlen; + u_int32_t seq; + pid_t pid; + u_int16_t reserved; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_msg *p; + int len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (len > MCLBYTES) + return NULL; + MGETHDR(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (m && len > MHLEN) { + MCLGET(m, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((m->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_freem(m); + m = NULL; + } + } + if (!m) + return NULL; + m->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_len = len; + m->m_next = NULL; + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2; + p->sadb_msg_type = type; + p->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + p->sadb_msg_satype = satype; + p->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(tlen); + p->sadb_msg_reserved = reserved; + p->sadb_msg_seq = seq; + p->sadb_msg_pid = (u_int32_t)pid; + + return m; +} + +/* + * copy secasvar data into sadb_address. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbsa(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_sa *p; + int len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_sa)); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_sa *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_sa_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_sa_exttype = SADB_EXT_SA; + p->sadb_sa_spi = sav->spi; + p->sadb_sa_replay = (sav->replay != NULL ? sav->replay->wsize : 0); + p->sadb_sa_state = sav->state; + p->sadb_sa_auth = sav->alg_auth; + p->sadb_sa_encrypt = sav->alg_enc; + p->sadb_sa_flags = sav->flags; + + return m; +} + +/* + * set data into sadb_address. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbaddr(exttype, saddr, prefixlen, ul_proto) + u_int16_t exttype; + struct sockaddr *saddr; + u_int8_t prefixlen; + u_int16_t ul_proto; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_address *p; + size_t len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_address)) + + PFKEY_ALIGN8(saddr->sa_len); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_address *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_address_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_address_exttype = exttype; + p->sadb_address_proto = ul_proto; + if (prefixlen == FULLMASK) { + switch (saddr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + prefixlen = sizeof(struct in_addr) << 3; + break; + case AF_INET6: + prefixlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr) << 3; + break; + default: + ; /*XXX*/ + } + } + p->sadb_address_prefixlen = prefixlen; + p->sadb_address_reserved = 0; + + bcopy(saddr, + mtod(m, caddr_t) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_address)), + saddr->sa_len); + + return m; +} + +#if 0 +/* + * set data into sadb_ident. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbident(exttype, idtype, string, stringlen, id) + u_int16_t exttype, idtype; + caddr_t string; + int stringlen; + u_int64_t id; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_ident *p; + size_t len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_ident)) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(stringlen); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_ident *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_ident_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_ident_exttype = exttype; + p->sadb_ident_type = idtype; + p->sadb_ident_reserved = 0; + p->sadb_ident_id = id; + + bcopy(string, + mtod(m, caddr_t) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_ident)), + stringlen); + + return m; +} +#endif + +/* + * set data into sadb_x_sa2. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbxsa2(mode, seq, reqid) + u_int8_t mode; + u_int32_t seq, reqid; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_x_sa2 *p; + size_t len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2)); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_x_sa2 *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_x_sa2_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_x_sa2_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SA2; + p->sadb_x_sa2_mode = mode; + p->sadb_x_sa2_reserved1 = 0; + p->sadb_x_sa2_reserved2 = 0; + p->sadb_x_sa2_sequence = seq; + p->sadb_x_sa2_reqid = reqid; + + return m; +} + +/* + * set data into sadb_lifetime + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadblifetime(type, alloc, bytes, addtime, usetime) + u_int16_t type; + u_int32_t alloc; + u_int64_t bytes, addtime, usetime; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_lifetime *p; + size_t len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_lifetime *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_lifetime_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_lifetime_exttype = type; + p->sadb_lifetime_allocations = alloc; + p->sadb_lifetime_bytes = bytes; + p->sadb_lifetime_addtime = addtime; + p->sadb_lifetime_usetime = usetime; + + return m; +} + +/* + * set data into sadb_x_policy + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_setsadbxpolicy(type, dir, id) + u_int16_t type; + u_int8_t dir; + u_int32_t id; +{ + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_x_policy *p; + size_t len; + + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)); + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + p = mtod(m, struct sadb_x_policy *); + + bzero(p, len); + p->sadb_x_policy_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + p->sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY; + p->sadb_x_policy_type = type; + p->sadb_x_policy_dir = dir; + p->sadb_x_policy_id = id; + + return m; +} + +/* %%% utilities */ +/* + * copy a buffer into the new buffer allocated. + */ +static void * +key_newbuf(src, len) + const void *src; + u_int len; +{ + caddr_t new; + + KMALLOC(new, caddr_t, len); + if (new == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_newbuf: No more memory.\n")); + return NULL; + } + bcopy(src, new, len); + + return new; +} + +/* compare my own address + * OUT: 1: true, i.e. my address. + * 0: false + */ +int +key_ismyaddr(sa) + struct sockaddr *sa; +{ +#ifdef INET + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct in_ifaddr *ia; +#endif + + /* sanity check */ + if (sa == NULL) + panic("key_ismyaddr: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + switch (sa->sa_family) { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + for (ia = in_ifaddr.tqh_first; ia; ia = ia->ia_list.tqe_next) +#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + for (ia = in_ifaddrhead.tqh_first; ia; + ia = ia->ia_link.tqe_next) +#else + for (ia = in_ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia_next) +#endif + { + if (sin->sin_family == ia->ia_addr.sin_family && + sin->sin_len == ia->ia_addr.sin_len && + sin->sin_addr.s_addr == ia->ia_addr.sin_addr.s_addr) + { + return 1; + } + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + return key_ismyaddr6((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa); +#endif + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef INET6 +/* + * compare my own address for IPv6. + * 1: ours + * 0: other + * NOTE: derived ip6_input() in KAME. This is necessary to modify more. + */ +#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> + +static int +key_ismyaddr6(sin6) + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; +{ + struct in6_ifaddr *ia; + struct in6_multi *in6m; + + for (ia = in6_ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia_next) { + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr *)&sin6, + (struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr, 0) == 0) + return 1; + + /* + * XXX Multicast + * XXX why do we care about multlicast here while we don't care + * about IPv4 multicast?? + * XXX scope + */ + in6m = NULL; +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(sin6->sin6_addr, ia->ia_ifp, in6m); +#else + for ((in6m) = ia->ia6_multiaddrs.lh_first; + (in6m) != NULL && + !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&(in6m)->in6m_addr, &sin6->sin6_addr); + (in6m) = in6m->in6m_entry.le_next) + continue; +#endif + if (in6m) + return 1; + } + + /* loopback, just for safety */ + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&sin6->sin6_addr)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} +#endif /*INET6*/ + +/* + * compare two secasindex structure. + * flag can specify to compare 2 saidxes. + * compare two secasindex structure without both mode and reqid. + * don't compare port. + * IN: + * saidx0: source, it can be in SAD. + * saidx1: object. + * OUT: + * 1 : equal + * 0 : not equal + */ +static int +key_cmpsaidx(saidx0, saidx1, flag) + struct secasindex *saidx0, *saidx1; + int flag; +{ + /* sanity */ + if (saidx0 == NULL && saidx1 == NULL) + return 1; + + if (saidx0 == NULL || saidx1 == NULL) + return 0; + + if (saidx0->proto != saidx1->proto) + return 0; + + if (flag == CMP_EXACTLY) { + if (saidx0->mode != saidx1->mode) + return 0; + if (saidx0->reqid != saidx1->reqid) + return 0; + if (bcmp(&saidx0->src, &saidx1->src, saidx0->src.ss_len) != 0 || + bcmp(&saidx0->dst, &saidx1->dst, saidx0->dst.ss_len) != 0) + return 0; + } else { + + /* CMP_MODE_REQID, CMP_REQID, CMP_HEAD */ + if (flag == CMP_MODE_REQID + ||flag == CMP_REQID) { + /* + * If reqid of SPD is non-zero, unique SA is required. + * The result must be of same reqid in this case. + */ + if (saidx1->reqid != 0 && saidx0->reqid != saidx1->reqid) + return 0; + } + + if (flag == CMP_MODE_REQID) { + if (saidx0->mode != IPSEC_MODE_ANY + && saidx0->mode != saidx1->mode) + return 0; + } + + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr *)&saidx0->src, + (struct sockaddr *)&saidx1->src, 0) != 0) { + return 0; + } + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr *)&saidx0->dst, + (struct sockaddr *)&saidx1->dst, 0) != 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * compare two secindex structure exactly. + * IN: + * spidx0: source, it is often in SPD. + * spidx1: object, it is often from PFKEY message. + * OUT: + * 1 : equal + * 0 : not equal + */ +int +key_cmpspidx_exactly(spidx0, spidx1) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx0, *spidx1; +{ + /* sanity */ + if (spidx0 == NULL && spidx1 == NULL) + return 1; + + if (spidx0 == NULL || spidx1 == NULL) + return 0; + + if (spidx0->prefs != spidx1->prefs + || spidx0->prefd != spidx1->prefd + || spidx0->ul_proto != spidx1->ul_proto) + return 0; + + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr *)&spidx0->src, + (struct sockaddr *)&spidx1->src, 1) != 0) { + return 0; + } + if (key_sockaddrcmp((struct sockaddr *)&spidx0->dst, + (struct sockaddr *)&spidx1->dst, 1) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * compare two secindex structure with mask. + * IN: + * spidx0: source, it is often in SPD. + * spidx1: object, it is often from IP header. + * OUT: + * 1 : equal + * 0 : not equal + */ +int +key_cmpspidx_withmask(spidx0, spidx1) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx0, *spidx1; +{ + /* sanity */ + if (spidx0 == NULL && spidx1 == NULL) + return 1; + + if (spidx0 == NULL || spidx1 == NULL) + return 0; + + if (spidx0->src.ss_family != spidx1->src.ss_family || + spidx0->dst.ss_family != spidx1->dst.ss_family || + spidx0->src.ss_len != spidx1->src.ss_len || + spidx0->dst.ss_len != spidx1->dst.ss_len) + return 0; + + /* if spidx.ul_proto == IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY, ignore. */ + if (spidx0->ul_proto != (u_int16_t)IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY + && spidx0->ul_proto != spidx1->ul_proto) + return 0; + + switch (spidx0->src.ss_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (satosin(&spidx0->src)->sin_port != IPSEC_PORT_ANY + && satosin(&spidx0->src)->sin_port != + satosin(&spidx1->src)->sin_port) + return 0; + if (!key_bbcmp((caddr_t)&satosin(&spidx0->src)->sin_addr, + (caddr_t)&satosin(&spidx1->src)->sin_addr, spidx0->prefs)) + return 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_port != IPSEC_PORT_ANY + && satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_port != + satosin6(&spidx1->src)->sin6_port) + return 0; + /* + * scope_id check. if sin6_scope_id is 0, we regard it + * as a wildcard scope, which matches any scope zone ID. + */ + if (satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_scope_id && + satosin6(&spidx1->src)->sin6_scope_id && + satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_scope_id != + satosin6(&spidx1->src)->sin6_scope_id) + return 0; + if (!key_bbcmp((caddr_t)&satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_addr, + (caddr_t)&satosin6(&spidx1->src)->sin6_addr, spidx0->prefs)) + return 0; + break; + default: + /* XXX */ + if (bcmp(&spidx0->src, &spidx1->src, spidx0->src.ss_len) != 0) + return 0; + break; + } + + switch (spidx0->dst.ss_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (satosin(&spidx0->dst)->sin_port != IPSEC_PORT_ANY + && satosin(&spidx0->dst)->sin_port != + satosin(&spidx1->dst)->sin_port) + return 0; + if (!key_bbcmp((caddr_t)&satosin(&spidx0->dst)->sin_addr, + (caddr_t)&satosin(&spidx1->dst)->sin_addr, spidx0->prefd)) + return 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (satosin6(&spidx0->dst)->sin6_port != IPSEC_PORT_ANY + && satosin6(&spidx0->dst)->sin6_port != + satosin6(&spidx1->dst)->sin6_port) + return 0; + /* + * scope_id check. if sin6_scope_id is 0, we regard it + * as a wildcard scope, which matches any scope zone ID. + */ + if (satosin6(&spidx0->src)->sin6_scope_id && + satosin6(&spidx1->src)->sin6_scope_id && + satosin6(&spidx0->dst)->sin6_scope_id != + satosin6(&spidx1->dst)->sin6_scope_id) + return 0; + if (!key_bbcmp((caddr_t)&satosin6(&spidx0->dst)->sin6_addr, + (caddr_t)&satosin6(&spidx1->dst)->sin6_addr, spidx0->prefd)) + return 0; + break; + default: + /* XXX */ + if (bcmp(&spidx0->dst, &spidx1->dst, spidx0->dst.ss_len) != 0) + return 0; + break; + } + + /* XXX Do we check other field ? e.g. flowinfo */ + + return 1; +} + +/* returns 0 on match */ +static int +key_sockaddrcmp(sa1, sa2, port) + struct sockaddr *sa1; + struct sockaddr *sa2; + int port; +{ + if (sa1->sa_family != sa2->sa_family || sa1->sa_len != sa2->sa_len) + return 1; + + switch (sa1->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (sa1->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return 1; + if (satosin(sa1)->sin_addr.s_addr != + satosin(sa2)->sin_addr.s_addr) { + return 1; + } + if (port && satosin(sa1)->sin_port != satosin(sa2)->sin_port) + return 1; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (sa1->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return 1; /*EINVAL*/ + if (satosin6(sa1)->sin6_scope_id != + satosin6(sa2)->sin6_scope_id) { + return 1; + } + if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&satosin6(sa1)->sin6_addr, + &satosin6(sa2)->sin6_addr)) { + return 1; + } + if (port && + satosin6(sa1)->sin6_port != satosin6(sa2)->sin6_port) { + return 1; + } + default: + if (bcmp(sa1, sa2, sa1->sa_len) != 0) + return 1; + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * compare two buffers with mask. + * IN: + * addr1: source + * addr2: object + * bits: Number of bits to compare + * OUT: + * 1 : equal + * 0 : not equal + */ +static int +key_bbcmp(p1, p2, bits) + caddr_t p1, p2; + u_int bits; +{ + u_int8_t mask; + + /* XXX: This could be considerably faster if we compare a word + * at a time, but it is complicated on LSB Endian machines */ + + /* Handle null pointers */ + if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL) + return (p1 == p2); + + while (bits >= 8) { + if (*p1++ != *p2++) + return 0; + bits -= 8; + } + + if (bits > 0) { + mask = ~((1<<(8-bits))-1); + if ((*p1 & mask) != (*p2 & mask)) + return 0; + } + return 1; /* Match! */ +} + +/* + * time handler. + * scanning SPD and SAD to check status for each entries, + * and do to remove or to expire. + * XXX: year 2038 problem may remain. + */ +void +key_timehandler(void) +{ + u_int dir; + int s; + struct timeval tv; + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ + microtime(&tv); +#else + tv = time; +#endif + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + + /* SPD */ + { + struct secpolicy *sp, *nextsp; + + for (dir = 0; dir < IPSEC_DIR_MAX; dir++) { + for (sp = LIST_FIRST(&sptree[dir]); + sp != NULL; + sp = nextsp) { + + nextsp = LIST_NEXT(sp, chain); + + if (sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD) { + key_freesp(sp); + continue; + } + + if (sp->lifetime == 0 && sp->validtime == 0) + continue; + + /* the deletion will occur next time */ + if ((sp->lifetime + && tv.tv_sec - sp->created > sp->lifetime) + || (sp->validtime + && tv.tv_sec - sp->lastused > sp->validtime)) { + sp->state = IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD; + key_spdexpire(sp); + continue; + } + } + } + } + + /* SAD */ + { + struct secashead *sah, *nextsah; + struct secasvar *sav, *nextsav; + + for (sah = LIST_FIRST(&sahtree); + sah != NULL; + sah = nextsah) { + + nextsah = LIST_NEXT(sah, chain); + + /* if sah has been dead, then delete it and process next sah. */ + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) { + key_delsah(sah); + continue; + } + + /* if LARVAL entry doesn't become MATURE, delete it. */ + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + if (tv.tv_sec - sav->created > key_larval_lifetime) { + key_freesav(sav); + } + } + + /* + * check MATURE entry to start to send expire message + * whether or not. + */ + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_MATURE]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + /* we don't need to check. */ + if (sav->lft_s == NULL) + continue; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->lft_c == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_timehandler: " + "There is no CURRENT time, why?\n")); + continue; + } + + /* check SOFT lifetime */ + if (sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_addtime != 0 + && tv.tv_sec - sav->created > sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_addtime) { + /* + * check SA to be used whether or not. + * when SA hasn't been used, delete it. + */ + if (sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_usetime == 0) { + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + } else { + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DYING); + /* + * XXX If we keep to send expire + * message in the status of + * DYING. Do remove below code. + */ + key_expire(sav); + } + } + /* check SOFT lifetime by bytes */ + /* + * XXX I don't know the way to delete this SA + * when new SA is installed. Caution when it's + * installed too big lifetime by time. + */ + else if (sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_bytes != 0 + && sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_bytes < sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_bytes) { + + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DYING); + /* + * XXX If we keep to send expire + * message in the status of + * DYING. Do remove below code. + */ + key_expire(sav); + } + } + + /* check DYING entry to change status to DEAD. */ + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_DYING]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + /* we don't need to check. */ + if (sav->lft_h == NULL) + continue; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->lft_c == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG,"key_timehandler: " + "There is no CURRENT time, why?\n")); + continue; + } + + if (sav->lft_h->sadb_lifetime_addtime != 0 + && tv.tv_sec - sav->created > sav->lft_h->sadb_lifetime_addtime) { + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + } +#if 0 /* XXX Should we keep to send expire message until HARD lifetime ? */ + else if (sav->lft_s != NULL + && sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_addtime != 0 + && tv.tv_sec - sav->created > sav->lft_s->sadb_lifetime_addtime) { + /* + * XXX: should be checked to be + * installed the valid SA. + */ + + /* + * If there is no SA then sending + * expire message. + */ + key_expire(sav); + } +#endif + /* check HARD lifetime by bytes */ + else if (sav->lft_h->sadb_lifetime_bytes != 0 + && sav->lft_h->sadb_lifetime_bytes < sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_bytes) { + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + } + } + + /* delete entry in DEAD */ + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[SADB_SASTATE_DEAD]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_timehandler: " + "invalid sav->state " + "(queue: %d SA: %d): " + "kill it anyway\n", + SADB_SASTATE_DEAD, sav->state)); + } + + /* + * do not call key_freesav() here. + * sav should already be freed, and sav->refcnt + * shows other references to sav + * (such as from SPD). + */ + } + } + } + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + /* ACQ tree */ + { + struct secacq *acq, *nextacq; + + for (acq = LIST_FIRST(&acqtree); + acq != NULL; + acq = nextacq) { + + nextacq = LIST_NEXT(acq, chain); + + if (tv.tv_sec - acq->created > key_blockacq_lifetime + && __LIST_CHAINED(acq)) { + LIST_REMOVE(acq, chain); + KFREE(acq); + } + } + } +#endif + + /* SP ACQ tree */ + { + struct secspacq *acq, *nextacq; + + for (acq = LIST_FIRST(&spacqtree); + acq != NULL; + acq = nextacq) { + + nextacq = LIST_NEXT(acq, chain); + + if (tv.tv_sec - acq->created > key_blockacq_lifetime + && __LIST_CHAINED(acq)) { + LIST_REMOVE(acq, chain); + KFREE(acq); + } + } + } + + /* initialize random seed */ + if (key_tick_init_random++ > key_int_random) { + key_tick_init_random = 0; + key_srandom(); + } + + /* + * should set timeout based on the most closest timer expiration. + * we don't bother to do that yet. + */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + callout_reset(&key_timehandler_ch, hz, + (void *)key_timehandler, (void *)0); +#else + (void)timeout((void *)key_timehandler, (void *)0, hz); +#endif + + splx(s); + return; +} + +/* + * to initialize a seed for random() + */ +static void +key_srandom() +{ + struct timeval tv; + int i; + + microtime(&tv); + + for (i = (int)((tv.tv_sec ^ tv.tv_usec) & 0x3ff); i > 0; i--) + (void)random(); + return; +} + +u_long +key_random() +{ + u_long value; + + key_randomfill(&value, sizeof(value)); + return value; +} + +void +key_randomfill(p, l) + void *p; + size_t l; +{ + size_t n; + u_long v; + static int warn = 1; + + n = 0; +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && NRND > 0 + n = rnd_extract_data(p, l, RND_EXTRACT_ANY); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + get_random_bytes(p, l); + n = l; +#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 4 + n = (size_t)read_random_unlimited(p, (u_int)l); +#endif + /* last resort */ + while (n < l) { + v = random(); + bcopy(&v, (u_int8_t *)p + n, + l - n < sizeof(v) ? l - n : sizeof(v)); + n += sizeof(v); + + if (warn) { + printf("WARNING: pseudo-random number generator " + "used for IPsec processing\n"); + warn = 0; + } + } +} + +/* + * map SADB_SATYPE_* to IPPROTO_*. + * if satype == SADB_SATYPE then satype is mapped to ~0. + * OUT: + * 0: invalid satype. + */ +static u_int16_t +key_satype2proto(satype) + u_int8_t satype; +{ + switch (satype) { + case SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC: + return IPSEC_PROTO_ANY; + case SADB_SATYPE_AH: + return IPPROTO_AH; + case SADB_SATYPE_ESP: + return IPPROTO_ESP; + case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP: + return IPPROTO_IPCOMP; + break; + default: + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * map IPPROTO_* to SADB_SATYPE_* + * OUT: + * 0: invalid protocol type. + */ +static u_int8_t +key_proto2satype(proto) + u_int16_t proto; +{ + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_AH: + return SADB_SATYPE_AH; + case IPPROTO_ESP: + return SADB_SATYPE_ESP; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + return SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP; + break; + default: + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* %%% PF_KEY */ +/* + * SADB_GETSPI processing is to receive + * <base, (SA2), src address, dst address, (SPI range)> + * from the IKMPd, to assign a unique spi value, to hang on the INBOUND + * tree with the status of LARVAL, and send + * <base, SA(*), address(SD)> + * to the IKMPd. + * + * IN: mhp: pointer to the pointer to each header. + * OUT: NULL if fail. + * other if success, return pointer to the message to send. + */ +static int +key_getspi(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *newsah; + struct secasvar *newsav; + u_int8_t proto; + u_int32_t spi; + u_int8_t mode; + u_int32_t reqid; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_getspi: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getspi: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getspi: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2] != NULL) { + mode = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_mode; + reqid = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_reqid; + } else { + mode = IPSEC_MODE_ANY; + reqid = 0; + } + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]); + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getspi: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* make sure if port number is zero. */ + switch (((struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1))->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (((struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1))->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(src0 + 1))->sin_port = 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (((struct sockaddr *)(src0 + 1))->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(src0 + 1))->sin6_port = 0; + break; + default: + ; /*???*/ + } + switch (((struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1))->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (((struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1))->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(dst0 + 1))->sin_port = 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (((struct sockaddr *)(dst0 + 1))->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(dst0 + 1))->sin6_port = 0; + break; + default: + ; /*???*/ + } + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, mode, reqid, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* SPI allocation */ + spi = key_do_getnewspi((struct sadb_spirange *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE], + &saidx); + if (spi == 0) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + + /* get a SA index */ + if ((newsah = key_getsah(&saidx)) == NULL) { + /* create a new SA index */ + if ((newsah = key_newsah(&saidx)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_getspi: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + } + + /* get a new SA */ + /* XXX rewrite */ + newsav = key_newsav(m, mhp, newsah, &error); + if (newsav == NULL) { + /* XXX don't free new SA index allocated in above. */ + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + /* set spi */ + newsav->spi = htonl(spi); + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + /* delete the entry in acqtree */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq != 0) { + struct secacq *acq; + if ((acq = key_getacqbyseq(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq)) != NULL) { + /* reset counter in order to deletion by timehandler. */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + acq->created = time_second; +#else + acq->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + acq->count = 0; + } + } +#endif + + { + struct mbuf *n, *nn; + struct sadb_sa *m_sa; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + int off, len; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) + + PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_sa)); + if (len > MCLBYTES) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (len > MHLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_freem(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + n->m_len = len; + n->m_next = NULL; + off = 0; + + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + + m_sa = (struct sadb_sa *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + m_sa->sadb_sa_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_sa)); + m_sa->sadb_sa_exttype = SADB_EXT_SA; + m_sa->sadb_sa_spi = htonl(spi); + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_sa)); + +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (off != len) + panic("length inconsistency in key_getspi"); +#endif + + n->m_next = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 0, 2, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + if (!n->m_next) { + m_freem(n); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + if (n->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + n = m_pullup(n, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (n == NULL) + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } + + n->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (nn = n; nn; nn = nn->m_next) + n->m_pkthdr.len += nn->m_len; + + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_seq = newsav->seq; + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } +} + +/* + * allocating new SPI + * called by key_getspi(). + * OUT: + * 0: failure. + * others: success. + */ +static u_int32_t +key_do_getnewspi(spirange, saidx) + struct sadb_spirange *spirange; + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + u_int32_t newspi; + u_int32_t min, max; + int count = key_spi_trycnt; + + /* set spi range to allocate */ + if (spirange != NULL) { + min = spirange->sadb_spirange_min; + max = spirange->sadb_spirange_max; + } else { + min = key_spi_minval; + max = key_spi_maxval; + } + /* IPCOMP needs 2-byte SPI */ + if (saidx->proto == IPPROTO_IPCOMP) { + u_int32_t t; + if (min >= 0x10000) + min = 0xffff; + if (max >= 0x10000) + max = 0xffff; + if (min > max) { + t = min; min = max; max = t; + } + } + + if (min == max) { + if (key_checkspidup(saidx, min) != NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_do_getnewspi: SPI %u exists already.\n", min)); + return 0; + } + + count--; /* taking one cost. */ + newspi = min; + + } else { + + /* init SPI */ + newspi = 0; + + /* when requesting to allocate spi ranged */ + while (count--) { + /* generate pseudo-random SPI value ranged. */ + newspi = min + (key_random() % (max - min + 1)); + + if (key_checkspidup(saidx, newspi) == NULL) + break; + } + + if (count == 0 || newspi == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_do_getnewspi: to allocate spi is failed.\n")); + return 0; + } + } + + /* statistics */ + keystat.getspi_count = + (keystat.getspi_count + key_spi_trycnt - count) / 2; + + return newspi; +} + +/* + * SADB_UPDATE processing + * receive + * <base, SA, (SA2), (lifetime(HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),) + * key(AE), (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> + * from the ikmpd, and update a secasvar entry whose status is SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL. + * and send + * <base, SA, (SA2), (lifetime(HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),) + * (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> + * to the ikmpd. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_update(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_sa *sa0; + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int16_t proto; + u_int8_t mode; + u_int32_t reqid; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_update: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL || + (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype == SADB_SATYPE_ESP && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT] == NULL) || + (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype == SADB_SATYPE_AH && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH] == NULL) || + (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] != NULL && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT] == NULL) || + (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] == NULL && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT] != NULL)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_SA] < sizeof(struct sadb_sa) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2] != NULL) { + mode = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_mode; + reqid = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_reqid; + } else { + mode = IPSEC_MODE_ANY; + reqid = 0; + } + /* XXX boundary checking for other extensions */ + + sa0 = (struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]); + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]); + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, mode, reqid, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* get a SA header */ + if ((sah = key_getsah(&saidx)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: no SA index found.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + } + + /* set spidx if there */ + /* XXX rewrite */ + error = key_setident(sah, m, mhp); + if (error) + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + + /* find a SA with sequence number. */ +#ifdef IPSEC_DOSEQCHECK + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq != 0 + && (sav = key_getsavbyseq(sah, mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_update: no larval SA with sequence %u exists.\n", + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq)); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + } +#else + if ((sav = key_getsavbyspi(sah, sa0->sadb_sa_spi)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_update: no such a SA found (spi:%u)\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sa0->sadb_sa_spi))); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } +#endif + + /* validity check */ + if (sav->sah->saidx.proto != proto) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_update: protocol mismatched (DB=%u param=%u)\n", + sav->sah->saidx.proto, proto)); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } +#ifdef IPSEC_DOSEQCHECK + if (sav->spi != sa0->sadb_sa_spi) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_update: SPI mismatched (DB:%u param:%u)\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi), + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sa0->sadb_sa_spi))); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } +#endif + if (sav->pid != mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_update: pid mismatched (DB:%u param:%u)\n", + sav->pid, mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid)); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* copy sav values */ + error = key_setsaval(sav, m, mhp); + if (error) { + key_freesav(sav); + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + /* check SA values to be mature. */ + if ((mhp->msg->sadb_msg_errno = key_mature(sav)) != 0) { + key_freesav(sav); + return key_senderror(so, m, 0); + } + + { + struct mbuf *n; + + /* set msg buf from mhp */ + n = key_getmsgbuf_x1(m, mhp); + if (n == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * search SAD with sequence for a SA which state is SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL. + * only called by key_update(). + * OUT: + * NULL : not found + * others : found, pointer to a SA. + */ +#ifdef IPSEC_DOSEQCHECK +static struct secasvar * +key_getsavbyseq(sah, seq) + struct secashead *sah; + u_int32_t seq; +{ + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int state; + + state = SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL; + + /* search SAD with sequence number ? */ + LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { + + KEY_CHKSASTATE(state, sav->state, "key_getsabyseq"); + + if (sav->seq == seq) { + sav->refcnt++; + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP, + printf("DP key_getsavbyseq cause " + "refcnt++:%d SA:%p\n", + sav->refcnt, sav)); + return sav; + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif + +/* + * SADB_ADD processing + * add a entry to SA database, when received + * <base, SA, (SA2), (lifetime(HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),) + * key(AE), (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> + * from the ikmpd, + * and send + * <base, SA, (SA2), (lifetime(HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),) + * (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> + * to the ikmpd. + * + * IGNORE identity and sensitivity messages. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_add(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_sa *sa0; + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *newsah; + struct secasvar *newsav; + u_int16_t proto; + u_int8_t mode; + u_int32_t reqid; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_add: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_add: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL || + (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype == SADB_SATYPE_ESP && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT] == NULL) || + (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype == SADB_SATYPE_AH && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH] == NULL) || + (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] != NULL && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT] == NULL) || + (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD] == NULL && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT] != NULL)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_add: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_SA] < sizeof(struct sadb_sa) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address)) { + /* XXX need more */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_add: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2] != NULL) { + mode = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_mode; + reqid = ((struct sadb_x_sa2 *)mhp->ext[SADB_X_EXT_SA2])->sadb_x_sa2_reqid; + } else { + mode = IPSEC_MODE_ANY; + reqid = 0; + } + + sa0 = (struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]; + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]; + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, mode, reqid, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* get a SA header */ + if ((newsah = key_getsah(&saidx)) == NULL) { + /* create a new SA header */ + if ((newsah = key_newsah(&saidx)) == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_add: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + } + + /* set spidx if there */ + /* XXX rewrite */ + error = key_setident(newsah, m, mhp); + if (error) { + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + /* create new SA entry. */ + /* We can create new SA only if SPI is differenct. */ + if (key_getsavbyspi(newsah, sa0->sadb_sa_spi)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_add: SA already exists.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EEXIST); + } + newsav = key_newsav(m, mhp, newsah, &error); + if (newsav == NULL) { + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + /* check SA values to be mature. */ + if ((error = key_mature(newsav)) != 0) { + key_freesav(newsav); + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + /* + * don't call key_freesav() here, as we would like to keep the SA + * in the database on success. + */ + + { + struct mbuf *n; + + /* set msg buf from mhp */ + n = key_getmsgbuf_x1(m, mhp); + if (n == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_update: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* m is retained */ +static int +key_setident(sah, m, mhp) + struct secashead *sah; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + const struct sadb_ident *idsrc, *iddst; + int idsrclen, iddstlen; + + /* sanity check */ + if (sah == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_setident: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* don't make buffer if not there */ + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC] == NULL && + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST] == NULL) { + sah->idents = NULL; + sah->identd = NULL; + return 0; + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setident: invalid identity.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + + idsrc = (const struct sadb_ident *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC]; + iddst = (const struct sadb_ident *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST]; + idsrclen = mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC]; + iddstlen = mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST]; + + /* validity check */ + if (idsrc->sadb_ident_type != iddst->sadb_ident_type) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setident: ident type mismatch.\n")); + return EINVAL; + } + + switch (idsrc->sadb_ident_type) { + case SADB_IDENTTYPE_PREFIX: + case SADB_IDENTTYPE_FQDN: + case SADB_IDENTTYPE_USERFQDN: + default: + /* XXX do nothing */ + sah->idents = NULL; + sah->identd = NULL; + return 0; + } + + /* make structure */ + KMALLOC(sah->idents, struct sadb_ident *, idsrclen); + if (sah->idents == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setident: No more memory.\n")); + return ENOBUFS; + } + KMALLOC(sah->identd, struct sadb_ident *, iddstlen); + if (sah->identd == NULL) { + KFREE(sah->idents); + sah->idents = NULL; + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_setident: No more memory.\n")); + return ENOBUFS; + } + bcopy(idsrc, sah->idents, idsrclen); + bcopy(iddst, sah->identd, iddstlen); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * m will not be freed on return. + * it is caller's responsibility to free the result. + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_getmsgbuf_x1(m, mhp) + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_getmsgbuf_x1: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 1, 9, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_EXT_SA, SADB_X_EXT_SA2, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD, SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT, + SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC, SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST); + if (!n) + return NULL; + + if (n->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + n = m_pullup(n, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (n == NULL) + return NULL; + } + mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + return n; +} + +static int key_delete_all __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *, u_int16_t)); + +/* + * SADB_DELETE processing + * receive + * <base, SA(*), address(SD)> + * from the ikmpd, and set SADB_SASTATE_DEAD, + * and send, + * <base, SA(*), address(SD)> + * to the ikmpd. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_delete(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_sa *sa0; + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + u_int16_t proto; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_delete: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] == NULL) { + /* + * Caller wants us to delete all non-LARVAL SAs + * that match the src/dst. This is used during + * IKE INITIAL-CONTACT. + */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: doing delete all.\n")); + return key_delete_all(so, m, mhp, proto); + } else if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_SA] < sizeof(struct sadb_sa)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + sa0 = (struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]); + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]); + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, IPSEC_MODE_ANY, 0, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* get a SA header */ + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, &saidx, CMP_HEAD) == 0) + continue; + + /* get a SA with SPI. */ + sav = key_getsavbyspi(sah, sa0->sadb_sa_spi); + if (sav) + break; + } + if (sah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete: no SA found.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + } + + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + sav = NULL; + + { + struct mbuf *n; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 1, 4, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_EXT_SA, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + if (n->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + n = m_pullup(n, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (n == NULL) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * delete all SAs for src/dst. Called from key_delete(). + */ +static int +key_delete_all(so, m, mhp, proto) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; + u_int16_t proto; +{ + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav, *nextsav; + u_int stateidx, state; + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]); + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]); + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, IPSEC_MODE_ANY, 0, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, &saidx, CMP_HEAD) == 0) + continue; + + /* Delete all non-LARVAL SAs. */ + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_alive); + stateidx++) { + state = saorder_state_alive[stateidx]; + if (state == SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL) + continue; + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[state]); + sav != NULL; sav = nextsav) { + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->state != state) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_delete_all: " + "invalid sav->state " + "(queue: %d SA: %d)\n", + state, sav->state)); + continue; + } + + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + } + } + } + { + struct mbuf *n; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + n = key_gather_mbuf(m, mhp, 1, 3, SADB_EXT_RESERVED, + SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + if (n->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + n = m_pullup(n, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (n == NULL) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(n->m_pkthdr.len); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +/* + * SADB_GET processing + * receive + * <base, SA(*), address(SD)> + * from the ikmpd, and get a SP and a SA to respond, + * and send, + * <base, SA, (lifetime(HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),) key(AE), + * (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> + * to the ikmpd. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_get(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_sa *sa0; + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav = NULL; + u_int16_t proto; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_get: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_get: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_get: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_SA] < sizeof(struct sadb_sa) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_get: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + sa0 = (struct sadb_sa *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SA]; + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]; + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]; + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, IPSEC_MODE_ANY, 0, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* get a SA header */ + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, &saidx, CMP_HEAD) == 0) + continue; + + /* get a SA with SPI. */ + sav = key_getsavbyspi(sah, sa0->sadb_sa_spi); + if (sav) + break; + } + if (sah == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_get: no SA found.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + } + + { + struct mbuf *n; + u_int8_t satype; + + /* map proto to satype */ + if ((satype = key_proto2satype(sah->saidx.proto)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_get: there was invalid proto in SAD.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + n = key_setdumpsa(sav, SADB_GET, satype, mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq, + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } +} + +/* XXX make it sysctl-configurable? */ +static void +key_getcomb_setlifetime(comb) + struct sadb_comb *comb; +{ + + comb->sadb_comb_soft_allocations = 1; + comb->sadb_comb_hard_allocations = 1; + comb->sadb_comb_soft_bytes = 0; + comb->sadb_comb_hard_bytes = 0; + comb->sadb_comb_hard_addtime = 86400; /* 1 day */ + comb->sadb_comb_soft_addtime = comb->sadb_comb_soft_addtime * 80 / 100; + comb->sadb_comb_soft_usetime = 28800; /* 8 hours */ + comb->sadb_comb_hard_usetime = comb->sadb_comb_hard_usetime * 80 / 100; +} + +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP +/* + * XXX reorder combinations by preference + * XXX no idea if the user wants ESP authentication or not + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_getcomb_esp() +{ + struct sadb_comb *comb; + const struct esp_algorithm *algo; + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m, *n; + int encmin; + int i, off, o; + int totlen; + const int l = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_comb)); + + m = NULL; + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_EALG_MAX; i++) { + algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(i); + if (!algo) + continue; + + if (algo->keymax < ipsec_esp_keymin) + continue; + if (algo->keymin < ipsec_esp_keymin) + encmin = ipsec_esp_keymin; + else + encmin = algo->keymin; + + if (ipsec_esp_auth) + m = key_getcomb_ah(); + else { +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (l > MLEN) + panic("assumption failed in key_getcomb_esp"); +#endif + MGET(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (m) { + M_ALIGN(m, l); + m->m_len = l; + m->m_next = NULL; + bzero(mtod(m, caddr_t), m->m_len); + } + } + if (!m) + goto fail; + + totlen = 0; + for (n = m; n; n = n->m_next) + totlen += n->m_len; +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (totlen % l) + panic("assumption failed in key_getcomb_esp"); +#endif + + for (off = 0; off < totlen; off += l) { + n = m_pulldown(m, off, l, &o); + if (!n) { + /* m is already freed */ + goto fail; + } + comb = (struct sadb_comb *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + o); + bzero(comb, sizeof(*comb)); + key_getcomb_setlifetime(comb); + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt = i; + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt_minbits = encmin; + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt_maxbits = algo->keymax; + } + + if (!result) + result = m; + else + m_cat(result, m); + } + + return result; + + fail: + if (result) + m_freem(result); + return NULL; +} +#endif + +/* + * XXX reorder combinations by preference + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_getcomb_ah() +{ + struct sadb_comb *comb; + const struct ah_algorithm *algo; + struct mbuf *m; + int min; + int i; + const int l = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_comb)); + + m = NULL; + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_AALG_MAX; i++) { +#if 1 + /* we prefer HMAC algorithms, not old algorithms */ + if (i != SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC && i != SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC) + continue; +#endif + algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(i); + if (!algo) + continue; + + if (algo->keymax < ipsec_ah_keymin) + continue; + if (algo->keymin < ipsec_ah_keymin) + min = ipsec_ah_keymin; + else + min = algo->keymin; + + if (!m) { +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (l > MLEN) + panic("assumption failed in key_getcomb_ah"); +#endif + MGET(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (m) { + M_ALIGN(m, l); + m->m_len = l; + m->m_next = NULL; + } + } else + M_PREPEND(m, l, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!m) + return NULL; + + comb = mtod(m, struct sadb_comb *); + bzero(comb, sizeof(*comb)); + key_getcomb_setlifetime(comb); + comb->sadb_comb_auth = i; + comb->sadb_comb_auth_minbits = min; + comb->sadb_comb_auth_maxbits = algo->keymax; + } + + return m; +} + +/* + * not really an official behavior. discussed in pf_key@inner.net in Sep2000. + * XXX reorder combinations by preference + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_getcomb_ipcomp() +{ + struct sadb_comb *comb; + const struct ipcomp_algorithm *algo; + struct mbuf *m; + int i; + const int l = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_comb)); + + m = NULL; + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_X_CALG_MAX; i++) { + algo = ipcomp_algorithm_lookup(i); + if (!algo) + continue; + + if (!m) { +#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC + if (l > MLEN) + panic("assumption failed in key_getcomb_ipcomp"); +#endif + MGET(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (m) { + M_ALIGN(m, l); + m->m_len = l; + m->m_next = NULL; + } + } else + M_PREPEND(m, l, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!m) + return NULL; + + comb = mtod(m, struct sadb_comb *); + bzero(comb, sizeof(*comb)); + key_getcomb_setlifetime(comb); + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt = i; + /* what should we set into sadb_comb_*_{min,max}bits? */ + } + + return m; +} + +/* + * XXX no way to pass mode (transport/tunnel) to userland + * XXX replay checking? + * XXX sysctl interface to ipsec_{ah,esp}_keymin + */ +static struct mbuf * +key_getprop(saidx) + const struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct sadb_prop *prop; + struct mbuf *m, *n; + const int l = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_prop)); + int totlen; + + switch (saidx->proto) { +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + case IPPROTO_ESP: + m = key_getcomb_esp(); + break; +#endif + case IPPROTO_AH: + m = key_getcomb_ah(); + break; + case IPPROTO_IPCOMP: + m = key_getcomb_ipcomp(); + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + + if (!m) + return NULL; + M_PREPEND(m, l, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!m) + return NULL; + + totlen = 0; + for (n = m; n; n = n->m_next) + totlen += n->m_len; + + prop = mtod(m, struct sadb_prop *); + bzero(prop, sizeof(*prop)); + prop->sadb_prop_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(totlen); + prop->sadb_prop_exttype = SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL; + prop->sadb_prop_replay = 32; /* XXX */ + + return m; +} + +/* + * SADB_ACQUIRE processing called by key_checkrequest() and key_acquire2(). + * send + * <base, SA, address(SD), (address(P)), x_policy, + * (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal> + * to KMD, and expect to receive + * <base> with SADB_ACQUIRE if error occured, + * or + * <base, src address, dst address, (SPI range)> with SADB_GETSPI + * from KMD by PF_KEY. + * + * XXX x_policy is outside of RFC2367 (KAME extension). + * XXX sensitivity is not supported. + * XXX for ipcomp, RFC2367 does not define how to fill in proposal. + * see comment for key_getcomb_ipcomp(). + * + * OUT: + * 0 : succeed + * others: error number + */ +static int +key_acquire(saidx, sp) + struct secasindex *saidx; + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m; +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + struct secacq *newacq; +#endif + u_int8_t satype; + int error = -1; + u_int32_t seq; + + /* sanity check */ + if (saidx == NULL) + panic("key_acquire: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + if ((satype = key_proto2satype(saidx->proto)) == 0) + panic("key_acquire: invalid proto is passed.\n"); + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + /* + * We never do anything about acquirng SA. There is anather + * solution that kernel blocks to send SADB_ACQUIRE message until + * getting something message from IKEd. In later case, to be + * managed with ACQUIRING list. + */ + /* get a entry to check whether sending message or not. */ + if ((newacq = key_getacq(saidx)) != NULL) { + if (key_blockacq_count < newacq->count) { + /* reset counter and do send message. */ + newacq->count = 0; + } else { + /* increment counter and do nothing. */ + newacq->count++; + return 0; + } + } else { + /* make new entry for blocking to send SADB_ACQUIRE. */ + if ((newacq = key_newacq(saidx)) == NULL) + return ENOBUFS; + + /* add to acqtree */ + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&acqtree, newacq, chain); + } +#endif + + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + seq = newacq->seq; +#else + seq = (acq_seq = (acq_seq == ~0 ? 1 : ++acq_seq)); +#endif + m = key_setsadbmsg(SADB_ACQUIRE, 0, satype, seq, 0, 0); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + result = m; + + /* set sadb_address for saidx's. */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&saidx->src, FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&saidx->dst, FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* XXX proxy address (optional) */ + + /* set sadb_x_policy */ + if (sp) { + m = key_setsadbxpolicy(sp->policy, sp->spidx.dir, sp->id); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + } + + /* XXX identity (optional) */ +#if 0 + if (idexttype && fqdn) { + /* create identity extension (FQDN) */ + struct sadb_ident *id; + int fqdnlen; + + fqdnlen = strlen(fqdn) + 1; /* +1 for terminating-NUL */ + id = (struct sadb_ident *)p; + bzero(id, sizeof(*id) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(fqdnlen)); + id->sadb_ident_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(*id) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(fqdnlen)); + id->sadb_ident_exttype = idexttype; + id->sadb_ident_type = SADB_IDENTTYPE_FQDN; + bcopy(fqdn, id + 1, fqdnlen); + p += sizeof(struct sadb_ident) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(fqdnlen); + } + + if (idexttype) { + /* create identity extension (USERFQDN) */ + struct sadb_ident *id; + int userfqdnlen; + + if (userfqdn) { + /* +1 for terminating-NUL */ + userfqdnlen = strlen(userfqdn) + 1; + } else + userfqdnlen = 0; + id = (struct sadb_ident *)p; + bzero(id, sizeof(*id) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(userfqdnlen)); + id->sadb_ident_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(*id) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(userfqdnlen)); + id->sadb_ident_exttype = idexttype; + id->sadb_ident_type = SADB_IDENTTYPE_USERFQDN; + /* XXX is it correct? */ + if (curproc && curproc->p_cred) + id->sadb_ident_id = curproc->p_cred->p_ruid; + if (userfqdn && userfqdnlen) + bcopy(userfqdn, id + 1, userfqdnlen); + p += sizeof(struct sadb_ident) + PFKEY_ALIGN8(userfqdnlen); + } +#endif + + /* XXX sensitivity (optional) */ + + /* create proposal/combination extension */ + m = key_getprop(saidx); +#if 0 + /* + * spec conformant: always attach proposal/combination extension, + * the problem is that we have no way to attach it for ipcomp, + * due to the way sadb_comb is declared in RFC2367. + */ + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); +#else + /* + * outside of spec; make proposal/combination extension optional. + */ + if (m) + m_cat(result, m); +#endif + + if ((result->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(NULL, result, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); + + fail: + if (result) + m_freem(result); + return error; +} + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE +static struct secacq * +key_newacq(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct secacq *newacq; + + /* get new entry */ + KMALLOC(newacq, struct secacq *, sizeof(struct secacq)); + if (newacq == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_newacq: No more memory.\n")); + return NULL; + } + bzero(newacq, sizeof(*newacq)); + + /* copy secindex */ + bcopy(saidx, &newacq->saidx, sizeof(newacq->saidx)); + newacq->seq = (acq_seq == ~0 ? 1 : ++acq_seq); +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + newacq->created = time_second; +#else + newacq->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + newacq->count = 0; + + return newacq; +} + +static struct secacq * +key_getacq(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + struct secacq *acq; + + LIST_FOREACH(acq, &acqtree, chain) { + if (key_cmpsaidx(saidx, &acq->saidx, CMP_EXACTLY)) + return acq; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static struct secacq * +key_getacqbyseq(seq) + u_int32_t seq; +{ + struct secacq *acq; + + LIST_FOREACH(acq, &acqtree, chain) { + if (acq->seq == seq) + return acq; + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif + +static struct secspacq * +key_newspacq(spidx) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + struct secspacq *acq; + + /* get new entry */ + KMALLOC(acq, struct secspacq *, sizeof(struct secspacq)); + if (acq == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_newspacq: No more memory.\n")); + return NULL; + } + bzero(acq, sizeof(*acq)); + + /* copy secindex */ + bcopy(spidx, &acq->spidx, sizeof(acq->spidx)); +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + acq->created = time_second; +#else + acq->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + acq->count = 1; + + return acq; +} + +static struct secspacq * +key_getspacq(spidx) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + struct secspacq *acq; + + LIST_FOREACH(acq, &spacqtree, chain) { + if (key_cmpspidx_exactly(spidx, &acq->spidx)) + return acq; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * SADB_ACQUIRE processing, + * in first situation, is receiving + * <base> + * from the ikmpd, and clear sequence of its secasvar entry. + * + * In second situation, is receiving + * <base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal> + * from a user land process, and return + * <base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal> + * to the socket. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_acquire2(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + const struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + struct secasindex saidx; + struct secashead *sah; + u_int16_t proto; + int error; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_acquire2: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* + * Error message from KMd. + * We assume that if error was occured in IKEd, the length of PFKEY + * message is equal to the size of sadb_msg structure. + * We do not raise error even if error occured in this function. + */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_len == PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) { +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + struct secacq *acq; + + /* check sequence number */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: must specify sequence number.\n")); + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + + if ((acq = key_getacqbyseq(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_seq)) == NULL) { + /* + * the specified larval SA is already gone, or we got + * a bogus sequence number. we can silently ignore it. + */ + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + + /* reset acq counter in order to deletion by timehander. */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + acq->created = time_second; +#else + acq->created = time.tv_sec; +#endif + acq->count = 0; +#endif + m_freem(m); + return 0; + } + + /* + * This message is from user land. + */ + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + if (mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] == NULL || + mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL] == NULL) { + /* error */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + if (mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] < sizeof(struct sadb_address) || + mhp->extlen[SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL] < sizeof(struct sadb_prop)) { + /* error */ + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: invalid message is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]; + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]; + + /* XXX boundary check against sa_len */ + KEY_SETSECASIDX(proto, IPSEC_MODE_ANY, 0, src0 + 1, dst0 + 1, &saidx); + + /* get a SA index */ + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (sah->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD) + continue; + if (key_cmpsaidx(&sah->saidx, &saidx, CMP_MODE_REQID)) + break; + } + if (sah != NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: a SA exists already.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EEXIST); + } + + error = key_acquire(&saidx, NULL); + if (error != 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_acquire2: error %d returned " + "from key_acquire.\n", mhp->msg->sadb_msg_errno)); + return key_senderror(so, m, error); + } + + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); +} + +/* + * SADB_REGISTER processing. + * If SATYPE_UNSPEC has been passed as satype, only return sabd_supported. + * receive + * <base> + * from the ikmpd, and register a socket to send PF_KEY messages, + * and send + * <base, supported> + * to KMD by PF_KEY. + * If socket is detached, must free from regnode. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_register(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct secreg *reg, *newreg = 0; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_register: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* check for invalid register message */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype >= sizeof(regtree)/sizeof(regtree[0])) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + + /* When SATYPE_UNSPEC is specified, only return sabd_supported. */ + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype == SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC) + goto setmsg; + + /* check whether existing or not */ + LIST_FOREACH(reg, ®tree[mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype], chain) { + if (reg->so == so) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_register: socket exists already.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EEXIST); + } + } + + /* create regnode */ + KMALLOC(newreg, struct secreg *, sizeof(*newreg)); + if (newreg == NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_register: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + bzero((caddr_t)newreg, sizeof(*newreg)); + + newreg->so = so; + ((struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so))->kp_registered++; + + /* add regnode to regtree. */ + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(®tree[mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype], newreg, chain); + + setmsg: + { + struct mbuf *n; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + struct sadb_supported *sup; + u_int len, alen, elen; + int off; + int i; + struct sadb_alg *alg; + + /* create new sadb_msg to reply. */ + alen = 0; + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_AALG_MAX; i++) { + if (ah_algorithm_lookup(i)) + alen += sizeof(struct sadb_alg); + } + if (alen) + alen += sizeof(struct sadb_supported); + elen = 0; +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_EALG_MAX; i++) { + if (esp_algorithm_lookup(i)) + elen += sizeof(struct sadb_alg); + } + if (elen) + elen += sizeof(struct sadb_supported); +#endif + + len = sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + alen + elen; + + if (len > MCLBYTES) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (len > MHLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_freem(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + n->m_pkthdr.len = n->m_len = len; + n->m_next = NULL; + off = 0; + + m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + newmsg = mtod(n, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(len); + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + + /* for authentication algorithm */ + if (alen) { + sup = (struct sadb_supported *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + sup->sadb_supported_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(alen); + sup->sadb_supported_exttype = SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH; + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*sup)); + + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_AALG_MAX; i++) { + const struct ah_algorithm *aalgo; + + aalgo = ah_algorithm_lookup(i); + if (!aalgo) + continue; + alg = (struct sadb_alg *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + alg->sadb_alg_id = i; + alg->sadb_alg_ivlen = 0; + alg->sadb_alg_minbits = aalgo->keymin; + alg->sadb_alg_maxbits = aalgo->keymax; + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*alg)); + } + } + +#ifdef IPSEC_ESP + /* for encryption algorithm */ + if (elen) { + sup = (struct sadb_supported *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + sup->sadb_supported_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(elen); + sup->sadb_supported_exttype = SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT; + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*sup)); + + for (i = 1; i <= SADB_EALG_MAX; i++) { + const struct esp_algorithm *ealgo; + + ealgo = esp_algorithm_lookup(i); + if (!ealgo) + continue; + alg = (struct sadb_alg *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + off); + alg->sadb_alg_id = i; + if (ealgo && ealgo->ivlen) { + /* + * give NULL to get the value preferred by + * algorithm XXX SADB_X_EXT_DERIV ? + */ + alg->sadb_alg_ivlen = + (*ealgo->ivlen)(ealgo, NULL); + } else + alg->sadb_alg_ivlen = 0; + alg->sadb_alg_minbits = ealgo->keymin; + alg->sadb_alg_maxbits = ealgo->keymax; + off += PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_alg)); + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef DIGAGNOSTIC + if (off != len) + panic("length assumption failed in key_register"); +#endif + + m_freem(m); + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); + } +} + +/* + * free secreg entry registered. + * XXX: I want to do free a socket marked done SADB_RESIGER to socket. + */ +void +key_freereg(so) + struct socket *so; +{ + struct secreg *reg; + int i; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL) + panic("key_freereg: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* + * check whether existing or not. + * check all type of SA, because there is a potential that + * one socket is registered to multiple type of SA. + */ + for (i = 0; i <= SADB_SATYPE_MAX; i++) { + LIST_FOREACH(reg, ®tree[i], chain) { + if (reg->so == so + && __LIST_CHAINED(reg)) { + LIST_REMOVE(reg, chain); + KFREE(reg); + break; + } + } + } + + return; +} + +/* + * SADB_EXPIRE processing + * send + * <base, SA, SA2, lifetime(C and one of HS), address(SD)> + * to KMD by PF_KEY. + * NOTE: We send only soft lifetime extension. + * + * OUT: 0 : succeed + * others : error number + */ +static int +key_expire(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + int s; + int satype; + struct mbuf *result = NULL, *m; + int len; + int error = -1; + struct sadb_lifetime *lt; + + /* XXX: Why do we lock ? */ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#else + s = splnet(); /*called from softclock()*/ +#endif + + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("key_expire: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + if (sav->sah == NULL) + panic("key_expire: Why was SA index in SA NULL.\n"); + if ((satype = key_proto2satype(sav->sah->saidx.proto)) == 0) + panic("key_expire: invalid proto is passed.\n"); + + /* set msg header */ + m = key_setsadbmsg(SADB_EXPIRE, 0, satype, sav->seq, 0, sav->refcnt); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + result = m; + + /* create SA extension */ + m = key_setsadbsa(sav); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* create SA extension */ + m = key_setsadbxsa2(sav->sah->saidx.mode, + sav->replay ? sav->replay->count : 0, + sav->sah->saidx.reqid); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* create lifetime extension (current and soft) */ + len = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(*lt)) * 2; + m = key_alloc_mbuf(len); + if (!m || m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + if (m) + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + bzero(mtod(m, caddr_t), len); + lt = mtod(m, struct sadb_lifetime *); + lt->sadb_lifetime_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)); + lt->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT; + lt->sadb_lifetime_allocations = sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_allocations; + lt->sadb_lifetime_bytes = sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_bytes; + lt->sadb_lifetime_addtime = sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_addtime; + lt->sadb_lifetime_usetime = sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_usetime; + lt = (struct sadb_lifetime *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + len / 2); + bcopy(sav->lft_s, lt, sizeof(*lt)); + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set sadb_address for source */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.src, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + /* set sadb_address for destination */ + m = key_setsadbaddr(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, + (struct sockaddr *)&sav->sah->saidx.dst, + FULLMASK, IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + m_cat(result, m); + + if ((result->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) { + error = EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + if (result->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + result = m_pullup(result, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (result == NULL) { + error = ENOBUFS; + goto fail; + } + } + + result->m_pkthdr.len = 0; + for (m = result; m; m = m->m_next) + result->m_pkthdr.len += m->m_len; + + mtod(result, struct sadb_msg *)->sadb_msg_len = + PFKEY_UNIT64(result->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(NULL, result, KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED); + + fail: + if (result) + m_freem(result); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * SADB_FLUSH processing + * receive + * <base> + * from the ikmpd, and free all entries in secastree. + * and send, + * <base> + * to the ikmpd. + * NOTE: to do is only marking SADB_SASTATE_DEAD. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_flush(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + struct secashead *sah, *nextsah; + struct secasvar *sav, *nextsav; + u_int16_t proto; + u_int8_t state; + u_int stateidx; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_flush: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_flush: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* no SATYPE specified, i.e. flushing all SA. */ + for (sah = LIST_FIRST(&sahtree); + sah != NULL; + sah = nextsah) { + nextsah = LIST_NEXT(sah, chain); + + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC + && proto != sah->saidx.proto) + continue; + + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_alive); + stateidx++) { + state = saorder_state_any[stateidx]; + for (sav = LIST_FIRST(&sah->savtree[state]); + sav != NULL; + sav = nextsav) { + + nextsav = LIST_NEXT(sav, chain); + + key_sa_chgstate(sav, SADB_SASTATE_DEAD); + key_freesav(sav); + } + } + + sah->state = SADB_SASTATE_DEAD; + } + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg) || + sizeof(struct sadb_msg) > m->m_len + M_TRAILINGSPACE(m)) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_flush: No more memory.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + } + + if (m->m_next) + m_freem(m->m_next); + m->m_next = NULL; + m->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_len = sizeof(struct sadb_msg); + newmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + newmsg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + newmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len); + + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); +} + +/* + * SADB_DUMP processing + * dump all entries including status of DEAD in SAD. + * receive + * <base> + * from the ikmpd, and dump all secasvar leaves + * and send, + * <base> ..... + * to the ikmpd. + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_dump(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int16_t proto; + u_int stateidx; + u_int8_t satype; + u_int8_t state; + int cnt; + struct sadb_msg *newmsg; + struct mbuf *n; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_dump: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + /* map satype to proto */ + if ((proto = key_satype2proto(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_dump: invalid satype is passed.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* count sav entries to be sent to the userland. */ + cnt = 0; + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC + && proto != sah->saidx.proto) + continue; + + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_any); + stateidx++) { + state = saorder_state_any[stateidx]; + LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { + cnt++; + } + } + } + + if (cnt == 0) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOENT); + + /* send this to the userland, one at a time. */ + newmsg = NULL; + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + if (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC + && proto != sah->saidx.proto) + continue; + + /* map proto to satype */ + if ((satype = key_proto2satype(sah->saidx.proto)) == 0) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_dump: there was invalid proto in SAD.\n")); + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + for (stateidx = 0; + stateidx < _ARRAYLEN(saorder_state_any); + stateidx++) { + state = saorder_state_any[stateidx]; + LIST_FOREACH(sav, &sah->savtree[state], chain) { + n = key_setdumpsa(sav, SADB_DUMP, satype, + --cnt, mhp->msg->sadb_msg_pid); + if (!n) + return key_senderror(so, m, ENOBUFS); + + key_sendup_mbuf(so, n, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); + } + } + } + + m_freem(m); + return 0; +} + +/* + * SADB_X_PROMISC processing + * + * m will always be freed. + */ +static int +key_promisc(so, m, mhp) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + const struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + int olen; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == NULL || m == NULL || mhp == NULL || mhp->msg == NULL) + panic("key_promisc: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + + olen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_len); + + if (olen < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { +#if 1 + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); +#else + m_freem(m); + return 0; +#endif + } else if (olen == sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + /* enable/disable promisc mode */ + struct keycb *kp; + + if ((kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so)) == NULL) + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + switch (mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype) { + case 0: + case 1: + kp->kp_promisc = mhp->msg->sadb_msg_satype; + break; + default: + return key_senderror(so, m, EINVAL); + } + + /* send the original message back to everyone */ + mhp->msg->sadb_msg_errno = 0; + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } else { + /* send packet as is */ + + m_adj(m, PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_msg))); + + /* TODO: if sadb_msg_seq is specified, send to specific pid */ + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ALL); + } +} + +static int (*key_typesw[]) __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *, + const struct sadb_msghdr *)) = { + NULL, /* SADB_RESERVED */ + key_getspi, /* SADB_GETSPI */ + key_update, /* SADB_UPDATE */ + key_add, /* SADB_ADD */ + key_delete, /* SADB_DELETE */ + key_get, /* SADB_GET */ + key_acquire2, /* SADB_ACQUIRE */ + key_register, /* SADB_REGISTER */ + NULL, /* SADB_EXPIRE */ + key_flush, /* SADB_FLUSH */ + key_dump, /* SADB_DUMP */ + key_promisc, /* SADB_X_PROMISC */ + NULL, /* SADB_X_PCHANGE */ + key_spdadd, /* SADB_X_SPDUPDATE */ + key_spdadd, /* SADB_X_SPDADD */ + key_spddelete, /* SADB_X_SPDDELETE */ + key_spdget, /* SADB_X_SPDGET */ + NULL, /* SADB_X_SPDACQUIRE */ + key_spddump, /* SADB_X_SPDDUMP */ + key_spdflush, /* SADB_X_SPDFLUSH */ + key_spdadd, /* SADB_X_SPDSETIDX */ + NULL, /* SADB_X_SPDEXPIRE */ + key_spddelete2, /* SADB_X_SPDDELETE2 */ +}; + +/* + * parse sadb_msg buffer to process PFKEYv2, + * and create a data to response if needed. + * I think to be dealed with mbuf directly. + * IN: + * msgp : pointer to pointer to a received buffer pulluped. + * This is rewrited to response. + * so : pointer to socket. + * OUT: + * length for buffer to send to user process. + */ +int +key_parse(m, so) + struct mbuf *m; + struct socket *so; +{ + struct sadb_msg *msg; + struct sadb_msghdr mh; + u_int orglen; + int error; + int target; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || so == NULL) + panic("key_parse: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + +#if 0 /*kdebug_sadb assumes msg in linear buffer*/ + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: passed sadb_msg\n")); + kdebug_sadb(msg)); +#endif + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (!m) + return ENOBUFS; + } + msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + orglen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len); + target = KEY_SENDUP_ONE; + + if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0 || + m->m_pkthdr.len != m->m_pkthdr.len) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: invalid message length.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invlen++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + if (msg->sadb_msg_version != PF_KEY_V2) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_parse: PF_KEY version %u is mismatched.\n", + msg->sadb_msg_version)); + pfkeystat.out_invver++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + if (msg->sadb_msg_type > SADB_MAX) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: invalid type %u is passed.\n", + msg->sadb_msg_type)); + pfkeystat.out_invmsgtype++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + /* for old-fashioned code - should be nuked */ + if (m->m_pkthdr.len > MCLBYTES) { + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + if (m->m_next) { + struct mbuf *n; + + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && m->m_pkthdr.len > MHLEN) { + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + n = NULL; + } + } + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + m_copydata(m, 0, m->m_pkthdr.len, mtod(n, caddr_t)); + n->m_pkthdr.len = n->m_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; + n->m_next = NULL; + m_freem(m); + m = n; + } + + /* align the mbuf chain so that extensions are in contiguous region. */ + error = key_align(m, &mh); + if (error) + return error; + + if (m->m_next) { /*XXX*/ + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + + msg = mh.msg; + + /* check SA type */ + switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype) { + case SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC: + switch (msg->sadb_msg_type) { + case SADB_GETSPI: + case SADB_UPDATE: + case SADB_ADD: + case SADB_DELETE: + case SADB_GET: + case SADB_ACQUIRE: + case SADB_EXPIRE: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: must specify satype " + "when msg type=%u.\n", msg->sadb_msg_type)); + pfkeystat.out_invsatype++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + break; + case SADB_SATYPE_AH: + case SADB_SATYPE_ESP: + case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP: + switch (msg->sadb_msg_type) { + case SADB_X_SPDADD: + case SADB_X_SPDDELETE: + case SADB_X_SPDGET: + case SADB_X_SPDDUMP: + case SADB_X_SPDFLUSH: + case SADB_X_SPDSETIDX: + case SADB_X_SPDUPDATE: + case SADB_X_SPDDELETE2: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: illegal satype=%u\n", + msg->sadb_msg_type)); + pfkeystat.out_invsatype++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + break; + case SADB_SATYPE_RSVP: + case SADB_SATYPE_OSPFV2: + case SADB_SATYPE_RIPV2: + case SADB_SATYPE_MIP: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: type %u isn't supported.\n", + msg->sadb_msg_satype)); + pfkeystat.out_invsatype++; + error = EOPNOTSUPP; + goto senderror; + case 1: /* XXX: What does it do? */ + if (msg->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_PROMISC) + break; + /*FALLTHROUGH*/ + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: invalid type %u is passed.\n", + msg->sadb_msg_satype)); + pfkeystat.out_invsatype++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + /* check field of upper layer protocol and address family */ + if (mh.ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC] != NULL + && mh.ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST] != NULL) { + struct sadb_address *src0, *dst0; + u_int plen; + + src0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mh.ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC]); + dst0 = (struct sadb_address *)(mh.ext[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST]); + + /* check upper layer protocol */ + if (src0->sadb_address_proto != dst0->sadb_address_proto) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: upper layer protocol mismatched.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + /* check family */ + if (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_family != + PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(dst0)->sa_family) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "key_parse: address family mismatched.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + if (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_len != + PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(dst0)->sa_len) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_parse: address struct size mismatched.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + switch (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_len != + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_parse: unsupported address family.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + goto senderror; + } + + switch (PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(src0)->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + plen = sizeof(struct in_addr) << 3; + break; + case AF_INET6: + plen = sizeof(struct in6_addr) << 3; + break; + default: + plen = 0; /*fool gcc*/ + break; + } + + /* check max prefix length */ + if (src0->sadb_address_prefixlen > plen || + dst0->sadb_address_prefixlen > plen) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_parse: illegal prefixlen.\n")); + pfkeystat.out_invaddr++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + /* + * prefixlen == 0 is valid because there can be a case when + * all addresses are matched. + */ + } + + if (msg->sadb_msg_type >= sizeof(key_typesw)/sizeof(key_typesw[0]) || + key_typesw[msg->sadb_msg_type] == NULL) { + pfkeystat.out_invmsgtype++; + error = EINVAL; + goto senderror; + } + + return (*key_typesw[msg->sadb_msg_type])(so, m, &mh); + +senderror: + msg->sadb_msg_errno = error; + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target); +} + +static int +key_senderror(so, m, code) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + int code; +{ + struct sadb_msg *msg; + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) + panic("invalid mbuf passed to key_senderror"); + + msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + msg->sadb_msg_errno = code; + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, KEY_SENDUP_ONE); +} + +/* + * set the pointer to each header into message buffer. + * m will be freed on error. + * XXX larger-than-MCLBYTES extension? + */ +static int +key_align(m, mhp) + struct mbuf *m; + struct sadb_msghdr *mhp; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct sadb_ext *ext; + size_t off, end; + int extlen; + int toff; + + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL || mhp == NULL) + panic("key_align: NULL pointer is passed.\n"); + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) + panic("invalid mbuf passed to key_align"); + + /* initialize */ + bzero(mhp, sizeof(*mhp)); + + mhp->msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + mhp->ext[0] = (struct sadb_ext *)mhp->msg; /*XXX backward compat */ + + end = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(mhp->msg->sadb_msg_len); + extlen = end; /*just in case extlen is not updated*/ + for (off = sizeof(struct sadb_msg); off < end; off += extlen) { + n = m_pulldown(m, off, sizeof(struct sadb_ext), &toff); + if (!n) { + /* m is already freed */ + return ENOBUFS; + } + ext = (struct sadb_ext *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + toff); + + /* set pointer */ + switch (ext->sadb_ext_type) { + case SADB_EXT_SA: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY: + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT: + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD: + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT: + case SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH: + case SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST: + case SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY: + case SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL: + case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH: + case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT: + case SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE: + case SADB_X_EXT_POLICY: + case SADB_X_EXT_SA2: + /* duplicate check */ + /* + * XXX Are there duplication payloads of either + * KEY_AUTH or KEY_ENCRYPT ? + */ + if (mhp->ext[ext->sadb_ext_type] != NULL) { + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_align: duplicate ext_type %u " + "is passed.\n", ext->sadb_ext_type)); + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.out_dupext++; + return EINVAL; + } + break; + default: + ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, + "key_align: invalid ext_type %u is passed.\n", + ext->sadb_ext_type)); + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.out_invexttype++; + return EINVAL; + } + + extlen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(ext->sadb_ext_len); + + if (key_validate_ext(ext, extlen)) { + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.out_invlen++; + return EINVAL; + } + + n = m_pulldown(m, off, extlen, &toff); + if (!n) { + /* m is already freed */ + return ENOBUFS; + } + ext = (struct sadb_ext *)(mtod(n, caddr_t) + toff); + + mhp->ext[ext->sadb_ext_type] = ext; + mhp->extoff[ext->sadb_ext_type] = off; + mhp->extlen[ext->sadb_ext_type] = extlen; + } + + if (off != end) { + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.out_invlen++; + return EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +key_validate_ext(ext, len) + const struct sadb_ext *ext; + int len; +{ + struct sockaddr *sa; + enum { NONE, ADDR } checktype = NONE; + int baselen = 0; + const int sal = offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_len) + sizeof(sa->sa_len); + + if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(ext->sadb_ext_len)) + return EINVAL; + + /* if it does not match minimum/maximum length, bail */ + if (ext->sadb_ext_type >= sizeof(minsize) / sizeof(minsize[0]) || + ext->sadb_ext_type >= sizeof(maxsize) / sizeof(maxsize[0])) + return EINVAL; + if (!minsize[ext->sadb_ext_type] || len < minsize[ext->sadb_ext_type]) + return EINVAL; + if (maxsize[ext->sadb_ext_type] && len > maxsize[ext->sadb_ext_type]) + return EINVAL; + + /* more checks based on sadb_ext_type XXX need more */ + switch (ext->sadb_ext_type) { + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY: + baselen = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_address)); + checktype = ADDR; + break; + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST: + if (((struct sadb_ident *)ext)->sadb_ident_type == + SADB_X_IDENTTYPE_ADDR) { + baselen = PFKEY_ALIGN8(sizeof(struct sadb_ident)); + checktype = ADDR; + } else + checktype = NONE; + break; + default: + checktype = NONE; + break; + } + + switch (checktype) { + case NONE: + break; + case ADDR: + sa = (struct sockaddr *)((caddr_t)ext + baselen); + if (len < baselen + sal) + return EINVAL; + if (baselen + PFKEY_ALIGN8(sa->sa_len) != len) + return EINVAL; + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +void +key_init() +{ + int i; + + bzero((caddr_t)&key_cb, sizeof(key_cb)); + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + callout_init(&key_timehandler_ch); +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < IPSEC_DIR_MAX; i++) { + LIST_INIT(&sptree[i]); + } + + LIST_INIT(&sahtree); + + for (i = 0; i <= SADB_SATYPE_MAX; i++) { + LIST_INIT(®tree[i]); + } + +#ifndef IPSEC_NONBLOCK_ACQUIRE + LIST_INIT(&acqtree); +#endif + LIST_INIT(&spacqtree); + + /* system default */ +#ifdef INET + ip4_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + ip4_def_policy.refcnt++; /*never reclaim this*/ +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + ip6_def_policy.policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE; + ip6_def_policy.refcnt++; /*never reclaim this*/ +#endif + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + callout_reset(&key_timehandler_ch, hz, + (void *)key_timehandler, (void *)0); +#else + timeout((void *)key_timehandler, (void *)0, hz); +#endif + + /* initialize key statistics */ + keystat.getspi_count = 1; + + printf("IPsec: Initialized Security Association Processing.\n"); + + return; +} + +/* + * XXX: maybe This function is called after INBOUND IPsec processing. + * + * Special check for tunnel-mode packets. + * We must make some checks for consistency between inner and outer IP header. + * + * xxx more checks to be provided + */ +int +key_checktunnelsanity(sav, family, src, dst) + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int family; + caddr_t src; + caddr_t dst; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sav->sah == NULL) + panic("sav->sah == NULL at key_checktunnelsanity"); + + /* XXX: check inner IP header */ + + return 1; +} + +#if 0 +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#define hostnamelen strlen(hostname) +#endif + +/* + * Get FQDN for the host. + * If the administrator configured hostname (by hostname(1)) without + * domain name, returns nothing. + */ +static const char * +key_getfqdn() +{ + int i; + int hasdot; + static char fqdn[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; + + if (!hostnamelen) + return NULL; + + /* check if it comes with domain name. */ + hasdot = 0; + for (i = 0; i < hostnamelen; i++) { + if (hostname[i] == '.') + hasdot++; + } + if (!hasdot) + return NULL; + + /* NOTE: hostname may not be NUL-terminated. */ + bzero(fqdn, sizeof(fqdn)); + bcopy(hostname, fqdn, hostnamelen); + fqdn[hostnamelen] = '\0'; + return fqdn; +} + +/* + * get username@FQDN for the host/user. + */ +static const char * +key_getuserfqdn() +{ + const char *host; + static char userfqdn[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + MAXLOGNAME + 2]; + struct proc *p = curproc; + char *q; + + if (!p || !p->p_pgrp || !p->p_pgrp->pg_session) + return NULL; + if (!(host = key_getfqdn())) + return NULL; + + /* NOTE: s_login may not be-NUL terminated. */ + bzero(userfqdn, sizeof(userfqdn)); + bcopy(p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login, userfqdn, MAXLOGNAME); + userfqdn[MAXLOGNAME] = '\0'; /* safeguard */ + q = userfqdn + strlen(userfqdn); + *q++ = '@'; + bcopy(host, q, strlen(host)); + q += strlen(host); + *q++ = '\0'; + + return userfqdn; +} +#endif + +/* record data transfer on SA, and update timestamps */ +void +key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m) + struct secasvar *sav; + struct mbuf *m; +{ + if (!sav) + panic("key_sa_recordxfer called with sav == NULL"); + if (!m) + panic("key_sa_recordxfer called with m == NULL"); + if (!sav->lft_c) + return; + + /* + * XXX Currently, there is a difference of bytes size + * between inbound and outbound processing. + */ + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len; + /* to check bytes lifetime is done in key_timehandler(). */ + + /* + * We use the number of packets as the unit of + * sadb_lifetime_allocations. We increment the variable + * whenever {esp,ah}_{in,out}put is called. + */ + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_allocations++; + /* XXX check for expires? */ + + /* + * NOTE: We record CURRENT sadb_lifetime_usetime by using wall clock, + * in seconds. HARD and SOFT lifetime are measured by the time + * difference (again in seconds) from sadb_lifetime_usetime. + * + * usetime + * v expire expire + * -----+-----+--------+---> t + * <--------------> HARD + * <-----> SOFT + */ + { +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_usetime = time_second; +#else + sav->lft_c->sadb_lifetime_usetime = time.tv_sec; +#endif + /* XXX check for expires? */ + } + + return; +} + +/* dumb version */ +void +key_sa_routechange(dst) + struct sockaddr *dst; +{ + struct secashead *sah; + struct route *ro; + + LIST_FOREACH(sah, &sahtree, chain) { + ro = &sah->sa_route; + if (ro->ro_rt && dst->sa_len == ro->ro_dst.sa_len + && bcmp(dst, &ro->ro_dst, dst->sa_len) == 0) { + RTFREE(ro->ro_rt); + ro->ro_rt = (struct rtentry *)NULL; + } + } + + return; +} + +static void +key_sa_chgstate(sav, state) + struct secasvar *sav; + u_int8_t state; +{ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("key_sa_chgstate called with sav == NULL"); + + if (sav->state == state) + return; + + if (__LIST_CHAINED(sav)) + LIST_REMOVE(sav, chain); + + sav->state = state; + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&sav->sah->savtree[state], sav, chain); +} + +void +key_sa_stir_iv(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + + if (!sav->iv) + panic("key_sa_stir_iv called with sav == NULL"); + key_randomfill(sav->iv, sav->ivlen); +} + +/* XXX too much? */ +static struct mbuf * +key_alloc_mbuf(l) + int l; +{ + struct mbuf *m = NULL, *n; + int len, t; + + len = l; + while (len > 0) { + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + if (n && len > MLEN) + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if (!n) { + m_freem(m); + return NULL; + } + + n->m_next = NULL; + n->m_len = 0; + n->m_len = M_TRAILINGSPACE(n); + /* use the bottom of mbuf, hoping we can prepend afterwards */ + if (n->m_len > len) { + t = (n->m_len - len) & ~(sizeof(long) - 1); + n->m_data += t; + n->m_len = len; + } + + len -= n->m_len; + + if (m) + m_cat(m, n); + else + m = n; + } + + return m; +} + +#ifdef __bsdi__ +#include <sys/user.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> + +int *key_sysvars[] = KEYCTL_VARS; + +int +key_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + if (name[0] >= KEYCTL_MAXID) + return EOPNOTSUPP; + switch (name[0]) { + case KEYCTL_DEBUG_LEVEL: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_debug_level); + default: + return sysctl_int_arr(key_sysvars, name, namelen, + oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen); + } +} +#endif /*__bsdi__*/ + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ +#include <vm/vm.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> + +int +key_sysctl(name, namelen, oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen) + int *name; + u_int namelen; + void *oldp; + size_t *oldlenp; + void *newp; + size_t newlen; +{ + if (name[0] >= KEYCTL_MAXID) + return EOPNOTSUPP; + switch (name[0]) { + case KEYCTL_DEBUG_LEVEL: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_debug_level); + case KEYCTL_SPI_TRY: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_spi_trycnt); + case KEYCTL_SPI_MIN_VALUE: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_spi_minval); + case KEYCTL_SPI_MAX_VALUE: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_spi_maxval); + case KEYCTL_RANDOM_INT: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_int_random); + case KEYCTL_LARVAL_LIFETIME: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_larval_lifetime); + case KEYCTL_BLOCKACQ_COUNT: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_blockacq_count); + case KEYCTL_BLOCKACQ_LIFETIME: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_blockacq_lifetime); + case KEYCTL_ESP_KEYMIN: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ipsec_esp_keymin); + case KEYCTL_ESP_AUTH: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ipsec_esp_auth); + case KEYCTL_AH_KEYMIN: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &ipsec_ah_keymin); + case KEYCTL_PREFERED_OLDSA: + return sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen, + &key_preferred_oldsa); + default: + return EOPNOTSUPP; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} +#endif /*__NetBSD__*/
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netkey/key_debug.c @@ -0,0 +1,762 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netkey/key_debug.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: key_debug.c,v 1.29 2001/08/16 14:25:41 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#ifdef _KERNEL +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> +#endif +#include <sys/socket.h> + +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netkey/key_var.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> + +#ifndef _KERNEL +#include <ctype.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#endif /* !_KERNEL */ + +static void kdebug_sadb_prop __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_identity __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_supported __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_lifetime __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_sa __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_address __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_key __P((struct sadb_ext *)); +static void kdebug_sadb_x_sa2 __P((struct sadb_ext *)); + +#ifdef _KERNEL +static void kdebug_secreplay __P((struct secreplay *)); +#endif + +#ifndef _KERNEL +#define panic(param) { printf(param); exit(1); } +#endif + +/* NOTE: host byte order */ + +/* %%%: about struct sadb_msg */ +void +kdebug_sadb(base) + struct sadb_msg *base; +{ + struct sadb_ext *ext; + int tlen, extlen; + + /* sanity check */ + if (base == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_msg{ version=%u type=%u errno=%u satype=%u\n", + base->sadb_msg_version, base->sadb_msg_type, + base->sadb_msg_errno, base->sadb_msg_satype); + printf(" len=%u reserved=%u seq=%u pid=%u\n", + base->sadb_msg_len, base->sadb_msg_reserved, + base->sadb_msg_seq, base->sadb_msg_pid); + + tlen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(base->sadb_msg_len) - sizeof(struct sadb_msg); + ext = (struct sadb_ext *)((caddr_t)base + sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + + while (tlen > 0) { + printf("sadb_ext{ len=%u type=%u }\n", + ext->sadb_ext_len, ext->sadb_ext_type); + + if (ext->sadb_ext_len == 0) { + printf("kdebug_sadb: invalid ext_len=0 was passed.\n"); + return; + } + if (ext->sadb_ext_len > tlen) { + printf("kdebug_sadb: ext_len exceeds end of buffer.\n"); + return; + } + + switch (ext->sadb_ext_type) { + case SADB_EXT_SA: + kdebug_sadb_sa(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT: + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD: + case SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT: + kdebug_sadb_lifetime(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST: + case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY: + kdebug_sadb_address(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH: + case SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT: + kdebug_sadb_key(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC: + case SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST: + kdebug_sadb_identity(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY: + break; + case SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL: + kdebug_sadb_prop(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH: + case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT: + kdebug_sadb_supported(ext); + break; + case SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE: + case SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE: + break; + case SADB_X_EXT_POLICY: + kdebug_sadb_x_policy(ext); + break; + case SADB_X_EXT_SA2: + kdebug_sadb_x_sa2(ext); + break; + default: + printf("kdebug_sadb: invalid ext_type %u was passed.\n", + ext->sadb_ext_type); + return; + } + + extlen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(ext->sadb_ext_len); + tlen -= extlen; + ext = (struct sadb_ext *)((caddr_t)ext + extlen); + } + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_prop(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_prop *prop = (struct sadb_prop *)ext; + struct sadb_comb *comb; + int len; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_prop: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + len = (PFKEY_UNUNIT64(prop->sadb_prop_len) - sizeof(*prop)) + / sizeof(*comb); + comb = (struct sadb_comb *)(prop + 1); + printf("sadb_prop{ replay=%u\n", prop->sadb_prop_replay); + + while (len--) { + printf("sadb_comb{ auth=%u encrypt=%u " + "flags=0x%04x reserved=0x%08x\n", + comb->sadb_comb_auth, comb->sadb_comb_encrypt, + comb->sadb_comb_flags, comb->sadb_comb_reserved); + + printf(" auth_minbits=%u auth_maxbits=%u " + "encrypt_minbits=%u encrypt_maxbits=%u\n", + comb->sadb_comb_auth_minbits, + comb->sadb_comb_auth_maxbits, + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt_minbits, + comb->sadb_comb_encrypt_maxbits); + + printf(" soft_alloc=%u hard_alloc=%u " + "soft_bytes=%lu hard_bytes=%lu\n", + comb->sadb_comb_soft_allocations, + comb->sadb_comb_hard_allocations, + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_soft_bytes, + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_hard_bytes); + + printf(" soft_alloc=%lu hard_alloc=%lu " + "soft_bytes=%lu hard_bytes=%lu }\n", + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_soft_addtime, + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_hard_addtime, + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_soft_usetime, + (unsigned long)comb->sadb_comb_hard_usetime); + comb++; + } + printf("}\n"); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_identity(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_ident *id = (struct sadb_ident *)ext; + int len; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_identity: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + len = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(id->sadb_ident_len) - sizeof(*id); + printf("sadb_ident_%s{", + id->sadb_ident_exttype == SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC ? "src" : "dst"); + switch (id->sadb_ident_type) { + default: + printf(" type=%d id=%lu", + id->sadb_ident_type, (u_long)id->sadb_ident_id); + if (len) { +#ifdef _KERNEL + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)(id + 1), len); /*XXX cast ?*/ +#else + char *p, *ep; + printf("\n str=\""); + p = (char *)(id + 1); + ep = p + len; + for (/*nothing*/; *p && p < ep; p++) { + if (isprint(*p)) + printf("%c", *p & 0xff); + else + printf("\\%03o", *p & 0xff); + } +#endif + printf("\""); + } + break; + } + + printf(" }\n"); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_supported(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_supported *sup = (struct sadb_supported *)ext; + struct sadb_alg *alg; + int len; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_supported: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + len = (PFKEY_UNUNIT64(sup->sadb_supported_len) - sizeof(*sup)) + / sizeof(*alg); + alg = (struct sadb_alg *)(sup + 1); + printf("sadb_sup{\n"); + while (len--) { + printf(" { id=%d ivlen=%d min=%d max=%d }\n", + alg->sadb_alg_id, alg->sadb_alg_ivlen, + alg->sadb_alg_minbits, alg->sadb_alg_maxbits); + alg++; + } + printf("}\n"); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_lifetime(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_lifetime *lft = (struct sadb_lifetime *)ext; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + printf("kdebug_sadb_lifetime: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_lifetime{ alloc=%u, bytes=%u\n", + lft->sadb_lifetime_allocations, + (u_int32_t)lft->sadb_lifetime_bytes); + printf(" addtime=%u, usetime=%u }\n", + (u_int32_t)lft->sadb_lifetime_addtime, + (u_int32_t)lft->sadb_lifetime_usetime); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_sa(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_sa *sa = (struct sadb_sa *)ext; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_sa: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_sa{ spi=%u replay=%u state=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sa->sadb_sa_spi), sa->sadb_sa_replay, + sa->sadb_sa_state); + printf(" auth=%u encrypt=%u flags=0x%08x }\n", + sa->sadb_sa_auth, sa->sadb_sa_encrypt, sa->sadb_sa_flags); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_address(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_address *addr = (struct sadb_address *)ext; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_address: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_address{ proto=%u prefixlen=%u reserved=0x%02x%02x }\n", + addr->sadb_address_proto, addr->sadb_address_prefixlen, + ((u_char *)&addr->sadb_address_reserved)[0], + ((u_char *)&addr->sadb_address_reserved)[1]); + + kdebug_sockaddr((struct sockaddr *)((caddr_t)ext + sizeof(*addr))); + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_key(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_key *key = (struct sadb_key *)ext; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_key: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_key{ bits=%u reserved=%u\n", + key->sadb_key_bits, key->sadb_key_reserved); + printf(" key="); + + /* sanity check 2 */ + if ((key->sadb_key_bits >> 3) > + (PFKEY_UNUNIT64(key->sadb_key_len) - sizeof(struct sadb_key))) { + printf("kdebug_sadb_key: key length mismatch, bit:%d len:%ld.\n", + key->sadb_key_bits >> 3, + (long)PFKEY_UNUNIT64(key->sadb_key_len) - sizeof(struct sadb_key)); + } + + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)key + sizeof(struct sadb_key), + key->sadb_key_bits >> 3); + printf(" }\n"); + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_sadb_x_sa2(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_x_sa2 *sa2 = (struct sadb_x_sa2 *)ext; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_x_sa2: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_x_sa2{ mode=%u reqid=%u\n", + sa2->sadb_x_sa2_mode, sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reqid); + printf(" reserved1=%u reserved2=%u sequence=%u }\n", + sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reserved1, sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reserved2, + sa2->sadb_x_sa2_sequence); + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_sadb_x_policy(ext) + struct sadb_ext *ext; +{ + struct sadb_x_policy *xpl = (struct sadb_x_policy *)ext; + struct sockaddr *addr; + + /* sanity check */ + if (ext == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sadb_x_policy: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("sadb_x_policy{ type=%u dir=%u id=%x }\n", + xpl->sadb_x_policy_type, xpl->sadb_x_policy_dir, + xpl->sadb_x_policy_id); + + if (xpl->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC) { + int tlen; + struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *xisr; + + tlen = PFKEY_UNUNIT64(xpl->sadb_x_policy_len) - sizeof(*xpl); + xisr = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)(xpl + 1); + + while (tlen > 0) { + printf(" { len=%u proto=%u mode=%u level=%u reqid=%u\n", + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len, + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto, + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode, + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level, + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid); + + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len > sizeof(*xisr)) { + addr = (struct sockaddr *)(xisr + 1); + kdebug_sockaddr(addr); + addr = (struct sockaddr *)((caddr_t)addr + + addr->sa_len); + kdebug_sockaddr(addr); + } + + printf(" }\n"); + + /* prevent infinite loop */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len <= 0) { + printf("kdebug_sadb_x_policy: wrong policy struct.\n"); + return; + } + /* prevent overflow */ + if (xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len > tlen) { + printf("invalid ipsec policy length\n"); + return; + } + + tlen -= xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len; + + xisr = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)((caddr_t)xisr + + xisr->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len); + } + + if (tlen != 0) + panic("kdebug_sadb_x_policy: wrong policy struct.\n"); + } + + return; +} + +#ifdef _KERNEL +/* %%%: about SPD and SAD */ +void +kdebug_secpolicy(sp) + struct secpolicy *sp; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sp == NULL) + panic("kdebug_secpolicy: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("secpolicy{ refcnt=%u state=%u policy=%u\n", + sp->refcnt, sp->state, sp->policy); + + kdebug_secpolicyindex(&sp->spidx); + + switch (sp->policy) { + case IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD: + printf(" type=discard }\n"); + break; + case IPSEC_POLICY_NONE: + printf(" type=none }\n"); + break; + case IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC: + { + struct ipsecrequest *isr; + for (isr = sp->req; isr != NULL; isr = isr->next) { + + printf(" level=%u\n", isr->level); + kdebug_secasindex(&isr->saidx); + + if (isr->sav != NULL) + kdebug_secasv(isr->sav); + } + printf(" }\n"); + } + break; + case IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS: + printf(" type=bypass }\n"); + break; + case IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST: + printf(" type=entrust }\n"); + break; + default: + printf("kdebug_secpolicy: Invalid policy found. %d\n", + sp->policy); + break; + } + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_secpolicyindex(spidx) + struct secpolicyindex *spidx; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (spidx == NULL) + panic("kdebug_secpolicyindex: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("secpolicyindex{ dir=%u prefs=%u prefd=%u ul_proto=%u\n", + spidx->dir, spidx->prefs, spidx->prefd, spidx->ul_proto); + + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&spidx->src, + ((struct sockaddr *)&spidx->src)->sa_len); + printf("\n"); + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&spidx->dst, + ((struct sockaddr *)&spidx->dst)->sa_len); + printf("}\n"); + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_secasindex(saidx) + struct secasindex *saidx; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (saidx == NULL) + panic("kdebug_secpolicyindex: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("secasindex{ mode=%u proto=%u\n", + saidx->mode, saidx->proto); + + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&saidx->src, + ((struct sockaddr *)&saidx->src)->sa_len); + printf("\n"); + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&saidx->dst, + ((struct sockaddr *)&saidx->dst)->sa_len); + printf("\n"); + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_secasv(sav) + struct secasvar *sav; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (sav == NULL) + panic("kdebug_secasv: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf("secas{"); + kdebug_secasindex(&sav->sah->saidx); + + printf(" refcnt=%u state=%u auth=%u enc=%u\n", + sav->refcnt, sav->state, sav->alg_auth, sav->alg_enc); + printf(" spi=%u flags=%u\n", + (u_int32_t)ntohl(sav->spi), sav->flags); + + if (sav->key_auth != NULL) + kdebug_sadb_key((struct sadb_ext *)sav->key_auth); + if (sav->key_enc != NULL) + kdebug_sadb_key((struct sadb_ext *)sav->key_enc); + if (sav->iv != NULL) { + printf(" iv="); + ipsec_hexdump(sav->iv, sav->ivlen ? sav->ivlen : 8); + printf("\n"); + } + + if (sav->replay != NULL) + kdebug_secreplay(sav->replay); + if (sav->lft_c != NULL) + kdebug_sadb_lifetime((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_c); + if (sav->lft_h != NULL) + kdebug_sadb_lifetime((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_h); + if (sav->lft_s != NULL) + kdebug_sadb_lifetime((struct sadb_ext *)sav->lft_s); + +#if defined (notyet) + /* XXX: misc[123] ? */ +#endif + + return; +} + +static void +kdebug_secreplay(rpl) + struct secreplay *rpl; +{ + int len, l; + + /* sanity check */ + if (rpl == NULL) + panic("kdebug_secreplay: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + printf(" secreplay{ count=%u wsize=%u seq=%u lastseq=%u", + rpl->count, rpl->wsize, rpl->seq, rpl->lastseq); + + if (rpl->bitmap == NULL) { + printf(" }\n"); + return; + } + + printf("\n bitmap { "); + + for (len = 0; len < rpl->wsize; len++) { + for (l = 7; l >= 0; l--) + printf("%u", (((rpl->bitmap)[len] >> l) & 1) ? 1 : 0); + } + printf(" }\n"); + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_mbufhdr(m) + struct mbuf *m; +{ + /* sanity check */ + if (m == NULL) + return; + + printf("mbuf(%p){ m_next:%p m_nextpkt:%p m_data:%p " + "m_len:%d m_type:0x%02x m_flags:0x%02x }\n", + m, m->m_next, m->m_nextpkt, m->m_data, + m->m_len, m->m_type, m->m_flags); + + if (m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) { + printf(" m_pkthdr{ len:%d rcvif:%p }\n", + m->m_pkthdr.len, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif); + } + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ + if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) { + printf(" m_ext{ ext_buf:%p ext_free:%p " + "ext_size:%u ext_ref:%p }\n", + m->m_ext.ext_buf, m->m_ext.ext_free, + m->m_ext.ext_size, m->m_ext.ext_ref); + } +#endif + + return; +} + +void +kdebug_mbuf(m0) + struct mbuf *m0; +{ + struct mbuf *m = m0; + int i, j; + + for (j = 0; m; m = m->m_next) { + kdebug_mbufhdr(m); + printf(" m_data:\n"); + for (i = 0; i < m->m_len; i++) { + if (i && i % 32 == 0) + printf("\n"); + if (i % 4 == 0) + printf(" "); + printf("%02x", mtod(m, u_char *)[i]); + j++; + } + printf("\n"); + } + + return; +} +#endif /* _KERNEL */ + +void +kdebug_sockaddr(addr) + struct sockaddr *addr; +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin4; +#ifdef INET6 + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; +#endif + + /* sanity check */ + if (addr == NULL) + panic("kdebug_sockaddr: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + /* NOTE: We deal with port number as host byte order. */ + printf("sockaddr{ len=%u family=%u", addr->sa_len, addr->sa_family); + + switch (addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + sin4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; + printf(" port=%u\n", ntohs(sin4->sin_port)); + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&sin4->sin_addr, sizeof(sin4->sin_addr)); + break; +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; + printf(" port=%u\n", ntohs(sin6->sin6_port)); + printf(" flowinfo=0x%08x, scope_id=0x%08x\n", + sin6->sin6_flowinfo, sin6->sin6_scope_id); + ipsec_hexdump((caddr_t)&sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)); + break; +#endif + } + + printf(" }\n"); + + return; +} + +void +ipsec_bindump(buf, len) + caddr_t buf; + int len; +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + printf("%c", (unsigned char)buf[i]); + + return; +} + + +void +ipsec_hexdump(buf, len) + caddr_t buf; + int len; +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i != 0 && i % 32 == 0) printf("\n"); + if (i % 4 == 0) printf(" "); + printf("%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]); + } +#if 0 + if (i % 32 != 0) printf("\n"); +#endif + + return; +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netkey/keydb.c @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netkey/keydb.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: keydb.c,v 1.64 2000/05/11 17:02:30 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> + +#include <net/pfkeyv2.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netinet6/ipsec.h> + +static void keydb_delsecasvar __P((struct secasvar *)); + +/* + * secpolicy management + */ +struct secpolicy * +keydb_newsecpolicy() +{ + struct secpolicy *p; + + p = (struct secpolicy *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (!p) + return p; + bzero(p, sizeof(*p)); + return p; +} + +void +keydb_delsecpolicy(p) + struct secpolicy *p; +{ + + free(p, M_SECA); +} + +/* + * secashead management + */ +struct secashead * +keydb_newsecashead() +{ + struct secashead *p; + int i; + + p = (struct secashead *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (!p) + return p; + bzero(p, sizeof(*p)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(p->savtree)/sizeof(p->savtree[0]); i++) + LIST_INIT(&p->savtree[i]); + return p; +} + +void +keydb_delsecashead(p) + struct secashead *p; +{ + + free(p, M_SECA); +} + +/* + * secasvar management (reference counted) + */ +struct secasvar * +keydb_newsecasvar() +{ + struct secasvar *p; + + p = (struct secasvar *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (!p) + return p; + bzero(p, sizeof(*p)); + p->refcnt = 1; + return p; +} + +void +keydb_refsecasvar(p) + struct secasvar *p; +{ + int s; + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + p->refcnt++; + splx(s); +} + +void +keydb_freesecasvar(p) + struct secasvar *p; +{ + int s; + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + p->refcnt--; + /* negative refcnt will cause panic intentionally */ + if (p->refcnt <= 0) + keydb_delsecasvar(p); + splx(s); +} + +static void +keydb_delsecasvar(p) + struct secasvar *p; +{ + + if (p->refcnt) + panic("keydb_delsecasvar called with refcnt != 0"); + + free(p, M_SECA); +} + +/* + * secreplay management + */ +struct secreplay * +keydb_newsecreplay(wsize) + size_t wsize; +{ + struct secreplay *p; + + p = (struct secreplay *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (!p) + return p; + + bzero(p, sizeof(*p)); + if (wsize != 0) { + p->bitmap = (caddr_t)malloc(wsize, M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (!p->bitmap) { + free(p, M_SECA); + return NULL; + } + bzero(p->bitmap, wsize); + } + p->wsize = wsize; + return p; +} + +void +keydb_delsecreplay(p) + struct secreplay *p; +{ + + if (p->bitmap) + free(p->bitmap, M_SECA); + free(p, M_SECA); +} + +/* + * secreg management + */ +struct secreg * +keydb_newsecreg() +{ + struct secreg *p; + + p = (struct secreg *)malloc(sizeof(*p), M_SECA, M_NOWAIT); + if (p) + bzero(p, sizeof(*p)); + return p; +} + +void +keydb_delsecreg(p) + struct secreg *p; +{ + + free(p, M_SECA); +}
new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/net/bsd_tcpip/current/src/sys/netkey/keysock.c @@ -0,0 +1,752 @@ +//========================================================================== +// +// src/sys/netkey/keysock.c +// +//========================================================================== +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTBEGIN#### +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +// Portions of this software may have been derived from OpenBSD, +// FreeBSD or other sources, and are covered by the appropriate +// copyright disclaimers included herein. +// +// Portions created by Red Hat are +// Copyright (C) 2002 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +// +// ------------------------------------------- +// +//####BSDCOPYRIGHTEND#### +//========================================================================== + +/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 20:07:41 itojun Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 +#include "opt_ipsec.h" +#endif + +/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#endif +#include <sys/mbuf.h> +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#endif +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/domain.h> +#include <sys/protosw.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#ifdef __NetBSD__ +#include <sys/proc.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> +#endif + +#include <net/raw_cb.h> +#include <net/route.h> + +#include <net/pfkeyv2.h> +#include <netkey/keydb.h> +#include <netkey/key.h> +#include <netkey/keysock.h> +#include <netkey/key_debug.h> + +struct sockaddr key_dst = { 2, PF_KEY, }; +struct sockaddr key_src = { 2, PF_KEY, }; + +static int key_sendup0 __P((struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int)); + +struct pfkeystat pfkeystat; + +#if !(defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3) +/* + * key_usrreq() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:route_usrreq() + */ +#ifndef __NetBSD__ +int +key_usrreq(so, req, m, nam, control) + struct socket *so; + int req; + struct mbuf *m, *nam, *control; +#else +int +key_usrreq(so, req, m, nam, control, p) + struct socket *so; + int req; + struct mbuf *m, *nam, *control; + struct proc *p; +#endif /*__NetBSD__*/ +{ + int error = 0; + struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so); + int s; + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + if (req == PRU_ATTACH) { + kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof(*kp), M_PCB, M_WAITOK); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp; + if (so->so_pcb) + bzero(so->so_pcb, sizeof(*kp)); + } + if (req == PRU_DETACH && kp) { + int af = kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol; + if (af == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */ + key_cb.key_count--; + key_cb.any_count--; + + key_freereg(so); + } + +#ifndef __NetBSD__ + error = raw_usrreq(so, req, m, nam, control); +#else + error = raw_usrreq(so, req, m, nam, control, p); +#endif + m = control = NULL; /* reclaimed in raw_usrreq */ + kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so); + if (req == PRU_ATTACH && kp) { + int af = kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol; + if (error) { + pfkeystat.sockerr++; + free((caddr_t)kp, M_PCB); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0; + splx(s); + return(error); + } + + kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0; + + if (af == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */ + key_cb.key_count++; + key_cb.any_count++; +#ifndef __bsdi__ + kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src; + kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst; +#else + /* + * XXX rcb_faddr must be dynamically allocated, otherwise + * raw_disconnect() will get angry. + */ + { + struct mbuf *m, *n; + MGET(m, M_WAITOK, MT_DATA); + if (!m) { + error = ENOBUFS; + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + free((caddr_t)kp, M_PCB); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0; + splx(s); + return(error); + } + MGET(n, M_WAITOK, MT_DATA); + if (!n) { + error = ENOBUFS; + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + free((caddr_t)kp, M_PCB); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0; + splx(s); + return(error); + } + m->m_len = sizeof(key_src); + kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = mtod(m, struct sockaddr *); + bcopy(&key_src, kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr, sizeof(key_src)); + n->m_len = sizeof(key_dst); + kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = mtod(n, struct sockaddr *); + bcopy(&key_dst, kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr, sizeof(key_dst)); + } +#endif + soisconnected(so); + so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK; + } + splx(s); + return(error); +} +#endif /* other than FreeBSD >= 3 */ + +/* + * key_output() + */ +int +#if __STDC__ +key_output(struct mbuf *m, ...) +#else +key_output(m, va_alist) + struct mbuf *m; + va_dcl +#endif +{ + struct sadb_msg *msg; + int len, error = 0; + int s; + struct socket *so; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, m); + so = va_arg(ap, struct socket *); + va_end(ap); + + if (m == 0) + panic("key_output: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + pfkeystat.out_total++; + pfkeystat.out_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len; + + len = m->m_pkthdr.len; + if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + pfkeystat.out_tooshort++; + error = EINVAL; + goto end; + } + + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == 0) { + pfkeystat.out_nomem++; + error = ENOBUFS; + goto end; + } + } + + if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) + panic("key_output: not M_PKTHDR ??"); + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m)); + + msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + pfkeystat.out_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++; + if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) { + pfkeystat.out_invlen++; + error = EINVAL; + goto end; + } + + /*XXX giant lock*/ +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + s = splsoftnet(); +#else + s = splnet(); +#endif + error = key_parse(m, so); + m = NULL; + splx(s); +end: + if (m) + m_freem(m); + return error; +} + +/* + * send message to the socket. + */ +static int +key_sendup0(rp, m, promisc) + struct rawcb *rp; + struct mbuf *m; + int promisc; +{ + int error; + + if (promisc) { + struct sadb_msg *pmsg; + + M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_NOWAIT); + if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (!m) { + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + m_freem(m); + return ENOBUFS; + } + m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(*pmsg); + + pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + bzero(pmsg, sizeof(*pmsg)); + pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2; + pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC; + pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len); + /* pid and seq? */ + + pfkeystat.in_msgtype[pmsg->sadb_msg_type]++; + } + + if (!sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv, (struct sockaddr *)&key_src, + m, NULL)) { + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + m_freem(m); + error = ENOBUFS; + } else + error = 0; + sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket); + return error; +} + +/* XXX this interface should be obsoleted. */ +int +key_sendup(so, msg, len, target) + struct socket *so; + struct sadb_msg *msg; + u_int len; + int target; /*target of the resulting message*/ +{ + struct mbuf *m, *n, *mprev; + int tlen; + + /* sanity check */ + if (so == 0 || msg == 0) + panic("key_sendup: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, + printf("key_sendup: \n"); + kdebug_sadb(msg)); + + /* + * we increment statistics here, just in case we have ENOBUFS + * in this function. + */ + pfkeystat.in_total++; + pfkeystat.in_bytes += len; + pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++; + + /* + * Get mbuf chain whenever possible (not clusters), + * to save socket buffer. We'll be generating many SADB_ACQUIRE + * messages to listening key sockets. If we simply allocate clusters, + * sbappendaddr() will raise ENOBUFS due to too little sbspace(). + * sbspace() computes # of actual data bytes AND mbuf region. + * + * TODO: SADB_ACQUIRE filters should be implemented. + */ + tlen = len; + m = mprev = NULL; + while (tlen > 0) { + if (tlen == len) { + MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + n->m_len = MHLEN; + } else { + MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA); + n->m_len = MLEN; + } + if (!n) { + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + return ENOBUFS; + } + if (tlen >= MCLBYTES) { /*XXX better threshold? */ + MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT); + if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) { + m_free(n); + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + return ENOBUFS; + } + n->m_len = MCLBYTES; + } + + if (tlen < n->m_len) + n->m_len = tlen; + n->m_next = NULL; + if (m == NULL) + m = mprev = n; + else { + mprev->m_next = n; + mprev = n; + } + tlen -= n->m_len; + n = NULL; + } + m->m_pkthdr.len = len; + m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL; + m_copyback(m, 0, len, (caddr_t)msg); + + /* avoid duplicated statistics */ + pfkeystat.in_total--; + pfkeystat.in_bytes -= len; + pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]--; + + return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target); +} + +/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */ +int +key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target) + struct socket *so; + struct mbuf *m; + int target; +{ + struct mbuf *n; + struct keycb *kp; + int sendup; + struct rawcb *rp; + int error = 0; + + if (m == NULL) + panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE) + panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n"); + + pfkeystat.in_total++; + pfkeystat.in_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len; + if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { +#if 1 + m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg)); + if (m == NULL) { + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + return ENOBUFS; + } +#else + /* don't bother pulling it up just for stats */ +#endif + } + if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) { + struct sadb_msg *msg; + msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *); + pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++; + } + +#ifdef __NetBSD__ + for (rp = rawcb.lh_first; rp; rp = rp->rcb_list.le_next) +#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + LIST_FOREACH(rp, &rawcb_list, list) +#else + for (rp = rawcb.rcb_next; rp != &rawcb; rp = rp->rcb_next) +#endif + { + if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY) + continue; + if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol + && rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) { + continue; + } + + kp = (struct keycb *)rp; + + /* + * If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted + * reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages. + * (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998) + */ + if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) { + if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) != NULL) { + (void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1); + n = NULL; + } + } + + /* the exact target will be processed later */ + if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp) + continue; + + sendup = 0; + switch (target) { + case KEY_SENDUP_ONE: + /* the statement has no effect */ + if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp) + sendup++; + break; + case KEY_SENDUP_ALL: + sendup++; + break; + case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED: + if (kp->kp_registered) + sendup++; + break; + } + pfkeystat.in_msgtarget[target]++; + + if (!sendup) + continue; + + if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) == NULL) { + m_freem(m); + pfkeystat.in_nomem++; + return ENOBUFS; + } + + if ((error = key_sendup0(rp, n, 0)) != 0) { + m_freem(m); + return error; + } + + n = NULL; + } + + if (so) { + error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0); + m = NULL; + } else { + error = 0; + m_freem(m); + } + return error; +} + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 +/* + * key_abort() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort() + */ +static int +key_abort(struct socket *so) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_attach() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach() + */ +static int +key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct proc *p) +{ + struct keycb *kp; + int s, error; + + if (sotorawcb(so) != 0) + return EISCONN; /* XXX panic? */ + kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK); /* XXX */ + if (kp == 0) + return ENOBUFS; + bzero(kp, sizeof *kp); + + /* + * The splnet() is necessary to block protocols from sending + * error notifications (like RTM_REDIRECT or RTM_LOSING) while + * this PCB is extant but incompletely initialized. + * Probably we should try to do more of this work beforehand and + * eliminate the spl. + */ + s = splnet(); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp; + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_attach(so, proto, p); + kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so); + if (error) { + free(kp, M_PCB); + so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0; + splx(s); + return error; + } + + kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0; + + if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */ + key_cb.key_count++; + key_cb.any_count++; + kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src; + kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst; + soisconnected(so); + so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK; + + splx(s); + return 0; +} + +/* + * key_bind() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind() + */ +static int +key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct proc *p) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_bind(so, nam, p); /* xxx just EINVAL */ + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_connect() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect() + */ +static int +key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct proc *p) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_connect(so, nam, p); /* XXX just EINVAL */ + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_detach() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach() + */ +static int +key_detach(struct socket *so) +{ + struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so); + int s, error; + + s = splnet(); + if (kp != 0) { + if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol + == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */ + key_cb.key_count--; + key_cb.any_count--; + + key_freereg(so); + } + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_disconnect() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect() + */ +static int +key_disconnect(struct socket *so) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_peeraddr() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr() + */ +static int +key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_send() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send() + */ +static int +key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam, + struct mbuf *control, struct proc *p) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, p); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_shutdown() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown() + */ +static int +key_shutdown(struct socket *so) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +/* + * key_sockaddr() + * derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr() + */ +static int +key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam) +{ + int s, error; + s = splnet(); + error = raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam); + splx(s); + return error; +} + +struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = { + key_abort, pru_accept_notsupp, key_attach, key_bind, + key_connect, + pru_connect2_notsupp, pru_control_notsupp, key_detach, + key_disconnect, pru_listen_notsupp, key_peeraddr, + pru_rcvd_notsupp, + pru_rcvoob_notsupp, key_send, pru_sense_null, key_shutdown, + key_sockaddr, sosend, soreceive, sopoll +}; +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ >= 3 */ + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +/* sysctl */ +SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family"); +#endif + +/* + * Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain. + */ + +extern struct domain keydomain; + +struct protosw keysw[] = { +{ SOCK_RAW, &keydomain, PF_KEY_V2, PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR, + 0, key_output, raw_ctlinput, 0, +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + 0, +#else + key_usrreq, +#endif + raw_init, 0, 0, 0, +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(__NetBSD__) + key_sysctl, +#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3 + &key_usrreqs +#endif +} +}; + +struct domain keydomain = + { PF_KEY, "key", key_init, 0, 0, + keysw, &keysw[sizeof(keysw)/sizeof(keysw[0])] }; + +#ifdef __FreeBSD__ +DOMAIN_SET(key); +#endif